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1 Introduction 
 
The rapid development of new, groundbreaking technologies in the last few decades and the 
merging of and interaction between different disciplines like linguistics, philosophy, biology, brain 
sciences, psychology, behavioral and social sciences gave rise to the interdisciplinary research field 
summed up as cognitive sciences. As for linguistics an interesting research topic arose in the early 
1990ies: the relationship between language and Theory of Mind (ToM), the cognitive capacity to 
understand and reason about mental states and interpreting them as causes and drives for behavior 
(see 2.1 ff for an exhaustive definition). The theme of language and thinking being causally related in 
one way or the other was not new to the linguistic world, but the way in which it was done this time 
around was different nonetheless. Jill de Villiers and colleagues stumbled upon intriguing patterns 
when investigating children's understanding and interpretation of WH-questions such as (1): 
(1)  a. Who did Big Bert forget that he invited? 
b. Who did Big Bert forget to invite? 
(Roeper & de Villiers 1994: 384) 
The authors' finding was that children did not understand the difference between these two 
questions and therefore treated them the same way. After investigating the issue closer from both 
linguistic and cognitive angles (see 3.4) the foundation for a new theory was laid. What de Villiers et 
al. claim from that moment on is that language causally determines ToM in child development.  
 
1.1 Topic 
 
The major claim in linguistic determinism is that children can only develop false belief (FB) 
reasoning, one of the more complex instances of ToM, if they acquire the linguistic structures that 
are used to express (false) beliefs, i.e. the acquisition of the syntactic structure of sentential 
complementation is considered to be the necessary prerequisite for the development of FB 
competence. The sentence in (2) shows an example for this special syntactic structure that 
supposedly is a child's only key to FB reasoning: 
 (2) The girl thought (that) she saw a pink frog. (de Villiers 2000) 
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This configuration consists of a matrix sentence "The girl thought" and an embedded sentential 
complement "(that) she saw a pink frog" and is indeed a rather special one as it is very complex with 
regards to its syntactic build-up and rather rare as it only occurs with very special types of verbs: 
communication and mental state verbs. To assume that FB reasoning depends on this syntactic 
structure means that it is temporally dependent on its acquisition (i.e. FB reasoning comes 
necessarily later in development) and that the mind's means to represent FBs are linguistic and not a 
different language-independent representational device. To make a link between this special 
structure and ToM does not seem to be far-fetched, but the claim has implications that are not 
innocent; accepting a strong hypothesis like this also determines a range of other theoretical stances 
like the general structuredness of the brain, the build-up and development or innateness of cognitive 
abilities, the dependency (or independence) of language and of ToM, the build-up of the linguistic 
system, its acquisition etc. The framework foots its hypotheses on various elements of evidence: 
correlations between ToM and language were tested in normally developing preschoolers and 
children with language or ToM delays, loss or impairments, training studies were conducted to look 
for positive evidence of language's influence on ToM and so on. The list of studies and evidence is 
long and varied; linguistic determinism built up a strong base in the past 15 years. 
There are other frameworks that examine ToM in children that do not believe in the causal 
relationship between FB reasoning and language (acquisition). A prominent stance is taken by Josef 
Perner who claims that ToM is language-independent in its acquisition and rather depends on a 
general-cognitive developmental progression. By now a lot of data and arguments against the claims 
of linguistic determinism pose challenges to the framework and cause discussions, changes and new 
research questions for the field. Criticism that penetrated linguistic determinism so far were some 
cross-linguistic studies like Perner and his colleagues' work on German (Perner, Sprung, Zauner & 
Haider 2003) where they show that certain cases of sentential complementation in child language 
don't contribute to the development of FB reasoning and don't even show temporal co-occurrence, 
Tardif & Wellman (2000)'s study on Chinese, conceptual criticism that was directed towards linguistic 
determinism's weaknesses in mental verb understanding, preciseness of linguistic analysis and 
similar issues, but there is a huge range of evidence and criticism threatening linguistic determinism 
that has not found its way into the discussion. The issues that can be found are quite diverse: 
- Experiment design: the setting in which children are tested, the structural build-up of the 
tests and experiments (like duration, materials used etc.) and most of all the linguistic 
performance demands of experiments are criticized heavily for both the FB reasoning tests 
and the language competence tests. An important dimension of the last aspect is that 
linguistic determinism tries to measure the correlation between a linguistic ability and a non-
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linguistic one while using highly linguistic tests and tasks to assess the two measures which 
should be assessed independently and neatly teased apart. 
- Early ToM: both in experiments and in spontaneous speech different instances of ToM 
(including FB reasoning) could be found earlier than claimed by linguistic determinism (i.e. 
earlier than 4 years). Recent research with infants even brought forward evidence for ToM 
being existent pre-linguistically, i.e. in infants.  
- Deviant populations: several experiments with children with SLI show that their 
shortcomings in complementation syntax do not keep them from developing FB reasoning 
and that in fact their performance on FB tests is only weak when the task demands have a 
high linguistic level. 
- Other syntactic structures: studies have shown that other syntactic structures that are 
explicitly excluded by linguistic determinism can also correlate significantly with FB reasoning 
if they are chosen carefully: double event relative clauses were proven to have the same 
effect as sentential complementation in a study by Smith, Apperly & White (2003).  
- Theoretical shortcomings: the linguistic background that is used for linguistic determinism is 
insufficient from a linguistic point of view. On a general note the assumption that an instance 
of thinking relies completely on language in development and on-line use is considered as 
highly problematic and unlikely. Also concerning the details in linguistic determinism 
argumentation there are a lot of contradictions, inaccuracies and questionable claims about 
syntactic structures and the linguistic expression of FB and ToM.  
 
1.1.1 Restrictions 
ToM. ToM has been a "hot topic" in cognitive science for the past 40 years and as a result 
literature, opinions and research exist in vast amounts. It will not be possible in this thesis to give an 
exhaustive and up-to-date in-depth analysis of ToM research. As this is a linguistics thesis 
concentrating on certain aspects of the relationship between language and ToM not every detail of 
ToM research will be elaborated on. 
Linguistic determinism. Linguistic determinism as a scientific term existed long before de Villiers 
used it for her framework. One important representative of earlier accounts of a linguistic relativity is 
for instance Wilhelm von Humboldt who worked on how language influences the way we see the 
world (the so-called "Weltansicht") and how it shapes our thinking, developing the concept of the 
inner speech-form ("Innere Sprachform"). A lot of other scholars thought and worked along 
Humboldt's line e.g. Leo Weisgerber with his concept of "sprachliches Weltbild", Edward Sapir and 
especially Benjamin Whorf claimed that grammar, lexicon and semantic structure of one's native 
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language form this language community's way of thinking. These concepts and scholars should be 
mentioned here not to elaborate on their ideas but to explicitly point out that there are structural 
differences between the general meaning of the term "linguistic determinism" that encompasses all 
kinds of interpretations and connotations of the term and can be applied to theories by Humboldt, 
Sapir, Whorf and many others compared to de Villiers and colleagues' quite specified use of this 
term. When the former group formulates general principles concerning the influence the whole 
linguistic system has on the entireness of humans' thinking and their culture, the latter deliberately 
pinpoint the relationship between language and thinking down to one specific concrete element of 
each area and connect them in theoretical and empirical analyses, looking for actual correlations and 
associations; they explicitly do not expand their specific claims to an overall determination or 
relationship. So this thesis is examining an empirically approachable issue rather than a general 
language-philosophical question. 
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1.2 Outline 
 
1.2.1 Aim 
The core focus of this thesis will be to analyze and criticize linguistic determinism and tease apart 
the current discussion's matters such that it becomes clearer where possible weaknesses lie, 
especially from a linguistic point of view. The already existent criticism that remained unheard until 
now will be incorporated in the broad analysis. Eventually we will find an answer to the question if 
linguistic determinism is a valid theory considering the facts and arguments laid out in this thesis. The 
second aim of this thesis is to give an exhaustive overview of linguistic determinism and sum up the 
most important cornerstones of the framework: the source and beginnings of linguistic determinism, 
its development and influences over time, the evidence and studies that are used to corroborate the 
theoretical basis and of course the core ideas and arguments that constitute linguistic determinism. 
Considering that one major flaw of linguistic determinism seems to be that the performance 
demands of both FB and language tasks seem to be of a linguistic nature and therefore might have a 
major impact on the measures and test results we will try to both decompose and analyze the 
relevant linguistic elements (e.g. sentential complementation and usage of mental verbs) that are 
used for theoretical claims in the literature and tease apart the linguistic and non-linguistic aspects of 
experiments made with children to assess FB and linguistic competence. 
 
1.2.2 Structure 
In order to fulfill the two aims of this thesis it is necessary to give a sufficient introduction to ToM 
which is done in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 contains a detailed account of the linguistic determinism 
framework and its development over the past 15 years; this chapter illustrates evidence, arguments 
and frameworks that support and oppose linguistic determinism. Chapter 4 can be seen as the 
argumentative core of this thesis, consequently it contains the criticism of linguistic determinism 
which will be presented in three sections: first we will look at issues that arise from empirical 
evidence that contradicts the claims of linguistic determinism. Secondly, the methodology and 
experiment design of studies in linguistic determinism will be analyzed and potential weaknesses and 
mistakes will be pointed out. The third section is concerned with conceptual and theoretical 
arguments that pose threats to linguistic determinism. All three sections present both existing data 
and arguments from the literature and new aspects on the different topics. Chapter 5 provides a 
summary and the final conclusions based on what this thesis explored and argued for.  
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2 Theory of Mind 
 
2.1 A short introduction to Theory of Mind 
2.1.1 General Remarks 
Understanding human action and behavior has always been of main interest in human thinking 
and science. Different scholars approached the question of how to explain and interpret human 
behavior, searched for philosophical, psychological, biological and other drives for behavior and tried 
to find patterns in it. But regardless of philosophical and psychological reasoning mankind has been 
equipped with its own universal and naïve interpretational device that enables a "commonsense 
explanation of human action" (Perner & Wimmer 1985: 437). This mental device enables human 
beings to understand, explain and predict their peers' behavior by attributing mental states (such as 
feelings, intentions, desires, attitudes, knowledge, perspectives and beliefs) to them and interpreting 
behavior as a causal consequence of these mental states. The term Theory of Mind indicates that this 
device is assumed to be a folk psychological "theory" in humans that is naïve (therefore also referred 
to as "naïve Theory of Mind") meaning that it neither depends on intelligence or conscious 
acquisition of knowledge nor that conscious (i.e. overt) forms of reasoning are necessary when ToM 
is applied – a functioning adult ToM works subconsciously, effortlessly and fast (Györi 2007). 
Since the mid 1970ies cognitive scientists try to solve the particular question how children 
acquire the understanding that humans are equipped with a mind that thinks and reasons, can bear 
knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, desires and many other mental states that are individual. Furthermore 
scientists want to find out when and how children start and learn to think and reason about, abstract 
from, interpret and understand the human mind in themselves as well as in others and how they 
come to understand that minds are independent, i.e. their contents may differ from each other and 
also from reality. In the grown-up world it is common knowledge that human individuals can bear 
intentions, desires, beliefs and knowledge that stand in relation with both reality and other mental 
states and moreover that human individuals' mental states can differ in quality. What one person 
desires is highly undesirable or uninteresting for someone else, what one person knows is unknown 
to another person, what one believes to be true is represented differently in someone else's mind 
and might therefore also differ from reality. Mental states are no mere reflections or imprints of 
reality but rather the individual representations of and attitudes towards it.  
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2.1.2 Definition 
Theory of Mind is the human capacity to understand, explain and predict various agents' 
behavior by attributing mental states to them and interpreting behavior as a causal consequence of 
the assigned mental states. In other words ToM is a term for the human ability of "mind-reading" 
(see Carston 2002: 43) which is part of the human cognitive system. It is based on hypothetical and 
abstract concepts (see 2.1.3) and a cognitive device that allows for a causal explanation of action. 
The conceptual basis for ToM is a representational-functional conception of mind. Some important 
general features of it are (according to Györi 2007):  
- ToM is a cognitive capacity that is highly complex and exclusive to humans1 (and it is 
universal in humankind). 
- ToM is crucial in social cognition and communication and has been shown to be absent or 
impaired in populations with problems in these fields (e.g. populations with autism spectrum 
syndrome). ToM as "the ability to impute mental states to oneself and to others" (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie & Frith 1985: 39) is a crucial component of human social skills. ToM is 
important for a child's socialization as it is an important social skill (Gale, de Villiers, de 
Villiers & Pyers 1996). 
- Developing a concept of "self" and "other" is another cognitive aspect that ToM is relevant 
for. ToM is entangled with perspective taking, differentiation of individual representations, 
states and so on.  
- ToM is based on a knowledge system that is of a theoretical and abstract nature although it 
is naïve and not necessarily manifest explicitly. 
- First aspects of ToM can be found early in child development (i.e. within the first year of life). 
- ToM seems to be domain-specific and furthermore to a certain extent innate (this is matter 
to discussion as it depends on general assumptions about cognition and the human mind). 
Astington & Baird (2005: 4) claim that the term "Theory of Mind" can refer to three different 
meanings:  
a) an area of research investigating the development of these abilities 
b) a cognitive structure leading to certain abilities  
c) a theoretical perspective explaining this development 
                                                          
1
 The question whether primates have ToM, too, has been subject to discussion; one of the first pieces on ToM 
actually deals with ToM in chimpanzees (Premack & Woodruff 1978). It is doubtful that primates have a fully-
fledged ToM at command (see e.g. Povinelli 1999) which has lead to different research and discussions (e.g. 
Segal (1998) and Smith (1996) against ToM without language (i.e. in primates) and e.g. Byrne & Whiten (1991) 
for ToM in primates, etc.). This thesis acts on the assumption that ToM abilities are existent in primates 
maximally up to a very basic and restricted level, if they posses any ToM at all.  
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Considering that these three meanings are closely interrelated they find it especially important to 
bear in mind that ToM is a multi-faceted term which is often used in a fuzzy way. In this thesis we will 
especially concentrate on the dimension of the term "Theory of Mind" indicated under b): an actual 
cognitive structure that is active in the human brain and is used for cognitive processes by humans in 
their everyday life for social interaction of different kinds.  
Why "Theory"? As mentioned above it is assumed that ToM is a folk-psychological theory about 
the fact that human cognition exists and how it works. The implicit claim that it is a fully fledged 
"theory" we are talking about cannot be taken for granted, i.e. this issue is subject to discussion. This 
thesis grounds on the assumption that a human mind indeed develops a theory about human 
cognition, no matter if this theory stays unconscious. ToM generally refers to a more or less complex 
folk psychological theory (hence "Theory") about a human ability (hence "mind"). Premack & 
Woodruff for instance put it that way: "An individual has a theory of mind if he imputes mental states 
to himself and others. A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory because such 
states are not directly observable and the system can be used to make predictions about behavior of 
others." (1978: 515). It should not remain unmentioned that that there are scholars completely 
negating the overall concept of ToM at least concerning child cognition, e.g. Hobson (1991) and 
Nelson (1998) argue against any attribution of a concept like ToM to young children and the way 
they deal with the social world as they do not accept that children as young as three years develop a 
theory-like mental device. 
 
2.1.3 Basics in Theory of Mind research 
The human mind and its drives and functions conjure up a plentitude of terms and concepts used 
in cognitive research. This section will cover the most basic and important concepts of the cognitive 
base of ToM research, so the concepts of the mental setup that either allow for or call for a ToM.  
 Mind. The mind is the center for everything that is cognitive and conscious in the human 
brain. All instances of thought, memory, emotion, perception, will and imagination are 
located in the human mind either consciously or unconsciously. In the current context 
"mind" refers to the human capacity of individual cognitive activity which is psychologically 
real in each and every person's brain. In a manner of speaking the mind is the "location" 
where individual representations are "made" and "kept".  
 Behavior. The human behavior that is relevant in this thesis' context is nonverbal and driven 
by certain intentions that are triggered by certain states the agent of the behavior is in.  
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 Mental states. The human ToM is based on the assumption that human beings (oneself as 
well as everyone else) have mental states that can be ascribed as a matter of reasoning. 
Mental states and the reasoning about them are unique to humans as they can (consciously) 
think and feel. A mental state is an inner (mental) implementation of thought or feeling, the 
most important mental state concepts being desire and belief. It is commonly known that 
desires and beliefs can differ from one person to the other, so mental states are always of an 
individual and subjective quality. Desires and beliefs lead to actions in their holder.  
 Intention. Humans are intentional beings whose behavior is triggered and driven by 
intention. Intention comes into being when a certain behavior needs to be triggered in order 
to change certain states the human is in: a desire, a belief, an urge or other (mental) states.  
 Desire. A desire is a mental state that aims at something which is not true fulfilled at a given 
point in time but wished to become true. A desire grounds on reality (because reality is the 
state that is not fulfilling in the relevant aspect and therefore triggering the desire) but it 
aims at a secondary representation of reality, in other words: an imagined reality that would 
fulfill the desire. In language desires manifest themselves through verbs like want and like 
and expressions of references ahead of speaking time. The syntax of desires will be discussed 
below.  
 Belief. The concept of belief has a broader range than the concept of desire. It is, too, a 
mental state and is a mental entity that stands in a special relation to reality. A belief usually 
has a certain objective truth value: either it is true or false. This truth value cannot render a 
belief invalid though; the holder of a belief is not necessarily aware of its "objective" truth 
value. All kinds of different nuances of mental states are summed up under the term "belief": 
attitudes on the one hand (e.g. I think that Britney Spears is better than her reputation.) 
which do not necessarily fall into a true and false distinction as they merely reflect opinions 
or taste, and actual beliefs on the other hand (e.g. I think that it is raining outside.) which do 
make a claim about truth and objective reality. For our matter the latter type of belief is 
relevant although one must bear in mind that especially in acquisition we cannot 
automatically expect for these two types to be independent. The concept of false belief (FB) 
is based on the fact that different people have different relations and attitudes towards a 
certain proposition or make different predictions about reality. The FB is an assumption 
about the world resp. reality that is wrong meaning that the "protagonist" of a given 
situation represents a certain proposition such that it collides with reality without him or her 
knowing it. This mental state as such becomes crucial for ToM when it leads to behavior that 
is not adequate for reality but only if the FB is considered.  
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  (Mental) representations. It is assumed that reality is not imprinted in a human's brain 1:1 
like a photograph but rather that it is filtered through perception, priorities, attitudes etc. 
These filters create representations in its holder's mind that are private and discrete to him 
and that stand in a certain relationship to reality and (to representations in) other minds. It is 
assumed that representations are psychologically real structures that have to develop in a 
human's mind. It is not agreed upon the status of representations in development (i.e. if they 
are innate or if they are to be developed), furthermore the question if language and other 
cognitive domains use the same representational means or if representations in different 
domains work and develop independently. This applies to simplex representations (i.e. 
representations of some real entity); complex representations (i.e. meta-representations or 
in other words: representations of representations) are considered to be more derived than 
simplex ones meaning that meta-representations can only be mentally mastered by children 
from a certain point of time onwards (see e.g. Perner 1991). It is not yet clear though if this is 
due to an "awareness factor" which could for instance mean that children are born with full 
representational system(s) but need time to realize that in the course of development. 
The list above does not include any drives for ToM, and that is for a good reason. The 
speculations about drives for the development and usage of ToM from an ontogenetic point of view 
are not matter to elaborate discussion. The only real drives for ToM usage I can formulate are two: 
one in the social area where we would assume that it is a human urge to understand others better in 
order to be able to improve interaction, reaction and understanding (at the very least to improve 
social regulation processes), the other "drive" being an urge to understand oneself better meaning 
that by observation and interpretation of behavior of others a human being might be able to 
understand himself or herself better. The discussion about hypothetical drives for emergence of ToM 
from a phylogenetic point of view is way too speculative and half-baked to elaborate on it within this 
thesis, for an overview of options see e.g. Malle (2001)  
According to Swoboda (2006) the core concepts of ToM are beliefs, desires and actions, where 
desires and beliefs are the mental states that drive humans to actions and behavior. Human behavior 
is determined by individual mental representations which are by definition "not necessarily 
congruent with the real state of the world" (Swoboda 2006: 65)2. Swoboda claims that ToM is an 
essential basis for social interaction, because our actions do not comply with real situations but with 
individual mental representations of the world. She emphasizes that the other person is identified as 
"other" with his or her own assumptions and beliefs, so ToM has a high priority in regulating social 
life (see Swoboda 2006: 65). Only if we can interpret and understand others' intentions and beliefs 
we can know how to react to these "others". 
                                                          
2
 "Mentale Repräsentationen sind nicht notwendig kongruent mit dem realen Zustand der Welt." 
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2.1.4 Overview of Theory of Mind research 
Letting aside the fact that the thinking about thinking and mind has been subject to scholars for 
thousands of years, the term and concept of "Theory of Mind" as we know and use it nowadays 
entered science in the 1970ies via at least two ways (cf. Astington & Baird 2005: 5): 
- Wellman (1979;1985) was working in the area of meta-cognition and referred to the child's 
conception of human cognition with the term "theory of mind" 
- Premack & Woodruff (1978) investigated cognition in primates and tried to find answers to 
the question "Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?" 
What Astington & Baird do not mention but is well documented in other literature (e.g. Hale & 
Tager-Flusberg 2003: 346) is that the first scholar to actually bring the term up in the 1970ies was 
someone else. The first use of "Theory of Mind" in today's sense can probably be ascribed to Dennett 
(1978) who inspired people like Premack & Woodruff (1978) and also Wellman (1979) to do more 
specified investigations on this topic from a developmental point of view as Dennett himself comes 
from a philosophical background. Dennett argued that "the ability to acknowledge that people hold 
beliefs of a simple, factual nature is an appropriate criterion for measuring theory of mind because 
this acknowledgment evidences a conception of another's mind as holding a certain belief" (cf. Hale 
& Tager-Flusberg 2003: 346) and that this also dissociates belief from reality. Subsequently also 
Wimmer & Perner (1983) were inspired to work on ToM (assumingly inspired by both Dennett and 
Premack & Woodruff) and pioneered in the field of ToM development in young children.  
A substantial question that should be discussed more in ToM research can be found in Premack 
and Woodruff (1978). It is this paper where we can find one of the first mentions of the concept and 
the question they investigate is whether chimpanzees possess a ToM as a capacity to consider 
properties of mental states and adapt to situations and environment. The crucial aspect here is that 
the ability to attend to mental states and the ability to adapt to environment could be quite different 
in their cognitive complexity. Reacting instinctively to a situation and to the environment probably 
does not need a conscious postulation of mental states. We expect that the observer is either 
surprised or not depending on his understanding of the situation through the attendance of mental 
states – so in order to find the minimal activity of ToM what we should look at is the reaction of the 
observer. In cognitive research the observation of reactions (especially in small children) is done e.g. 
via habituation-dishabituation tests where attendance times, looking times and frequency and other 
measures are taken and analyzed. This "instinctive" understanding might be much simpler cognitively 
than attending mental states overtly (i.e. to draw conclusions and construct own behavior according 
to it and also talk about them) for a young child. The question is if these two facets of ToM are in fact 
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two different steps of development or even two different pairs of shoes – but we will come to that 
later when implicit and explicit ToM are handled (see section 4.3.1.3). 
As mentioned above the first occurrences of ToM in the literature focus on primates but this 
should change quickly. Being interested in the questions of how and when children acquire the ability 
to reason about the human mind Wimmer and Perner (1983) were the ones to set two standards for 
ToM research which are still valid nowadays: for one they designed a test for assessing children's 
ToM abilities: the "Unseen displacement" task which is used to test the understanding of FB in 
children (see 3.3.1). The other standard Wimmer and Perner set was the finding that children are 
able to pass this kind of FB task around the age of 4 years, their claim is that this is the age where a 
major change in ToM development and therefore cognitive development takes place. Up to today 
this claim is vastly accepted and well proven in relevant literature (cf. Hale & Tager-Flusberg 2003; 
seeWellman, Cross & Watson 2001). The influential work of Wimmer and Perner inspired many 
scholars to do likewise and from the early 1980ies on we can find a lot of research on ToM in children 
(and also adults and primates).  
The frameworks explaining and examining ToM can be roughly divided into two camps (cf. Hale 
& Tager-Flusberg 2003): the theory-theory on the one hand and performance based approaches on 
the other hand. This distinction is particularly relevant in the question of acquisition: the first 
approach assumes a maturing and/or developing ToM and the latter approach assumes a ToM that is 
(to a certain extent) innate and therefore successful performance is only impeded by external 
factors. A third somewhat different account disregarded by Hale & Tager-Flusberg is the simulation-
theory of mind (especially developed and represented by Harris, see e.g. Harris 1992;1996;2005 etc.) 
which shares some aspects with the theory-theory approaches but otherwise does not necessarily 
negate one or the other camp and is not crucially defined by its stance towards innateness. 
Performance based approaches assume that ToM does not have to develop over time but that 
other, ToM-external factors limit children's performance on ToM tasks. One approach is the nativist 
modular theory where it is assumed that much younger children (younger than 4) already have a 
concept of belief but that they are limited by other cognitive factors like e.g. they lack computational 
resources (see e.g. Leslie, Fodor, etc.). Other researchers adopt an executive function theory which 
basically grounds on the assumption that the supposed "change" is brought about by development of 
executive function processes such as working memory and inhibitory control. Another performance 
based account is Leslie's approach. The heart of his account (e.g. 2000) is what he calls a Theory of 
Mind Mechanism (ToMM) which is a domain-specific instance cooperating with the so called 
selection processor (a more general cognitive mechanism). ToMM is defined as "a specialized 
component of social intelligence providing the time-pressured, on-line intentional interpretations of 
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behavior that are necessary for an agent to take part effectively in conversations and other real-time 
social interactions" (Leslie 2000: 7). Leslie believes that neither representational nor conceptual 
limits keep children from passing ToM tasks but performance factors like conversational skills (see 
Siegal & Beattie 1991, Surian & Leslie 1999), inhibitory control (e.g. Leslie & Polizzi 1998) and 
memory (e.g. Freeman & Lacohée 1995). Training studies for these factors have shown improvement 
on ToM tasks in young children (cf. Hale & Tager-Flusberg 2003) which supports the assumption of a 
relationship between ToM performance and executive function (see e.g. Carlson & Moses 2001).  
In the framework of simulation ToM the main assumption is that the other person will behave 
just as the observer would if he was in the same situation – so simulation ToM claims that the 
observer simulates the thoughts and feelings the other person might have considering the 
observable situation in himself and then assigns the simulated mental states to the person who 
actually is in the situation. The observer adopts the attitude or position of the actor and simulates his 
or her mental states. Perner (1999) notes that this theory of simulation is based on introspection 
which does not apply to the theory-theory (or other frameworks). From a developmental point of 
view the simulation theory claims that children become aware of mental states in themselves and 
transfer those onto others. The ability to simulate is a genetically determined device that develops 
through learning processes. Considering this the simulation ToM is closer to the theory-theory 
because according to it ToM as such still has to develop after birth in contrast to fully nativist 
theories. In simulation ToM predecessors of a fully-fledged ToM are pretend play, hypothetical 
assuming and the adoption of someone's attitudes. Children understand their own FBs before they 
can understand others' FBs. Swoboda (2006) integrates the simulation theory into theory-theory by 
claiming that a child might switch to simulation if she doesn't have a theory at her hands, meaning 
that she simply ascribes states to the protagonist that she might have herself because the child is 
able to fall back on familiar patterns. If this process Swoboda assumes can be seen as "simpler" than 
the theory-theory of mind is not explained further and might be an oversimplification of the 
misleading term "simulation" – it is not proven that introspection and subsequent assigning is 
simpler than developing and applying an unconscious theory. Swoboda merely states that theories 
are harder to obtain because they have to be true. Non-introspective views in the simulation ToM 
paradigm like the one by Gordon (e.g. 1996) claim that it is not the mental events we simulate in 
ourselves in order to project them onto others but that we simply see the situations from the other 
person's perspective, so there is no transfer from the self to the other person. 
The theory-theory camp (represented by e.g. Fodor 1992; Perner 1991, Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997 
and others) claims that the changes in ToM mastery in early childhood are brought about by actual 
cognitive development, especially by conceptual change which is conceived in terms of theory 
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formation. The cognitive concepts theory-theorists refer to are organized in intuitive theories: they 
are interdefined and mutually supportive and they are coherent and domainspecific. The 
development of the assumed theory in the child's brain is triggered by theory-internal factors like the 
need to incorporate new and contradictory evidence. Studies have been carried out to show that the 
change of performance takes place as a result of exposure to new information (so triggered 
externally) in contrast to simple maturation (internal). The hypothesis in the theory-theory 
framework is that a child's representational ToM is an intuitive theory rather than a set of isolated 
concepts (see Slaughter & Gopnik 1996 for evidence) that works in its own cognitive module. In a 
training study by Slaughter (1998) performance on and understanding of pictorial and mental 
representations were compared and the results showed that there were no transfer effects from 
pictorial to mental representation training (or vice versa) but only module-internal improvement. The 
theory-theory of mind stands for the assumption that children develop knowledge about mental 
states via hypotheses that are constantly revised and adapted.  
Mental events are covert (not directly observable) and in order to understand them humans 
have to construct explanations for human actions. The group of researchers assuming a meta-
representational development in children claims that there is an innate module (see Fodor 1992) or a 
predisposition for a ToM (see Perner 1991). Children's ability for perspective taking and switching 
starts developing in the first year of life, Roeper & de Villiers (2004) claim that there is a close 
relationship between the understanding of Point of View and the development of a ToM. The 
developmental path towards a meta-representation is from "real copies" of states in a child's mind to 
interpretation of states which enables them to realize that their assumptions can differ from reality. 
The understanding of others' mental states (or in other words: the self-other-distinction in terms of 
mental states) emerges around the age of four. Perner (1991) sees the development of the 
understanding of representations as a cumulative process that happens in phases. This 
understanding works in the sense of a theory in every stage. Perner stresses that social interactions 
are crucial in order to check and revise knowledge. Adults and parents intuitively mediate emotional 
and terminological structures of the socio-cultural, physic and psychic world (see also Dunn & Brophy 
2005). Perner defines two main phases in the course of this cognitive development: the phase of 
primary representations (such as direct perception and reality) and the phase of secondary 
representations (which are deviant from reality). At the age of two years children start noticing that 
other people don't always have the same perspective as they themselves. A mentalistic 
interpretation of behavior is possible at this early age (like in picture perspective tasks where 
children have to move a picture such that their opponent can see it correctly) but this beginning 
mental understanding does not yet indicate that children that young have mental representations 
about people having different interpretations of situations, actions, desires etc. The child rather 
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retrieves past experiences that pattern together with the current situation and makes hypothetical 
assumptions. This is what Perner calls the age where children are "situational theorists": in this stage 
children assume that people perceive the same things in shared situations as they themselves do. 
Around the age of four children turn into "representational theorists" where they become aware of 
the relativity of representations, i.e. they develop the understanding that people can perceive, 
interpret and last but not least represent situations differently. This is where children need to be able 
to imagine for something to be real that is not real in the given situation (e.g. imagine that there are 
actually smarties in the smarties tube even if the child just found out that there are crayons in the 
smarties tube). After the situational and the representational theories the next phase is where 
children start recognizing metarepresentations, i.e. where they understand representations and 
mental activity in an individual as such.  
Looking at this plentitude of theories and explanations it is hard to extract the facts that are most 
likely to be robust and universal. Flavell (2004) calls for a standardization of ToM theories and 
suggests the following minimals (or primitives):  
- ToM is an innate or early developing mentalistic ability 
- the knowledge about mental processes is an informal theory 
- language and information processing abilities support the development of ToM 
 
Up to the mid 1990ies the theory-theory and performance based accounts dominated research 
on ToM development but then a group of researchers started investigating a potential relationship 
between language and ToM where the question was: does language have a (decisive) role in bringing 
about the observed changes and developments in children's ToM, especially their ability to reason 
about (true and false) beliefs? This issue should create a subculture in ToM research discussing 
heatedly which parts of language (syntax, semantics, mental vocabulary, discourse about mental 
states, parental input etc.) influence ToM development in which way. A framework called "linguistic 
determinism" emerged from this discussion. The main person in linguistic determinism, Jill de Villiers, 
together with her colleagues could – in various studies – isolate a specific syntactic construction as 
the crucial bit in the ToM development-puzzle that is responsible for FB reasoning development: 
sentential complementation. The path that led scientists to assume a relationship between language 
and ToM is described in 2.3 and a detailed description and analysis of the language approach to ToM 
follows in chapter 3.   
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2.2 Acquisition of Theory of Mind 
 
In the debate around the acquisition or development of ToM (if it isn't an approach that assumes 
a fully fledged innate ToM, see 2.1.4: performance based accounts) one important issue is from 
which stage or ability on ToM can be assumed to be acquired and which stages are still only 
precursors. For instance joint attention behaviors are widely assumed to be precursors of ToM 
understanding in children whereas FB reasoning is accepted to be the developmental stage where 
ToM is acquired at least in its basic form. This section will present a rough overview of the certain 
stages and theoretical claims about them and the precursors and acquisitional specifics of ToM. 
Following work by Gopnik & Wellman (1994), Astington & Baird (2005: 5) define ToM very accurately 
from a developmental point of view: 
"In the most precise use, theory of mind is a domain-specific, psychologically real structure, composed 
of an integrated set of mental state concepts employed to explain and predict people's actions and 
interactions that is reorganized over time when faced with counterevidence to its predictions" 
Swoboda (2006) describes two different tasks that children have to master when acquiring a ToM:  
1) the discovery that humans have thinking at their command 
2) the discovery how thinking works 
Another relevant task (especially for scenarios where different states of mind are included) is 
disregarded here: the discovery that thinking is individual (even if this is not solely a matter of ToM 
but also needed in other, more general cognitive developments like self-other-distinction and 
perspective taking). Different researchers define two rough phases that children have to go through. 
Perner speaks of a course of development that leads from the phase of primary representations (as 
in direct perception, (copies of) reality) to a phase of secondary representations deviating from 
reality. A similar differentiation comes from Wellman (1990) who claims that the crucial basis for 
developing a ToM is to develop the ability to differentiate between mental and real world.  
 
2.2.1 Implementations of Theory of Mind  
ToM is a complex cognitive capacity that probably develops its different forms and stages over 
the first years of life (see e.g. Perner 1988). Generally speaking the term "Theory of Mind" sums up a 
whole range of phenomena. As ToM seems to emerge in a fixed sequence we will attempt a 
chronological ordering of the instances of ToM here. On a different level we will also assess an 
increase of complexity between the different stages and implementations. At this point it is 
important to emphasize that how we know and assess a child's grasp of the following 
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implementations is not at all an innocent question to ask. Researchers can only do as much; they can 
observe children's talk about these mental concepts, they can play games, act out stories and ask 
follow-up questions, they can analyze children's reactions and measure their reaction times, but still 
we lack the means of assessment to be absolutely sure. Furthermore it is not completely clear what it 
means that a child "grasps" something, and this is not only due to lack of precise definitions. To grasp 
something (e.g. the concept of belief) probably relies on certain precursors and is presumably a 
gradual process in child development (and therefore has "pre-grasp" stages and then a final state 
where the child actually grasps the full concept); furthermore, the difference between active and 
passive – or implicit and explicit – knowledge is relevant. So the following explanations sketch 
different stages and implementations of ToM in general and from a developmental point of view, but 
in the course of upcoming chapters the issues just mentioned will play major roles. The most 
straightforward way to determine whether a child has an understanding for (certain) mental states 
comes from indirect evidence: the child's behavior (even if this might not be the most unambiguous 
of indicators). As soon as a child e.g. is able to consciously deceive someone, the child must have at 
least some understanding of mental states and how to manipulate them, but the pure ToM 
"algorithm", namely the device that helps us understand behavior, is hard to assess. 
 Intention understanding. The child's recognition of intention in others shows through 
behavior like establishing shared reference and focus (which is possible through e.g. eye gaze 
tracking). The first phenomena in child development that are assumed to be ToM (or at least 
precursors of it) are Joint Attention Behaviors (JABs). These behavioral procedures establish 
a "triangulation" (de Villiers 2007: 1860) between the speaker, the listener and the object, or 
in a non-verbal context between the agent, the observer and the object. Amongst these early 
implementations of ToM the key feature is recognition and reading of intention which 
manifests itself in practices like eye gaze tracking (the child is able to "interpret" another 
person's eye gaze as intentional and non-coincidental3 and follows with its own eye gaze), 
usage of, understanding of and reacting to reaching, pointing respectively showing and 
similar procedures to establish joint focus. Children have proven to be able to take part in 
JABs as early as in their first year of life. In a study by Tomasello and Haberl (Tomasello & 
Haberl 2003) it was shown that children as young as 18 months can take into account the 
experience of an adult participating in the experiments: the child monitored which toy out of 
three was the one the adult hasn't seen yet although the child herself has seen all three.  
 
                                                          
3
 the status of an infant's eye gaze being mental and intentional rather than merely perceptual is disputed in 
the literature, see de Villiers, J. 2007: 1860; Tomasello et al. 2005, etc.). 
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 Desire understanding. The basic understanding for desire descents directly from JABs 
(especially in connection with the verb want) where children can observe their opponent 
reaching for something, struggling to get hold of something, looking at something etc. Want 
is one of the most common first 50 words in English (cf. the communicative development 
inventory , Fenson, Dale, Reznick, Thal et al. 1993) and also found in the input frequently (cf. 
Bartsch & Wellman 1995). The more complex level of desires is when the wish, desire etc. 
refers to something "invisible" (an event or an object) that is away from the actual situation 
temporally and/or spatially. The child is exposed to this level of desire almost solely via 
language, as it is not manifest in observable behavior (letting aside the fact that the child – at 
least subconsciously – is always exposed to her own desires). On this level the objects of 
desires are irrealis (see J. de Villiers 2005) and refers to something in the future.  
 Belief understanding. Beliefs and other instances of thinking are private and internal; beliefs 
are not directly observable and do not become manifest in directly linked behavior (cf. 
physical struggle to reach a desired object). A belief is a representation of (a situation, event, 
state, etc. in) the world. This is not relevant for ToM when beliefs match reality and / or 
one's own beliefs, but when a belief mismatches either one's own belief or reality belief 
understanding becomes crucial. For a child to understand (false) beliefs it is necessary to 
have an (however subconscious, naïve or simple) understanding that a) that humans think 
(i.e. have a mind) b) that thinking is not a reflection of reality in ourselves (i.e. that it is 
representational) and c) that this thinking can be wrong or deviant with respect to the world 
(i.e. thinking is individual). So indeed, belief understanding is the most complex instance of 
ToM.  
These general stages of understanding show themselves in behavior like JABs, deception, teasing, 
pretense, FB reasoning etc. as they all require considering mental states of others.  
On an abstract level there are different forms of considering mental states. We are confronted 
with three mental processes that are different in their complexity, their time reference and their 
aims which might play a role in ToM development. These three processes are:  
1 Understanding: this mental process is probably the most unconscious one as it does not 
ask for an explanation or a conscious preoccupation with the given situation. As soon as 
the (remember: fast, unconscious and effortless device of) ToM works in the child's mind 
it will be able to understand observed situations that require appliance of ToM. In other 
words, if the child is not puzzled, outraged, surprised or anything alike in a FB situation 
she has a working "comprehension ToM".  
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2 Explaining: another ToM process is the explanation of states that require conscious 
attendance of past events and furthermore requires basic causal argumentation and 
understanding devices in the child that also need to be available consciously. As soon as 
children can answer the "Why?"-questions in ToM test batteries one can assume that 
they possess an "explanatory ToM".  
3 Predicting: the most complex instance of ToM appliance is prediction of behavior. It was 
Bartsch and Wellman (1989) who claimed that prediction is harder than explanation 
because in prediction children are always confronted with and misled by reality (and an 
uncertain outcome) whereas in explaining they can overrule their bias towards reality 
easier: they have already observed the behavior caused by the FB. Furthermore it 
requires the child to be able to grasp future concepts (i.e. that a future exists, that it is 
infinite, uncertain, speculative, etc.), the child must also be able to plan, anticipate and 
check feasibility of predictions and subsequently he or she must understand the causal 
relationship between a mental state at time X and a future behavior at time Y even 
before that behavior actually happens.  
On a general note, the process of understanding is "online" meaning that it deals only with the 
present situation whereas explaining and predicting are rather similar as they both refer to a point in 
time other than present.  
Swoboda formulates three "Phases of ToM development" (Swoboda 2006: 82) that might reflect 
the idea of three ToM processes that differ in complexity within the ToM capacity presented above: 
A) "up to 3 years: Situational ToM including joint attention, social referencing, pretend play, simple 
deception, understanding for perception (cf. "situational theorists" by Perner) 
B) 3-5 years: Representational ToM including desire and desire-belief, false belief, counterfactual 
situations, emotions, knowledge, meta-representations, understanding for intention, desires and needs 
C) from 5 years onwards: Interpretative ToM including second order beliefs" 
An even more important and straightforward explanation this complexity scale offers is for the so 
called "implicit ToM" (see chapter 4). 
 
2.2.2 External Influences on Theory of Mind development 
Kern (2005) defines several aspects that the development of ToM is or might be influenced by: 
- executive function 
- language competence 
- linguistic socialization through and in the family 
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- socio-cultural factors and 
- (probably) the existence of older siblings 
The interaction with (older) siblings apparently is an important influential factor in ToM development 
for a child, for instance in Perner, Ruffman & Leekam (1994) a significant influence on the mastery of 
FB tasks was shown. In Ruffman, Perner & Parkin (1999) results show that parents, siblings and 
especially the order of the siblings have a meaningful influence on the ToM development (see also 
e.g. Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla et al. 1991, Jenkins & Astington 1996). The way mental 
processes and states are talked and reflected about amongst peers or family members are influential 
(see Astington & Baird 2005, Dunn & Brophy 2005). Lohmann, Tomasello & Meyer (2005) show that 
the parental "discourse behavior" is an important factor and sensitizing and supporting the child's 
understanding of mental states.  
An important question though is whether the factors listed above are actually crucial in a child's 
development of mental understanding. The effect found by the numerous researchers might have a 
rather simple and superficial explanation: children are sensitive to training in the ToM domain (which 
is also shown by several training studies, see e.g. Lohmann & Tomasello 2003, Hale & Tager-Flusberg 
2003, etc.) and if they are "trained" by the people who are closest to them and who they see the 
most (i.e. parents and siblings) it is probably not surprising that the training effect is extraordinarily 
good. A stimulating environment stimulates development, an axiom that is not only intuitively true 
but also shown in many different fields of child development. For this reason this thesis will not 
elaborate on the role of parental or similar environmental influence on a development of ToM, even 
if there might be interesting and even crucial effects that should not be explicitly ruled out here.  
Other effects and influences come from the following instances and abilities:  
- pretend play (it boosts the production of cognitive concepts about real and imaginary things) 
- talk about past events (this can be seen as talk about de-contextualized events and highlights 
their existence, see Swoboda 2006) 
- talk about different perspectives and possible actions (this language input leads children to 
language of the mind) 
By the age of five children usually are able to understand that their mental representations of the 
world can differ from reality and from other people's representations and that human beings 
construct their knowledge based on perception.  
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2.2.3 Developmental precursors of Theory of Mind 
ToM consists of a lot of different phenomena that differ in (cognitive, social and linguistic) 
complexity, time of emergence, the type of mental reference etc. A domain-specific view on ToM 
development predicts that there are precursors for it in early development and that a child's 
understanding becomes more and more complex over time. This is what makes ToM a very multi-
faceted concept that is difficult to grasp. Swoboda (2006: 74ff) gives the following overview of the 
chronological stages in development that are widely accepted across researchers: 
- 9-18 months: children acquire the ability to understand intentions behind actions of other 
people (e.g. the intentional aspect of an adult utterance). A parallel development is the 
felicitous establishing of a joint focus; at this stage children comprehend real copies of the 
world (which is the stage of primary representations following Leslie 1988). 
- 12 months: children make active use of eye-gaze-tracking (interpreting eye gaze as 
intentional and following it), e.g. they understand someone will pick up what they look at.  
- 18 months: children put themselves in the position of others and understand that they can 
have differing desires and needs (cf. stage of secondary representations in Leslie 1988), 
Woodward (1998) did experiments with children where the experimenter preferred food the 
children rejected compared to something more desirable – they were already able to feed 
the experimenter with what he liked best despite their own preferences. 
- 2 years: children have means of an intentional understanding of causality and they develop 
elementary concepts for want, believe (cf. Scholl & Leslie 2001)  
- 3 years: children are able to  
o distinguish real and imagined objects 
o predict behavior based on present events (will he laugh or cry now that he fell) 
o assign and relate moods  
o formulate others' expectations 
o actively use their first mental verbs (especially want)  
- end of 4th year: children are able to 
o detect and understand FBs and actions based on them 
o start to consciously deceive others 
o think about others' thoughts and knowledge, recognize differences in mental states 
- 5 years:  
o the child's causal understanding develops into an understanding of causality 
o children start to actively take perspectives in conversations and narrations  
o illusions (e.g. optical illusions like clear water in a dyed drinking glass) are recognized 
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2.2.3.1 Pretend Play as an important precursor of Theory of Mind 
Pretend play is being tipped as one of the crucial precursors for FB understanding as it needs the 
child to be capable of contra-factual thinking ("If the stone were a car…"). For pretend play to be 
felicitous the child needs to hold two representations: a real and a fictional representation of the 
object, the protagonist, the situation or whatever is part of the pretense. Models of reality can be 
consulted for hypothetical situations. As mentioned before, Perner distinguishes two main steps in 
the child's theory development. In the first phase the child is a "situational theorist" where he or she 
has multiple mental models but no conscious use of representations. The child is able to distinguish 
between reality and fiction but is not using a conscious mental representation to "turn" the stone 
into a car. Up to the age of 4 children cannot understand representations and misrepresentations. 
This can be seen in the way children make use of pretend play: by the age of 3 years children imitate 
voices, clothing styles, movements and other external features if they imitate a person. By the age of 
5 years children include different mental states in their imitations (e.g. they imitate their mother 
scolding about something they themselves like). 
Bartsch & Wellman (1995) claim that the mentalistic folk psychology consists of two aspects: belief 
(like thoughts, ideas, opinions) and desire (as in wishes, needs, likings). According to them the stages 
of ToM precursors proceed in three steps:  
1 1st step: understand simple causal connection between desire and actions without 
understanding that mental states (desires) can differ  
2 2nd  year of life: differing desires are recognized and talked about 
3 3rd year of life: mentalistic theory about behavior & situations is developed, the 
differentiation between physical and mental world is active, the prediction of actions 
based on certain mental states (namely desires) is possible 
It seems that the ability to understand what other people want (understanding for desires) emerges 
earlier in child development than what people think and believe. One purely cognitive explanation 
might be that the level of abstractness (in comparison to concrete things in the real world) is higher 
with beliefs than with desires which might lead to a "delay" in the understanding of think. 
4 4th year of life: the child's theory changes, he or she starts to understand that thinking is 
individual representations of individual persons – basic ToM is acquired. 
  
23 
 
2.3 Language and Theory of Mind 
 
It is not a random coincidence that the human capacity for language and the human capacity for 
ToM are compared and related to each another to that big an extent. It is important to investigate 
why this relationship is more straightforward than other potential relationships between language 
and any other domain of human cognition. The reasons can be found in the ways the two capacities 
co-exist and co-arise, in their structural and temporal analogies, parallels and potential relations. The 
following section will explain how these connections are natured and why they are special.  
 
2.3.1 Important analogies  
Swoboda (2006) observes parallels between language acquisition and the different stages in the 
course of meta-representational development: both are innately predispositioned (which is adopted 
from Perner (e.g. 1991)) and both show interim structures in their development towards the target 
structure. Certain parallels can be observed between the language domain and the ToM domain, 
both in their characteristics and their developmental time frame (Györi 2007):  
Structural analogies  
 In the cognitive basis: 
in both systems processing seems to be governed by abstract concepts and rules 
both are recursive 
they are based on certain knowledge structures which can be reconstructed as theories in their 
mature functioning 
 In the mature state: 
both are infinitely productive 
at least in their higher levels of complexity both capacities are exclusively human 
in their default application both cognitive capacities function fast, effortlessly and to a large 
extent unconsciously 
Developmental analogies in observable surface-instances of the two capabilities: 
Roughly around 12 months of age we can observe these developmental co-occurrences: 
ToM:   joint-attention behaviors and attribution of intention emerge 
Language:  first words emerge, labeling is necessary for that 
 
around 18-24 months of age we can observe: 
ToM:   joint attention behaviors become flexible and productive, flexible  
  understanding of pretend arises 
Language:  lexical explosion begins, "telegraphic speech" arises 
and finally around 4 years of age  
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ToM:   essential properties are acquired  
Language:  essential properties are acquired 
 
2.3.2 Associations and Dissociations 
The major aspect of this thesis will be to examine the assumed associations between language 
and FB reasoning in child development (see chapter 3). Researchers try to find out if there are 
associations between ToM development and language acquisition that exceed mere co-occurrence 
by conducting experiments with both normally developing children and populations with deviations 
in either of the two domains. Subsequently these considerations potentially allow for conclusions 
about the modularity of the brain and other general structures of the brain, theories about child 
development, language acquisition and cognition. The following accounts in this domain put different 
aspects of language in their focus which provides a classification into different frameworks (cf. 
Astington & Baird 2005: 7ff):  
A) Conversation and Pragmatics. In Dunn et al. (1991) evidence is presented to show that 
young children's natural observations of conversations are related to later understanding of 
other minds. There are researchers working on the relationship between motherly discourse 
input and ToM development in the child (e.g. Harris 1996, the influence of motherly input is 
emphasized e.g by Ruffman et al. 2002 etc.), others emphasize the importance of pragmatic 
development (e.g. O'Neill 2005). Harris (1999) states that conversational exchanges expose 
children to the fact that people know and don't know different things. He concludes that 
information exchange highlights the existence of different viewpoints and the fact that 
people are epistemic subjects. Saxe & Baron-Cohen (2006) present findings that show 
relationships between affective perspective taking and ToM development. 
 
B) Lexical Semantics. The claim here, too, is that children acquire concepts of mental states in 
conversation (see e.g. Bartsch & Wellman 1995, Olson 1988, Peterson & Siegal 2000). They 
can abstract underlying mental-state concepts out of conversations because language 
encodes these concepts semantically. Parents use perception-, emotion-, desire- and 
cognition-terms to describe and explain the child's own and other people's experiences and 
behavior, which provides a means of mapping own experiences (and mental states) to other 
people. Nelson (1998) emphasizes that the first use of mental terms in child language does 
not yet have full mental reference which she takes as an indicator that children acquire the 
full meaning of these terms through usage. 
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C) Complementation Syntax. Another group of researchers points out that merely grasping a 
mental term might not be enough in order to handle ToM and ToM tasks and therefore put 
syntactic structures into the spotlight. More precisely these scholars relate those syntactic 
structures to ToM development that are used with mental terms and also used to express 
points of view: sentential complements. Children start using these constructions as early as 
two years (see e.g. Shatz, Wellman & Silber 1983) but supporters of the complement syntax 
hypothesis argue that these first uses of complementation are "merely formulaic" (e.g. 
Diessel & Tomasello 2001: 106) or "stereotyped routines" (de Villiers 2000: 96). In their view 
the full mastery of the complementation structures is acquired 1-2 years later and at this 
stage children's scores on sentential complements predict later mastery of FB tasks (de 
Villiers & Pyers 1997;2002). Assuming that the necessary syntactic constructions are 
developed on the basis of the communication verb say (which can also have a false 
complement just as think and other mental verbs), analogy allows for the mental verbs to 
inherit the structure and can then be the trigger for FB understanding.  
 
D) Synergies. Astington & Baird (2005: 10f) point out that there have been and still are scholars 
and frameworks that combine the roles for language we explored above. Just as Astington & 
Gopnik (1991) said that at some level every single one of these neatly separated accounts 
must be true, Astington & Baird (2005) also admit that the different roles for language they 
claim "are not in competition but cohere to give a more complete explanation of why 
language matters for a Theory of Mind." (Astington & Baird 2005: 10-11). What may sound 
like the bigger picture and proof for the strength of linguistic determinism rather sounds like 
a revealing confession: if one examines the different papers and studies and their aims 
precisely, one thing is always to be found: the "proof" that this and only this linguistic aspect 
gives rise to ToM, negating all other attempts of linguistic (or no) determinism explicitly.  
 
E) Language plays no special role. Nativist modularity theorists (like Fodor e.g. 1992) see ToM 
as an innately specified capacity that only shows explicitly when the linguistic and the 
cognitive development of the child reach a certain step.  
Another point of view in this area is that language only plays a superficial role when it comes 
to ToM: most of the ToM tasks are verbal and therefore mastery of these tasks also requires 
a certain level of linguistic ability from the tested subject (e.g. Miller 2004). Others say that 
language is merely the scaffolding for the crucial information and does not serve any other 
purpose in ToM development (see Gopnik & Wellman 1994, Perner 2000).  
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Counterevidence to language-based frameworks comes from different sources; one is (child) 
populations that show deviant forms of development where either language or ToM is impaired (but 
not both at the same time) which hints at a dissociation of language and ToM. Dissociations that foot 
on acquired impairments for instance come from studies with grammatical aphasia where language 
is impaired at some point in time after its acquisition and ToM nevertheless is preserved (e.g. 
Apperly, Samson, Carroll, Hussain et al. 2006). In certain cases ToM can be affected by an acquired 
impairment during development, for instance through certain cases of pre-frontal and right 
hemisphere damage (see Happé, Brownell & Winner 1999). Cases of developmental dissociations 
(i.e. dissociations that ground on the loss or impairment of an ability due to genetic reasons or birth 
complications) can be found in populations with grammatical SLI (specific language impairment) 
where language is impaired and ToM is acquired. In cases of high functioning autism (hfA) we deal 
with a very heterogeneous group: people with hfA can have complex mental understanding including 
FB understanding (cf. Győri, Lukács & Pléh 2004), but even if they do not, their language is not 
affected. Some of these dissociations are treated in later sections of this thesis, but there is not 
enough space to discuss all of them. 
Within the continuum of frameworks postulating a relationship between language and ToM de 
Villiers defines two opposing end points: one being a cultural-anthropological viewpoint where a 
child's task is to learn the culture's discourse about mind in order to get access to related concepts, 
the other being a cognitive viewpoint where language is a specialized cognitive module of the human 
mind (e.g. Fodor 1983). In the latter language about the mind needs to be learned and is mapped 
onto concepts that the child grasps prior to the linguistic terms. A crucial notion is that of 
"propositional attitudes": to understand human behavior it is necessary to postulate hidden states of 
desire, emotion, belief etc. When these states are mapped onto reality, propositional attitudes are 
"created" – a human capable of bearing mental states has a certain mental state towards a 
proposition; this means that the proposition is represented in a particular way in this human's mind. 
On the status of representations there are different opinions. For instance, the simulation theory 
account (e.g. Harris 1996) works without assuming representations of those attitudes; in the 
representationalist view propositional attitudes need to be supported by mental representations 
somehow, the discussion being whether the means of representation are innate (e.g. Fodor 1992), 
acquired (Perner 1991) or maturing (Leslie 1994). The bottom line here is that, for one, there is 
cultural universality with respect to ToM (all languages possess terms for referring to the mind and 
those terms have special universal properties, see Gleitman 1990) and secondly that talk about the 
mind merely reflects the child's development and does not indicate or relate to development in any 
other module (positively postulating modularity of the mind).  
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De Villiers discusses Perner's (1991) considerations about Leslie's (1987) claim that pretense and 
the representational means for it appear significantly earlier in child development than FB 
competence. Perner states that in pretense the child can map imagined (i.e. different from reality) 
propositions onto imagined protagonists, so all a 3-year-old has to do is map reality onto reality and 
imagination onto imagination. In the case of FB the child must map an imagined resp. false 
proposition onto a real person, i.e. s/he has to recognize a mismatch between two propositional 
contents, which 3-year-olds cannot yet handle. A 4-year-old on the other hand is able to recognize 
not only the mismatch between but also the attitudes towards the propositions and the 
independency of proposition and attitude. The 4-year-old develops a representational ToM which 
means the child understands that people act upon representations of reality, not necessarily upon 
reality itself and the child's theory of knowledge is enriched by a causal component. Karmiloff-Smith 
(1992) argues that socially embedded language is internalized to "serve a cognitive function" (de 
Villiers 2000: 94) and is representing the view (like Perner and de Villiers, too) that there is a 
significant change at the age of 4. In Karmiloff-Smith's theory cognitive development progresses from 
procedural via implicit to explicit knowledge, she considers the acquisition of mental terms as 
essential as these help the "redescription" processes from one representational format to the next. 
Karmiloff-Smith sees linguistic representations as a privileged format for encoding propositional 
attitudes. The fact that 3-year-olds fail at standard FB tasks is caused by the rudimentary symbolic 
representations which are not strong enough to override experience-based interpretations. De 
Villiers' own account differs from all those approaches in different ways, especially from Karmiloff-
Smith's because for de Villiers language has not only a symbolic function.  
 
2.3.3 The make-up of the relationship 
Scholars working on ToM and language of course are not only concerned with the question if 
there is a relationship between the two capacities but also what this relationship looks like. They 
investigate the direction of the relationship (bi- or unidirectional) and the "active period" of the 
relationship (if it is a purely developmental, a purely mature-state or a holistic relationship). The 
latter issue has more or less been answered over the last 10 years. First of all, work with aphasic 
patients who lost certain language abilities after they had acquired it normally did not show related 
loss of ToM (see e.g. Apperly et al. 2006 etc.). Secondly, people who assume a strong relationship 
between language and ToM have only ever found evidence for developmental facilitation or causality 
(it seems to be counterintuitive to assume that ToM as a fast, subconscious and effortless cognitive 
device would underlyingly always depend on on-line and conscious language access). In the issue of 
directionality it seems that if there is a relationship between ToM and language in child development 
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at all, it is a heterogeneous one. Apart from the fact that for different stages of development there 
are different claims about the causality of the relationship (whether it is there at all and if so, 
whether it is necessary or just facilitative), also the direction of the supposed relationship is unclear 
and at certain points even contradictory. While JABs seem to have a positive effect on language 
learning, it is claimed for later steps in development (like FB reasoning) that language is the relevant 
developmental trigger. Malle (2001) shortly discusses two possible scenarios concerning the 
direction of the relationship: one where language precedes ToM at all times and one vice versa 
without coming to a final (i.e. biunique) conclusion for this issue. One would assume that at least for 
the linguistic determinism camp there is a clear answer to this question: namely that the relation 
leads from language to ToM and not the other way round, but it is not that simple. While de Villiers 
(2000) still states that the relevant influence only goes from language to ToM (merely granting the 
possibility that for linguistic perspective shifting ToM might be of help), she makes this question a 
more central aspect later where she makes the proposal "that the interface between language and 
Theory of Mind is bidirectional" (de Villiers 2007: 1858). To this day no clear answer has been found 
by any of the different frameworks. This leaves the impression that the form of the relationship 
described by linguistic determinism is a problematic one, at least in its unconditional and causal 
version.  
Chapter 3 will take us to the special case this thesis is dedicated to: the relationship between FB 
reasoning and language acquisition. 
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3 False Belief and Language – Linguistic 
Determinism 
 
3.1 Overview 
 
We will now move away from properties that connect and are shared by language and ToM in 
general and come to more specific and framework-dependent (framework of cognition, modularity, 
language and developmental psychology) aspects of this relationship, namely the relationship 
between the development and acquisition of grammar and the development of FB reasoning in 
preschoolers (with some exceptions). This particular focus was chosen because of reasons that 
become apparent in the following section: preschoolers have shown peculiar linguistic behavior with 
certain question types that are highly relevant for FB reasoning. 
The widely accepted fact that children only start understanding FBs around the age of four years 
(see chapter 2 for greater detail) made people wonder what brings about this incisive change. It has 
first been claimed in the 1990ies that there is more to language and ToM than just analogies, Janet 
W. Astington and Jennifer Jenkins (1995) and Jill de Villiers (1995b) were amongst the first people to 
present arguments and data that indicated correlations between preschoolers' performance on 
language tests and FB reasoning tests. These findings should trigger an avalanche of research in both 
linguistic and psychological work. In order to assess the make-up of this assumed relationship and its 
conditions, a lot of studies have been carried out with different populations of different ages. 
Starting out with normally developing children to show a developmental link, soon other populations 
were covered as researchers wanted to find out if the assumed relationship was a developmental 
one or holistic and permanent in humans, so adults needed to be tested, too. Furthermore it was 
unclear when the relationship was active or provable, so populations with different impairments 
were investigated: deaf people with and without a lag in language development, native sign language 
users of the first generation (this refers to Jenny Pyers' work, e.g. Pyers 2005, with a population of 
Nicaraguan signers who made up a new sign language from scratch), populations with SLI (specific 
language impairment) and others. It was important to find out if the same connections can be shown 
cross-linguistically and if linguistic training contributes to the development of ToM or not. In short, 
there was a lot of work to do and this way plenty of evidence and studies were brought about both in 
favor of this relationship and against it.  
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3.1.1 Four global hypotheses on language and ToM 
According to Lohmann & Tomasello (2003) "there are four global hypotheses" (p. 1131) 
concerning the specific nature of the role language plays in (developing) FB reasoning:  
1) Language plays no special role, "any and all data are relevant" for children to form theories about other people 
and minds. This is argued for by frameworks like the theory-theory, see e.g. Gopnik & Wellman 1992, Perner 1991 
etc. 
2) Primarily the acquisition and usage of mental state terms (especially mental state verbs: think, know, believe etc.) 
play a key role in false belief reasoning development (e.g. Olson 1988, and partly Bartsch & Wellman 1995 and 
Astington 2000), children acquire the mental concepts via adults using those mental terms to indicate mental 
states. 
3) The acquisition of syntactic structures of mental language plays the crucial role in false belief development (de 
Villiers & de Villiers 2000, Gale et al. 1996) providing the children with the representational format for handling 
ToM and false beliefs. The open truth value of those constructions leads children to understand epistemic states in 
others. The mental verbs themselves are given some vague credit (in some accounts more, in some less or none).  
4) Linguistic interchange is the key to children's understanding of false beliefs (Harris 1996;1999), – children's 
discourse with other people contains the processes for children to appreciate that people know different things 
and have different perspectives. (Tomasello 1999 and Siegal 1999 stressed the importance of discourse 
interaction, too). Evidence comes e.g. from studies with deaf children who engaged in richer discourse interaction 
and therefore were better in false belief tasks (Peterson & Siegal 2000 etc.) 
The viewpoint negating the relationship between FB reasoning and language development is 
represented by several frameworks giving counterarguments either from an empirical or a 
theoretical point of view. Some of those counterarguments have led to improvement and change in 
linguistic determinism whereas others have not been taken into account by mainstream linguistic 
determinism. In some cases this is for a good reason: there are threatening data and arguments that 
are not resolvable by the linguistic determinism camp with the theories they use accounting for the 
assumed relationship. This issue will be addressed in chapter 4. 
In this chapter we will take a detailed look at linguistic determinism in Jill de Villiers' meaning of 
the term and chronologically cover the process of an interdisciplinary framework arising. This 
overview will cover the standard arguments and the recognized counterstrikes to the framework. 
Only in chapter 4 will we cover the criticism and the shortcomings of this framework. 
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3.2 Core principles of Linguistic Determinism 
 
This thesis is focused on the third type of hypothesis concerning language and ToM: the 
acquisition of syntactic structures of mental language is responsible for a successful acquisition of FB 
understanding. This framework is generally referred to as Linguistic Determinism. It developed along 
a rather neat chronological line taking its origin in the mid 1990ies.  
 
3.2.1 Central claim  
The general claim is that the concept of FB can only be contained, acquired and understood if the 
language used to express it is in place. Let's recapitulate: FB understanding is a ToM competence and 
is defined as the culmination of ToM abilities (cf. de Villiers 2000). We talk about a "false belief" 
when somebody has or makes an assumption that does not match with actual reality. The bearer of 
this assumption represents it as true in his mind and is not aware of the mismatch with reality (i.e. FB 
is different from pretense or lying). For our purposes FB gets important when it constitutes the 
mental basis of behavior as it will render certain behavior inadequate with respect to reality and 
common knowledge. An observer of this behavior who knows the truth (or at least represents a 
different belief as true) will not be able to understand and interpret this behavior as it will seem 
inadequate, illogical or mysterious if he or she does not have a command of ToM: in order to 
understand behavior based on a FB it is vital to know that every human individual can represent the 
world different from everybody else and therefore can also bear false representations of the world in 
his or her mind. These representations then can have influence on behavior, for instance: If a woman 
– who just witnessed the sun come out again after days of pouring rain – watches her boyfriend put 
on his rubber boots, rain coat and umbrella she will not consider him crazy if she has a full command 
of ToM; she will rather conclude from his behavior that her boyfriend bears the FB that it is still 
raining outside. 
Generally, the direction of effect between concepts and language expressing them is that 
concepts develop first and then we find (acquire) the words for them. The assumption presented 
above clearly violates this general rule – here language would precede the concept in the 
developmental sequence. De Villiers and Pyers (2002) argue that other schemes have been imagined, 
such as "the scenario in which the child uses a term without fully knowing what it encodes, and 
hence is alerted to develop a concept or a conceptual " (p. 1038) and refer to work by Bowerman 
1996, Gopnik & Meltzoff 1993 and Nelson 1998. In other words, they indicate the reversal of this 
direction could apply to the linguistic elements that encode mental states: 
32 
 
Language expressing FB: the linguistic means to express mental states (especially FB) are not 
only the verbs that encode those states, like want, believe, think, know, remember etc., a wholesome 
linguistic containment can only be achieved in combination with the special syntactic configuration 
that these verbs allow for. Only with a mental verb it is possible to syntactically subordinate a 
proposition, see (2): 
 (2) The girl thought (that) she saw a pink frog. (de Villiers 2000) 
The syntactic structure in (2) is a complex configuration consisting of a matrix clause "The girl 
thought" and an embedded clause "(that) she saw a pink frog". The embedded clause is a sentential 
complement, in other words it is a syntactic entity has all the ingredients of a full-fledged sentence 
but is syntactically subordinated to another sentence (part). This special configuration renders 
certain interesting features that will be discussed later. The bottom line is:  
The acquisition of the syntactic structure of embedded complementation is the unconditional 
developmental prerequisite to successfully acquire a) the concept of FB and b) the competence of 
reasoning about it.  
Presenting the framework chronologically hopefully gives the reader insight into how and why 
things developed the way they did. To make the chronological presentation in this chapter as 
transparent as possible we will anticipate the basic ideas the framework grounds upon. The main 
assumptions have been defined around the year 2000 (see de Villiers 2000 resp. 3.4.2) when enough 
studies and investigations had been conducted to manifest what linguistic determinism means in this 
domain of cognitive research. So in order to make the detailed discussion of the framework clear and 
taut the status quo of linguistic determinism in 2000 was the following: 
i) Mental state verbs like believe and think and crucially the syntactic constructions 
connected to them (embedded sentential complements) are the only way to express and 
therefore mentally represent FB adequately, for example the sentence (3): 
(3) "Mother thought that father has already left the house." 
is a sufficient explanation for a situation like (4) 
(4) Mother set the breakfast table only for the children and herself, leaving out 
father's spot although father was present and wanted to have breakfast with 
his family. 
and is the only way to do so. 
ii) The acquisition of the syntactic structure of embedded sentential complements is the 
necessary (and unconditional) prerequisite for the acquisition of FB competence in 
children. Complementation under a communication or mental state verb allows for the 
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embedding of a certain proposition into another proposition. This means that these 
linguistic structures provide the representational means for FB reasoning. 
iii) The crucial and unique property of these structures is the autonomy of the involved 
propositions' truth values: the truth value of the embedded complement is independent 
of the truth value of the matrix clause which means that the complement can be false 
without rendering the matrix clause false and vice versa – only in this construction the 
truth value of the whole sentence can have a non-conflicting value. 
iv) The acquisition of mental state structures comes about via analogy: children acquire the 
structures of communication verbs first (e.g. He said that the weather was nice) and 
project the acquired structures onto mental state verbs. The most important step in the 
acquisition is a feature located in the CP that encodes the potential falseness of the 
complement. 
v) Verbs of desire can be excluded from this argumentation as they show crucial differences 
in their syntactic realization: they take nominal phrases as arguments, refer to future 
events and states etc., but never temporally embedded, finite or false propositions.  
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3.3 Testing 
 
Before we start illustrating the framework and its chronological development it is helpful to first 
get an overview over the most common ways of assessing FB competence in children in order to 
understand the following argumentations and study outlines better. Also a short overview of the 
language testing methods will be given. The first FB tests were developed in the late 1970s/early 
1980s and are still used today in adapted versions. What we are looking for in preschoolers is the 
ability to interpret, predict and explain behavior that grounds on certain mental states. The 
commons ways to assess these abilities are the following:  
 
3.3.1 False belief tests 
a. Unexpected contents task (developed by Perner, Leekam & Wimmer 1987.) – a version of 
it is the Representational change task (Gopnik & Astington 1988)  
In this task children usually have to predict future behavior (or reactions) on the basis of a 
situation they themselves experience. 
Test make up: the experimenter presents the child a well known container (e.g. a smarties 
tube) [optional: and in some cases the experimenter asks the child what s/he thinks is in 
the container]. After that the container is opened and the actual (unexpected) contents 
are revealed (e.g. crayons). Then the child is asked  
i) what would happen if someone else was exposed to the same scenario (e.g. what will 
happen if [optional: we close the container again and then] your friend Sally comes 
into the room and we ask her what she thinks the container holds). 
ii) what the child himself/herself had thought or said was in the box before opening it.  
Questions: 
Usually children are asked the prediction question and a check question ("What did you 
say before when the container was still closed?" which does not qualify as a mere 
memory check question because it already refers to mental processes), very often they 
also get explanation/justification questions ("Why…?").  
b. Appearance-reality test  
This task is a variation of the unexpected contents task – children have to predict future 
behavior on the basis of experiencing something as one thing and then as something else 
and have to be able to integrate themselves as potential bearers of FB. 
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Test make-up: children are shown an object that looks like one thing (e.g. a rock) and 
really is something else (e.g. a sponge). They are asked what the object looks like or what 
they think it is, then what it really is and finally what their (absent) friend would say it was 
when they first saw it (and sometimes in addition what they themselves thought before 
what the object was). 
c. Unseen displacement/transfer task, or Change-in-location task (first developed by 
Wimmer & Perner 1983), also referred to as "Sally-Anne test" 
In this task children have to predict a future behavior on the basis of a(n acted out) story. 
Test make-up: the child witnesses a story (usually being acted out with dolls) where two 
characters, say Sally and Anne, put an object, a marble, in location A, say a basket, 
together. Both leave the location and later one of the characters, Sally, comes back to 
transfer the marble from location A (the basket) to some other location B (a box). The 
second character, Anne, is absent and neither sees it nor knows about it. Sally leaves. 
Anne returns with the now FB that the marble is still in the basket. When Anne wants to 
fetch the marble, children are asked where she will look for it.  
Questions: 
Children will always be asked about the expected action of the bearer of the FB, 
additionally they can get a justification question ("Why…?") and memory check questions 
("Where did Anne put the marble before? Where is it now?") 
d. Explanation of action (first developed by Bartsch & Wellman 1989) 
This test is a variation of the unexpected contents task such that it is applied onto an 
acted out story, too (the direct involvement of the child is avoided). In this test children 
usually have to answer an explanation question. 
Test make-up:  
Here a doll is being tricked resp. deceived. While the doll leaves to take a nap in a 
different room, a certain object is transferred to another location, e.g. the doll's eggs are 
taken out of the egg box and hidden in a different, neutral container. When the doll 
enters the scene again it e.g. feels like having omelet and tries to retrieve the eggs from 
the egg box. The child then is asked why the doll would look in there.  
Questions (e.g. in de Villiers & Pyers 2002): 
Explanation question: "Why is he looking in there?" 
Justification question: "Why isn't he looking in that (other) box?"  
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Question types: 
- FB questions: Predict 
Prediction questions refer to future reactions or subsequent behavior on the basis of a FB 
situation, e.g. in the unseen transfer task: "Where is he going to look for it?"  
- FB questions: Memory question 
This particular case refers back to an earlier situation like in the memory check questions but 
it investigates the child about a former (now cancelled) FB. It is used in appearance-reality 
tasks and unexpected contents tasks: "What did you say before was in the box?" 
- Memory check questions / reality questions:  
This question assesses whether the child knows the facts true to the world, e.g. in the change 
in Location task: "Where is the cake really?" or even in the memory for complements task 
(see Perner et al. 2003): "What is the child really doing?"  
- Explanatory Questions/Justification Questions 
This question assesses whether the child understands behavior (rather than how the child 
predicts behavior), e.g. "Why did he look there?" in the explanation of action task. 
 
3.3.2 Language tests and measures 
a. General language ability 
These are the most common tests used to get measures of children's vocabulary, syntax and 
semantics and their general language competence without focusing on complementation: 
i) MLU = mean length of utterance  
It is a rough measure of mean syntax length disregarding complexity or categories. 
ii) TELD = Test of Early Language Development (by Hresko, Reid & Hammill 1981) 
It measures syntactic and semantic skills in expressive and receptive forms that are 
triggered by questions and pictures. 
iii) IPSyn = Index of productive syntax (Scarborough 1990) 
The IPSyn, too, is a syntax measure that analyses the range and complexity of the 
grammatical forms that are used. It is possible to retrieve subscores with the IPSyn 
that measure e.g. complements only.  
iv) PPVT = Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Dunn & Dunn 1981) 
It is a picture-based test of word knowledge and helps to assess spoken one-word 
vocabulary comprehension and production. 
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b. Complements 
i) Memory for Complements Task (de Villiers & Pyers 1997)  
In this verbal test the child is confronted with a story-question-sequence like in (5): 
(5) story: "The Mom said she bought apples, but look, she really bought oranges." 
     question: " What did the Mom say she bought?" 
The test is run with a communication verb (say), so according to the test designers the 
postulation or understanding of mental processes is not necessary for passing this test. 
As long-distance WH-movement is only possible in sentence structures with true 
sentential embeddings (which are the only structure adequate for FBs), the test 
designers assume that passing proves a full and productive competence in sentential 
complements.  
 
ii) Medial answers to WH-questions (de Villiers & Pyers 2002) 
To test whether children can appropriately subcategorize a complement under a verb, 
different tests with (long distance) WH-movement have been designed, one of them 
deals with medial WH-elements and whether children treat them as question words 
(incorrect) or as complementizers (correct), see de Villiers & Pyers 2002:  
(6) story: "This little girl went shopping one afternoon but she was very late 
going home.  She went a short way home over a fence but she ripped her dress on 
the wire. That  night when she was in bed she told her mom, “Look I ripped my dress 
this  afternoon!" 
 question: "When did the girl say what she ripped?" 
 
iii) Sentential Complements Task (Perner et al. 2003)  
In this test the situation is presented non-verbally, the children are presented pictures 
that show two protagonists simultaneously, where protagonist A says/thinks/wants 
that protagonist B does something, while protagonist B does something else (usually 
the opposite), for example: 
(7) picture: shows two rooms of a house, parents are sitting in the living room 
and son  Bobby is in his room. Mother thinks / says to father that Bobby is in his bed 
sleeping. In the other half of the picture we see Bobby playing with his cars.  
The follow-up questions are: 
 Want-question: "What does mother think/say/want Bobby does/to do?" 
 Reality-question: "What is Bobby really doing?" 
 See-question: "Can Mom and Dad see what Bobby is doing?"  
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3.4 How it all started 
 
This relationship was first entered into scientific discussion via two paths: cognitive science on 
the one and linguistic research on the other hand. The original idea to take a closer look at language 
in the context of ToM came from a linguistic background: in 1995 Jill de Villiers contributed an article 
to the Handbook of Language acquisition (de Villiers 1995b) which was concerned with the 
acquisition of empty categories and complex sentence structures in first language acquisition, 
especially concentrating on the acquisition and understanding of WH-questions. What made de 
Villiers suspect a correlation between the acquisition of syntactic structures and the cognitive 
capacity of FB reasoning was the peculiarities children show in the acquisition of certain question 
structures, namely their violations of adult language constraints on WH-movement. As already 
mentioned in earlier work (Roeper & de Villiers 1994) 4- 5 year old children were not able to see the 
difference in the following two questions and therefore answered them imprecisely: 
(1)  a. Who did Big Bert forget that he invited? 
b. Who did Big Bert forget to invite? 
(Roeper & de Villiers 1994: 384) 
These questions followed up a story in which Big Bert for one invited his friend Grover to a party (but 
later forgets that he did that – (1a)) and additionally Big Bert forgot to invite his friend Bert entirely 
(see (1b)). Another example is medial WH-complementizers that children tend to treat like questions. 
Peculiarly children tend to answer a question like (8b) with concentrating on the medial WH-word (in 
this case they would say "her dress!") which actually does not function as a question word here.  
(8) a. story: This little girl went shopping one afternoon but she was very late going 
   home. She went a short way home over a fence but she ripped her dress on the 
   wire. That night when she was in bed she told her mom, "Look I ripped my dress
   this afternoon !" 
b. question: When did the girl say what she ripped? 
(de Villiers & Pyers 2002: 1044) 
Linguistic deviances like this caught de Villiers' attention and made her investigate both the 
conceptual and semantic contexts and the linguistic configuration more intensely. De Villiers (1995) 
makes the syntactic structures responsible; embedded clause structures are required relatively late 
and children are able to understand to-infinitives way earlier than finite (tensed) constructions 
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introduced by the determiner "that". This is de Villiers' explanation for why children treat question 
(7a) just like question (7b). As J. de Villiers & P. de Villiers mention in their recent work, "the focus on 
complementation grew out of work on long distance WH-questions, namely questions that attach to 
the lower verb in a two-clause sentence such as 'When did the boy say he fell', whether the answer is 
about when he fell not about when he spoke about it" (de Villiers & de Villiers 2009: 2). Also, these 
question structures have been used in FB tests since the 1980ies, they inherently treat mental 
contents – not only the structural (syntactic) understanding of them but also the conceptual one. 
This made de Villiers wonder if there is a closer relationship between the language capturing these 
mental states and the mental states themselves. The close analysis of these structures made de 
Villiers take the next step: she wanted to find out if the two capacities were dependent or correlated 
in any way, so experiments were conducted to define the correlation between FB understanding and 
linguistic competence in preschoolers.  
The other source for the language-ToM-synapse naturally came from a general cognitive angle. 
Janet Astington and Jennifer Jenkins were working on the development of cognitive abilities in 
children and were especially involved with ToM. In two papers first presented at the biennial 
meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development in 1995 (de Villiers 1995a and Astington & 
Jenkins 1995) linguistic determinism in the strict sense should take its starting point. As a follow-up 
Jenkins & Astington (1996) conducted the first study to explicitly test 3- 5-year-olds on standard 
false-belief tests and various standard measures of general language ability (for instance on tests for 
vocabulary or sentence memory of the Stanford Binet Intelligence Scale and the Test of Early 
Language Development) and found high correlations between the scores. The first proof that 
language and FB reasoning competence enhance (if not determine) each another was shown. The 
assumptions and findings so far suggested that there are significant correlations between theory of 
mind task performance and language competence in toddlers (up to that point shown by e.g. Cutting 
& Dunn 1999; Hughes & Dunn 1997; Jenkins & Astington 1996). These momentary results conjured 
up issues and questions that needed closer investigations, researchers wanted to determine how this 
relationship was natured. It was not clear if 
- both capacities influence each another or if there was an asymmetry, a direction of 
influence (i.e. only one capacity influences the other and not the other way round) 
- the development of the two capacities depended on some other, third factor 
- the correlations are unconditional meaning that the development of one or both depend 
entirely on the other capacity  
- etc.  
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The first results came from cross-sectional studies (so to test a cohort of children exactly one time), 
but in order to answer the questions above the testing methods needed reconsideration. To get to 
the bottom of things the following components were necessary for an empirical assessment of the 
claimed relationships:  
- tests that assess children's FB reasoning competence 
- tests that measure children's linguistic competence and permit for teasing apart different 
linguistic measures, in particular competence in complement syntax  
- longitudinal studies instead of the hitherto used cross-sectional studies that enable 
researchers to investigate the development of the two capacities for one, and secondly 
the direction of influence between language and ToM 
- training studies on different ToM- and language competences to show if and how the 
increase of competence does or does not influence other domains 
The studies and tests must be construed such that possible correlations between the results of 
the FB tests and the language measures can be calculated. The most crucial guideline might be that 
the FB tests should be as language-independent as possible or at least such that the part language 
plays can be teased apart from the ToM part. The following section will show that this point is 
problematic.  
 
3.4.1 Longitudinal Studies 
The need for longitudinal studies was met soon, right after the starting year of 1995 two studies 
were conducted: a longitudinal study by de Villiers and Pyers (1997) over the time-span of one year 
testing 19 children (starting age ranging from 3;1 to 3;9) three times and a longitudinal study by 
Astington & Jenkins (1999) over the time-span of 7 months, testing 59 children (2;9 – 3;10 years at 
the beginning) also three times.  
3.4.1.1 Longitudinal study (normally developing children): Astington & Jenkins 1999 
The authors wanted to investigate two issues with their longitudinal study: 1) the direction of the 
relation and 2) the contributions of semantic and syntactic aspects. The authors defined three 
possible scenarios for the nature of the relation between language and ToM development:  
a) ToM depends on language 
b) language depends on ToM, or  
c) ToM and language are dependent on some other, third factor.  
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As for a) they emphasize that although FB assessment methods rely heavily on language, 
nonverbal ToM resp. FB tasks are not easier for children, so Jenkins and Astington do believe that 
language is crucial for ToM development and test design does not matter all that much. For b) the 
authors see a Piaget'ian foundation and explain that in this view children would have to first acquire 
a conceptual understanding of (false) belief and then wait for language to become elaborate enough 
to reflect this development. By this time it was already shown that adults who lose relevant language 
capacities do not lose FB understanding (Varley 1998) but Jenkins & Astington do emphasize the 
possibility of a developmental relationship. In option c) ToM and language would depend on an 
external factor like e.g. executive function. This still leaves the option for an intertwined definition of 
the relationship in the "external factor"-approach (see e.g. Shatz 1994 who assumes mutual 
facilitation via bootstrapping). Having settled on scenario a) Astington and Jenkins define these parts 
of language as crucial for ToM-development: Pragmatics (by definition) because pragmatic abilities 
enable one to use and interpret language appropriately in social situations, scores are usually 
related. Semantics kick in at the level of word meaning, many authors claim that acquisition of and 
understanding for certain words (especially mental verbs) are the crucial factors for FB 
understanding (Olson 1988). Syntax is a representational means for ToM and therefore highly 
relevant. Astington and Jenkins wanted to show that the direction of influence is from language to 
ToM and that general language ability plays the crucial role in ToM development.  
Testing. FB reasoning was tested with an unexpected contents task, an appearance-reality task 
(deceptive objects) and a change-in-location task. Linguistic competence was assessed with the TELD 
(Test of Early Language Development, Hresko et al. 1981).  
Prediction. The expectation was that the influential capacity would a) emerge earlier and b) 
significantly predict the success of the other capacity in later rounds.  
Results. The rates of failing and passing on both linguistic and theory-of-mind measures were 
compared and put through hierarchical regression. To make sure that only the "contribution of 
language to change in theory-of-mind test scores" (Astington & Jenkins 1999: 1315) and vice versa 
was extracted, age was controlled for. ToM could not predict language competence for any of the 
analyzed time spans (namely from ToM scores of round 1 to language scores in round 2, ToM in 
round 2 to language in round 3 and ToM in round 1 to language in round 3), but total language scores 
did predict ToM scores between phase 1 and phase 2 and between phase 1 and phase 3 (not 
between phase 2 and phase 3), so language at an earlier point in time predicted theory of mind 
performance at a later point in time. When considering the subscores of syntax and semantics, 
"syntax made an independent contribution to the prediction of theory of mind after semantics was 
entered, but semantics made no additional contribution after syntax was entered" (Astington & 
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Jenkins 1999: 1316), but also here neither syntax nor semantic scores of time 2 made a contribution 
to the prediction of ToM at time 3. Only syntax made an independent contribution to the prediction 
of change in ToM performance.  
The authors conclude that the structural features of language are the crucial ones for ToM 
development because the objects used in the visual experience and in the linguistic representation of 
a FB test are the same but they differ in their spatial arrangements. Following de Villiers (1995), 
Astington & Jenkins argue that syntactic (object) complementation provides the format for the 
representation of FB, but they do not agree with her in the claim that the acquisition of this specific 
syntactic construction is required in order for a child to develop a FB understanding arguing that 
object complements can be found in spontaneous toddler speech data (see e.g. Bartsch & Wellman 
1995) long before they master FB reasoning. Also the difference between pretend and think speaks 
against a complementation-only explanation: children pass tasks of the form [person]-[is 
pretending]-[that x] but not of the form [person]-[thinks]-[that x] (see Astington & Jenkins 1999: 
1318 following Custer 1996). The authors admit that they cannot yet rule out option c), namely that 
both language and ToM rely on some other, third factor as the language tests used and the language 
data extracted might simply be a better measure of the underlying structure (the third factor) than 
the theory-of-mind measure. Astington & Jenkins conclude that their data even if not conclusive 
supports the view that ToM depends on language in child development. 
 
3.4.1.2 Longitudinal study: de Villiers & Pyers (1997) 
Jill de Villiers and Jennie Pyers (1997) were the first to filter out two things on the basis of 
their longitudinal study: for one they claimed that the direction of the correlation is from language 
development to ToM development in the specific case of syntax and FB reasoning and secondly they 
found out that only one syntactic measure mattered statistically for the development of FB 
reasoning: sentential complementation.  
They argue that a "rich system of interlocking propositions of the same semantic precision as 
that found in natural languages" (de Villiers & Pyers 1997: 136) is needed to represent propositional 
attitudes towards mental states. The authors consider the representation of others' FBs as "parasitic 
on the linguistic form" (de Villiers & Pyers 1997: 136), so until children haven't acquired the means to 
represent the grammar and semantics of an embedded complement they also lack the cognitive 
ability to reason about others' FBs and represent them.  
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3.4.1.3 Sentential Complementation in linguistic determinism 
Sentential complementation is a special case of complex syntax that is different from other cases of 
complex syntax in several ways. De Villiers and Pyers ruled out every other kind of complex syntax 
explicitly, saying that "to-complements, relative clauses, if-then clauses, or conjunctions and 
adjunctions of other sorts" (de Villiers & Pyers 1997: 136) are not relevant for FB reasoning 
development – unlike sentential complementation. In a later article de Villiers explicates this claim 
with examples (taken from de Villiers 2000: 89): 
 (9) sentential complementation 
  a. The girl said she saw a pink frog.  
  b. The girl thought she saw a pink frog. 
 (10) other complex syntactic structures 
  a. The girl laughed and saw a pink frog. 
  b. The girl laughed before she saw a pink frog. 
  c. When the girl laughed she saw a pink frog. 
  d. The girl who saw a pink frog laughed. 
The examples in (9) are cases of sentential complementation: the proposition "she saw a pink frog" is 
syntactically embedded under the matrix verb (i.e. said or thought), its special property being that it 
is false. Now, the propositions in the examples in (10) are also false, we can see a simple conjunction 
(10a), temporal relative clauses (10b,c), and restrictive relative clauses (10d) which according to de 
Villiers do not contribute to the development of FB reasoning. The reason why the examples in (9) 
are relevant for ToM and those in (10) aren't is the following: all sentences presented above contain 
a false proposition (i.e. its truth value is "false"4) but in the examples in (9) the truth value of the 
embedded proposition does not affect the truth value of its containing matrix clause or the whole 
sentence. So the truth value of (9a) is "true" if and only if the girl said x, in this case x being "I saw a 
pink frog" and this is the case independent of the proposition x's truth value which is not the case for 
the examples in (10): in all four cases the false proposition x ("she/who saw a pink frog") is false and 
therefore renders the truth value of the whole sentence false, no matter if the other parts of the 
sentence are true in themselves or not. Back to the study in 1997: de Villiers & Pyers act on the 
assumption that only "the ability to use mental state verbs with sentential complements that could 
be false" (p. 137) is the crucial prerequisite to mastery of FBs.  
                                                          
4
 The proposition in question is "false" if we accept one of two scenarios: scenario A) contextual knowledge dictates that 
there is a pink frog but we know that the girl could not have seen it because she was lying in bed ill all day; scenario B) 
encyclopedic knowledge dictates that there is no such thing as a pink frog in this world and therefore the girl could not have 
seen such a thing. 
44 
 
 Testing. As mentioned above the study was carried out with 19 preschoolers starting age 
ranging from 3;1 to 3;9. For assessment of FB competence they used  
- an unexpected contents task, asking about: 1) the child's belief before the opening 2) an 
absent person's expected belief after the unveiling 3) the child's own belief prior to the 
unveiling. 
- an unseen displacement task asking the following questions: 1) Memory check question: 
Where did X put Y? Where is Y now? 2) FB question: Where will X first look for Y? 3) 
Explanation question: Why will X look there? 
- an explanation of action task in which a puppet is deceived with a familiar container hose 
contents have been hidden in another container. The questions asked were: 1) Why is he 
looking in X? 2) Why isn't he looking in Y? 
For assessment of language competence they used:  
- Memory for complements in described mistakes-task: children were told that the protagonist 
in a picture story either a) made a mistake b) told a lie or c) had a FB – the child had to report 
the contents of the mistake, lie or FB after being asked: a) mistake: "What did X think?" b) lie: 
"What did X say?" c) FB: "What did X think X did?" 
- spontaneous speech data which was collected in round 2 and 3 during the testing (i.e. it was 
transcribed what children said during the test sessions, while playing computer games and 
watching silent videos). The following measures were extracted: MLU scores and IPSyn 
scores with the subscores for total Sentence Score (SS), the total complex sentences (total 
complex IPSyn), the total score for complements (IPSyn comps) and the total complex minus 
complements (IPSyn complex no comps) which enabled the authors to test the influence of 
the single subscores separately (other complex sentence forms were considered irrelevant). 
Results. Using a Spearman Rank Order for the correlations it showed that the measure for IPSyn 
Comps significantly correlated with each of the FB measures, the Memory for complements measure 
correlated significantly only with the FB measures of prediction and contents, MLU with prediction 
only and IPSyn No Comps did not correlate with one single FB measure. All five competences 
measured (language: "what think" and "what think x", FB: prediction, contents, explanation) changed 
and grew within the same time frame indicating a direction of influence from this pattern. What the 
authors did next was to look at the changes over rounds. Success on one capacity was entered as a 
function of passing the other capacity. Children who failed the memory for complements task did not 
make progress on FB tasks, furthermore the passers of FB succeeded on complements and failers on 
FB did make progress in their linguistic representations. Making use of simple regressions a strong 
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asymmetry was found, language in round 2 as a predictor variable of FB in round 3 accounted for a 
significant variance of 32,1% ( p<.01), whereas FB measures of round 2 as a predictor of complement 
syntax in round 3 only accounted for an insignificant variance of 9,5%. The authors concluded that "a 
certain level of mastery of complements is prerequisite for FB, not vice-versa." (p. 143). Finally a 
stepwise regression showed that IPSyn-comp of all language measures accounted for 47% of the 
variance (p<.001) and no other language measure added significantly to that and also as a predictor 
variable production of sentential complements was the most significant one. Concluding, de Villiers 
and Pyers point out that their study with normally developing children supports the view that 
complement syntax is the critical prerequisite for FB reasoning in deaf children (as investigated in 
Gale et al. 1996) but that they do broaden this claim to the general stance "ToM depends on 
language", as they see possibilities that some instances of ToM might also lead to new 
understandings of linguistic tasks like e.g. referential substitution (cf. de Villiers & Fitneva 1996). 
 
3.4.2 De Villiers' "manifesto" 
After first evidence supporting the linguistic determinism hypothesis was collected, Jill de Villiers 
wrote a kind of "manifesto" (de Villiers 2000) elaborating on her views on language and thought in 
general and language and ToM specifically. 
3.4.2.1 Concepts 
Contradicting the standard view (e.g. Fodor 1975) that concepts develop before language (i.e. 
they either are innate or emerge earlier) and all that language does is to pick out certain concepts of 
the potential ones and label them, de Villiers claims that language precedes thinking and concepts 
are formed on the basis of language – at least for certain types of concepts. Language learning draws 
a child's attention towards these concepts and they manifest themselves around a certain term – 
language is a highlighter or an "anchor" around which single bits of meaning group together to 
become a concept. Fodor claimed that there is a "language of thought" which is a rich, symbolic and 
propositional representational medium and which is shared by humans and speech-less beings 
(animals, children etc.). According to Fodor concepts can neither be learnt by experience nor is it 
possible for a child to acquire a word without having formed the concept first. De Villiers emphasizes 
that two different abilities are being mixed up here: on the one hand the ability to distinguish any A 
from any B, on the other hand the ability to group together all As and all Bs, or in other words: the 
ability to conceptualize A-ness vs. B-ness. Conceptualizing is a process of summing stimuli up along a 
certain dimension, not just distinguishing stimuli from each another, so de Villiers agrees with Fodor 
saying that distinguishing A from B is pre-linguistic, but she doubts that classifying all As and all Bs as 
coherent groups is language-independent. Evidence from infants' acquisition of basic-level concepts 
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(e.g. Mandler & McDonough 1993) shows that detecting perceptual similarity alone does not prove 
conceptual classification. Analyzing examination times of stuffed animals in tests with toddlers 
(habituation/dishabituation-paradigms), children seem to be able to "see" the perceptual differences 
between stuffed cats and dogs, but these differences did not incite different behavior. Mandler & 
McDonough could only find differences in the treatment of animate vs. inanimate things. Basic 
object level categories are established only on a perceptual level at the end of the first year of life.  
Concepts in need of a linguistic basis. To illustrate her hypothesis of language preceding 
concepts de Villiers presents how different concept types need language for their full development. 
Spatial relations: concepts like "tight fit – loose fit" are linguistically realized e.g. in Korean. To 
prove her point de Villiers confronts the reader with a group of As (tight fit) and a group of several Bs 
(loose fit) without first announcing their underlying concept, arguing that someone confronted with 
this list would be able to distinguish the As from the Bs, but not conceptualize Aness and Bness. 
Though once instructed about the concept, everyone is able to come up with examples of it. Despite 
of being able to spot the difference, a coherence class is not formed unless the reader is pushed. 
Action categories: comparing some event A with some event B (e.g. an act of jumping with an act 
of running) de Villiers would expect constant different reactions to every kind of jumping or running 
independent of agent, situation, motive etc. Language is what provides the necessary input via verbs 
to densify the perceived differences in a symbol for a class of events. On an object level one can 
observe reactions by infants to basic categories like feeding, showing, sleeping, smiling etc. which are 
concepts that could, according to de Villiers, emerge prior to labeling. But these pre-linguistic classes 
are rather limited – if you take for instance a super-ordinate like "fruit" it is unlikely that children 
show general reactions exceeding the basic object-level, so it is the labels that send the behavioral 
signal for classifying. Language invites the formation of a super-ordinate class.  
Properties: colors for instance are – in the child's natural world – attached to objects; they aren't 
forming natural classes (i.e. there is no certain reaction triggered by all red objects). Subsequently 
the only natural grounds that group certain colors together are labels as they offer an alternative 
way of differentiation, namely that of property (in opposition to that of thing-hood).  
Second-order categories (logical relations): referring to Premack (1983) de Villiers finds further 
proof that there are concepts genuinely dependent on language. Premack argues that second-order 
categories like "same" or "different" rely on symbolic mediation for their formation. This means that 
symbol-less species do not entertain concepts like these and do not understand them. Even though 
chimpanzees that are especially trained on symbols are able to discriminate different symbols, they 
are not able to form a coherence class like the second order relationship of 'same' vs. 'different'. 
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What they are lacking is the ability to detect sameness. Take for instance a matching test for 
sameness: "find the match for "AA" – is it "AB" or "BB"?" The matching counterpart concerning 
sameness for “AA” is “BB” because we are looking for a judgment about the relation between 
relations. Chimpanzees in this case would pick “AB” as it looks most similar to “AA” – the concept of 
sameness which would lead to the correct answer is oblivious to species like that. De Villiers 
concludes that only language is the appropriate symbolic code to form concepts like these. Other 
examples are negation, relations like "more than", "bigger as", "to the left of", "cause" etc. Assuming 
Premack is right, de Villiers has a strong argument in favor of language being not only an "invitation" 
or highlighter for forming (certain) concepts but the only way to do it.  
De Villiers admits that there probably are certain basic object-level categories and certain basic 
human actions that form coherence classes based on behavioral equivalence – these might be prior 
to labeling and shared with other species. Superordinate object classes though – properties, actions, 
events, spatial relations and logical dependencies cannot be conceptualized pre-linguistically. 
"Labelling is usually the mechanism by which the coherence classes get formed, though it is not 
necessary that language be the mechanism." (de Villiers 2000: 87) 
3.4.2.2 Sentential complements 
De Villiers elaborates that language is more than a provider of symbols. Thanks to its 
combinatorial power (with its constituents, grammatical system, recursivity and other mechanisms) it 
permits for the creation of infinite propositions which is the basis for opening up possible worlds. 
This combinatorial power also makes it possible to embed one proposition into another by the 
grammatical means of sentential complementation (under a communication or mental state verb). 
i) The relativity of the truth value 
As mentioned earlier (see 3.4.1.3) not only the fact that two propositions can be correlated in 
one syntactic entity makes this sentence type special, the independence of the truth value of the 
complement from the matrix clause and vice versa makes this sentence type unique. This is not true 
for any other sentence type, and no other logical expression (like or, if, then, can, it is not the case 
that) as they cannot give access to worlds that are or can be true in someone else's mind.  
ii) Long Distance WH-movement as a proof for ToM-specific semantic properties 
Another crucial argument for de Villiers is the case of long-distance WH-movement, claiming that 
only in true sentential complementation structures (a full clause/proposition is embedded under a 
mental state or communication verb) long-distance WH-movement is possible. WH-Movement is a 
syntactic operation for which it is hypothesized that WH-items (words like when, who, where etc. 
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which are question words in their default use) are originally (syntactically underlying resp. in-situ) 
located where they belong according to argument structure in the syntactic constellation. This 
basically means that the "who" in "Whoi did John meet ti?" is located right after "meet" (indicated by 
the trace 'ti') and is then moved to the beginning of the sentence via a syntactic movement 
operation. In the case of long distance movement we can observe a peculiar asymmetry. Take the 
following two sentences: 
 (11) a. The girl thought that the train was leaving tomorrow. 
  b. The girl saw that the train was leaving tomorrow. 
These examples seem to have the same syntactic constellation, but as soon as you turn them into 
questions you stumble across asymmetries:  
 (12) a. When did the girl think the train was leaving?  long distance WH-movement 
  b. When did the girl see the train was leaving?    no long distance WH-movement 
We can see that in (12a) the WH-element can refer to 'leaving' (i.e. long-distance WH-movement) 
but in (12b) the WH-element can only refer to 'see' (long distance WH-movement is ungrammatical 
here, i.e.: "* Wheni did the girl see the train was leaving ti ?"). 
Sentential complementation is special as it is more than mere adjunction to the verb as in (11b). 
This property is necessary for pointing out the distinction between what really happened and what 
happened according to someone's mind. Information needs to be integrated across two verbs, not 
merely one. Language can capture a mind's contents, the relativity of it and therefore has the 
potential to represent it. De Villiers emphasizes that the class of events that refer to mental states 
can only be recognized and formed by language: first via the labels for those events (i.e. verbs like 
think, know, believe) and then via the structures that enable us to represent false propositions 
embedded in true propositions correctly.  
3.4.2.3 Naturalistic evidence for relations between language and ToM 
For joint attention behaviors de Villiers sees a mutual facilitation, e.g. labeling and establishing 
reference and antecedents are supported by joint attention behaviors and nonverbally perceived 
intentionality supports early language acquisition. Speech on the other hand might facilitate the 
acquisition of a notion of intentionality. Concerning desires de Villiers says that others' desires are 
consciously perceived from the third year of life onwards and children begin to predict behavior 
according to these desires. Around the same time mental terms of desire (want, like etc.) enter the 
child's active lexicon. De Villiers emphasizes that desire verbs do not take full, temporally embedded 
propositions as arguments but nominal phrases, future events and states (coded by infinitive forms) 
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or currently true resp. habitual events (coded by gerund forms) and that the arguments are at no 
time false (i.e. never in conflict with reality). At this stage language is merely a "shortcut" for 
inferences, it is not necessary to reason about desires felicitously.  
Beliefs. Mental verbs like think and know first occur within the 3rd year of life but initially do not 
have real mental reference yet. De Villiers claims that only at the age of four children are starting to 
understand the notion of thinking and especially its potentially false contents, as three-year-olds 
mostly use mental terms in stereotyped routines("I don't know" or "I guess" or to express insecurity 
"I think it's in here"), self-referentially and in the vast majority with true propositions (cf. Bartsch & 
Wellman 1995). De Villiers reports of Bartsch and Wellman's study (1995) where spontaneous speech 
data often contains mental terms early in development, used in contexts of mistakes where they do 
mark deviation from reality, e.g. "A (2;11): I painted on them. [his hands]" – "B: Why did you?" – "A: I 
thought my hands are paper." (see de Villiers 2000: 97). Early cases of mental reference have also 
been found by Shatz, Wellman and Silber (1983) where children aged 2;8 uttered sentences like "I 
thought there wasn't any socks, but when I looked I saw them" and "The people thought Dracula was 
mean, but he was nice." (Shatz et al. 1983: 309). These spontaneous speech data show that talk 
about mental states with genuine mental reference appear quite long before successful performance 
on standard FB tasks. De Villiers handles this by claiming that performance demands might be 
responsible for this gap, and she calls on the notion of "skill or productive mastery" meaning that 
"doing something once in a while, when everything is right and you are in control, is a lot different to 
summoning the performance successfully every time" (de Villiers 2000: 97). Furthermore the 
syntactic status of the mental verb's arguments cannot be determined, i.e. we don't know if the 
complements are real embedded complements with the full syntactic structure.  
3.4.2.4 The memory for complements task and the role of communication verbs 
For that exact reason de Villiers and Pyers (1997) developed the memory for complements task: 
 (13) a. The girl said she went to buy oranges. But look, she really bought strawberries! 
  b. What did the girl say she bought? 
De Villiers' claim is that this test shows if the relevant syntactic structures are acquired fully without 
having to access any mental understanding. Children answering the question in (13b) incorrectly 
(namely with what the girl really bought) don't have full command of real complementation yet. 
Situations with communication verbs need the same syntactic structures as mental verbs, according 
to de Villiers children only have to tease apart speech acts without reflecting on hidden mental 
processes. Even more so, children in fact only have to "remember" what they were told audibly.  
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De Villiers concludes that communication verbs play a central role in mental development: the 
syntax for both communication and mental verbs is the same and furthermore they share the 
genuine possibility for embedding false complements / propositions. De Villiers' idea is that the 
syntactic structure of communication verb constructions is acquired first and then in analogously 
applied to mental verbs. This predicts (and accounts for) a state where children can make use of 
mental state verb constructions which are overtly correct even if they are not fully understood yet. 
The relevant complement structures in combination with the acquired mental terms (verbs) provide 
the basis for the acquisition of representational structures for encoding FB. The last step in the 
development of FB understanding is the acquisition of a feature located in the CP (complementizer 
phrase of a syntactic construction5). This feature is a marks the potential falseness of the CP resp. the 
independency of the CP's truth value. This feature is triggered or introduced by the verbs that need 
it: communication and mental state verbs ("non-factive verbs" cf. de Villiers). She describes this 
feature as a formal property of the grammar that must be set in order for children to understand 
non-factivity. In analogy to some linguists assuming a feature for factive verbs (like know, forget) 
which signals that their complements are obligatorily true and as the CP site is considered to carry 
information about properties like quantification, questions, focus, topic, point of view etc. De Villiers 
sees theoretical grounds for her feature. 
 
 Summary. In short, de Villiers' main arguments are:  
a) The acquisition of the syntactic structure of embedded sentential complements is the basis 
for the acquisition of FB competence in child development. 
b) Mental-state verbs like believe and think are the only verbal expressions that are adequate 
for FBs both structurally and representationally. 
c) The acquisition of the syntactic structure that mental-state verbs bear or project happens via 
analogy of communication verbs' structure, so it is not necessary for the child to understand 
the concepts before acquiring the according language. 
d) The last and crucial step in the linguistic development is the acquisition of an abstract 
syntactic feature (set in the CP of the sentence) that indicates the potential falseness of the 
following clause. This feature is projected by communication and mental state verbs only. 
All in all these main arguments did not change up to today (see e.g. de Villiers 2007) and still 
constitute the basis of the linguistic determinism-framework. Shifts in direction and widening or 
changing of the arguments will be addressed chronologically in the sections below.  
                                                          
5
 i.e. the place where complementizers like that, for, if, what are located in syntactic constructions 
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3.5 Evidence from different populations 
 
In order to find arguments for or against linguistic determinism in child development it is crucial 
to test both children's language competence and their FB competence and contrasting the scores of 
normally developing children with children who show impairments in the linguistic domain (like for 
example oral deaf children with language delay or children with SLI). We will concentrate on the 
populations of preschoolers investigated closely for arguing for linguistic determinism (so studies 
where populations were explicitly tested for their language competence in respect to correlating the 
language measures to the ToM measures). The different sources of evidence supporting the basic 
framework described above are the following (see J. de Villiers 2005: 189f): 
- For normally developing children (for main arguments see e.g. de Villiers & Pyers 1997;2002) 
it has been shown that only children who pass the crucial language competence tests will 
successively pass FB reasoning tests. Significant correlations have been found. 
- Oral deaf children and ASL-acquiring children who show delays in language acquisition (see 
e.g. de Villiers & de Villiers 2000) have been proven to show FB competence significantly 
later than normally developing children. Deaf children of deaf parents (in other words: deaf 
children who acquire ASL natively from their parents without delays) who don't show delays 
or deviations in their language development have been control groups for the above (e.g. de 
Villiers, de Villiers, Schick & Hoffmeister 2000) and as predicted they did not show delays in 
FB competence.) 
- A group of signers of the first generation (i.e. deaf children who are not exposed to any 
formal well-developed sign language and therefore have to "make one up" from scratch) has 
been tested, namely a group of first-generation Nicaraguan signers (Pyers 2005). It was 
shown that these people did not develop sentential complementation (i.e. complex syntactic 
structures) and hence did never acquire the ability to reason about FBs. 
- Training studies of different kinds with training on either language (sentential 
complementation and the likes) or ToM (FBs, deceptive objects etc.) or both have been 
conducted to tease apart the intensity of influence on ToM-development (see e.g. Hale & 
Tager-Flusberg 2003, Lohmann & Tomasello 2003 etc.).  
All these studies have brought about evidence supporting the argument that language 
necessarily and determinatively precedes ToM in child development, for instance by showing that a 
delay in language acquisition supposedly causes a delay in FB reasoning acquisition. The following 
section gives an overview of the details and results of those studies.  
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3.5.1 Studies with normally developing children 
Two of the first theory-determining studies were conducted by Jill de Villiers and Jennie Pyers 
(1997 and 2002). The paper from 1997 is discussed in section 3.4.1.2. The study in 2002 was also 
dedicated to investigating the relationship between the language about the mind (especially 
complementation syntax) and the development of FB understanding. They wanted to find out which 
ability comes first in development and what the direction of influence is. De Villiers and Pyers (2002) 
tested two cohorts of preschoolers (28 in total) with starting ages between 3;1 to 3;10 years over the 
course of a year. Both cohorts were tested in four session blocks, procedures and materials were 
identical. 
Testing. For FB assessment de Villiers and Pyers used three FB tasks: 
- Unexpected contents task (featuring a smarties tube, a band-aids tin, a raisins box, a small 
milk carton, and a Playdoh container), the questions asked were a FB prediction question 
("What will Sarah think is in the box?") and a FB memory question ("Before, when you were 
sitting over there, what did you think was in the box?") 
- Unseen displacement task (with stories like the Bobby and daddy buy a cake-story), the 
questions were a memory check question ("Where did Bobby put the cake? Where is it 
now?"), a false-belief question ("When he comes in the kitchen, where will Bobby first look 
for the cake?") and an explanation question ("Why will he look there?") 
- Explanation of action task (with stories of the type where a doll is going to sleep and later 
craves eggs that were moved out of the adequate container), with the following questions: 
FB explanation question ("Why is he looking in there?") and a FB explanation question ("Why 
isn’t he looking in that (other) box?") 
Passing. In the unexpected contents task children at least had to give the correct word (expected 
answers are "smarties" = correct or "crayons" = wrong) with two possible points, in the unseen 
displacement task children could score one point for correct prediction and two points for justified 
prediction (NB: no mental reference was needed for the justification question to be correct, an 
answer like "because he put it there" sufficed). The third task had the same passing logic as the 
second. 5 or 6 correct out of 6 possible points counted as a pass.  
For language assessment the authors chose the memory for complements in described mistakes-
task (half of the stories with communication verbs, half with mental state verbs) as presented in their 
1997 paper and they analyzed spontaneous speech data (the utterances children made during the 
test sessions and while playing computer games, playing with various toys and watching silent videos 
were recorded and coded in MLU and IPSyn scores with relevant subscores). Besides that they also 
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investigated how children treat medial WH-words that function as complementizers. As children 
have the tendency to answer those as if they were questions this is another good test for command 
of full complementation. For a detailed description see 3.3.2. 
The data showed that scores on both types of memory for complements were continuously 
higher than on FB. Within FB scores the measure of prediction was relatively high, justified prediction 
was a better correlate with the other FB measures than prediction alone. All in all round two showed 
the highest variance on all tasks. The complement-relevant measures (memory for complements 
mental & communication and the IPSyn score on complementation) showed a strong relationship 
with the FB measures (only the score of the medial WH-complementizers was too low in round 2 to 
show a strong relationship). The other syntactic measures showed a weaker relationship with FB 
scores. Interestingly, the least verbal FB measure – prediction – showed the weakest correlation with 
complementation. Only very few children failed the memory for complements tasks but managed to 
pass FB –the other scores of those children revealed though that all of these "outlaws" either gave 
full-fledged justifications (with mental verb and complement in place) and/or had occurrences of 
complementation in their spontaneous speech data which de Villiers and Pyers took as good enough 
proof to their theory. 
Predicting FB. General syntax measures such as MLU and IPSyn general and IPSyn w/o 
complements did not predict a significant percentage of variance in FB. The significant predictors 
were indeed the complementation measures.  
Direction of influence. To find the direction of influence both FB and memory for complements 
scores of round three were used as dependent variable in regression analyses; for FB in round three 
neither round two scores of MLU and IPSyn w/o complements nor adding the other two 
complementation measures had a significant influence on variance. Only memory for complements 
could successfully (significantly) predict FB performance. The reversal did not show significant 
correlations: neither IPSyn complements nor memory for complements in round three could be 
predicted by any FB measure of round two. Prediction (without justification) which apparently was 
an easier task than the other FB measures could be predicted in round two with the memory for 
complements score in round one – so even if it is a less complex subtype of FB understanding, it is 
still correlated with complementation.  
The authors argue that language is not only necessary to encode belief states for reporting on 
them but is needed in order to represent mental states of other people. They argue that their 
framework does not need to be strongly committed to either the view that children have all syntactic 
structures available from the start in form of Universal Grammar (explaining problems or lack of 
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complementation as performance or processing errors) or the view that children have incomplete 
language competence and therefore fail complementation, because in either case children who are 
not able to conjure up a full and correct syntactic representation of a complement construction will 
fail FB understanding because they lack the representational means. Concluding the authors note 
that a bi-directional effect between the two capacities is not excluded because the understanding of 
FB renders talking about it more likely. Furthermore, they admit to the possibility that an implicit 
understanding or expectation of how others' will react to certain situations emerges before the 
explicit ability to reason about it.  
 
After that it became customary to conduct studies with deviant populations and to have 
normally developing children integrated as control groups, so there is still data collected from 
normally developing children but usually in different contexts. 
 
3.5.2 Studies with deaf and signing populations  
The linguistic determinism community was very intrigued by the fact that deaf children who do 
not acquire sign language natively (i.e. do not have deaf resp. signing parents) show delays in their 
language development. Obviously the prediction of linguistic determinism for a language delayed 
child would be that theory of mind or, more precisely, FB reasoning, would also show a delay in 
development that ideally correlates significantly with the delay in language development. As deaf 
children do not show associated or secondary impairments like for instance children with autism do 
they are considered particularly good test subjects that ideally allow for teasing out the effects of the 
developmental language delay on ToM.  
 
3.5.2.1  Orally taught deaf children: de Villiers & de Villiers 2000 
The first to investigate this relation were Gale and colleagues (Gale et al. 1996) who found out 
that the production of complex syntax (in spontaneous speech) of orally taught deaf children was 
highly correlated with their FB understanding which was three years delayed on average. A 
representative list of studies that investigated related questions can be found in Pyers (2005: p. 45). 
One group investigated by Jill & Peter de Villiers (2000) were orally taught deaf children who are 
brought up by hearing parents (i.e. no fully developed sign language is used natively in the children's 
homes) and taught in oral schools for the deaf where auditory and speech training and sometimes 
lip-reading are the teaching focus. According to de Villiers, "the average six-year-old deaf child 
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acquiring English as a first language is significantly delayed, both in lexical knowledge and, 
importantly, in grammar." (de Villiers 2000: 107), whereas the impairment mainly concerns 
inflectional morphology (like missing plurals, past tense, possessive markers etc.) and syntax (with 
less reliably marked word order e.g. in agent-action-patient sentences and a particular difficulty with 
embedded clauses), furthermore their narrative abilities are impoverished. Overall a developmental 
lag of three to four years can be found in comparison to normally developing children in vocabulary 
and syntax tests (cf. de Villiers 2000). Nonverbal tests on the other hand are usually mastered in a 
normal or even above-average time-frame (e.g. tests that include spatial relations, visual sequences 
etc.); emotionally and socially these children show age-adequate behavior. Because of their language 
inhibitions6 standard FB tasks might be problematic testing methods for deaf children, de Villiers & 
de Villiers rather collected spontaneous speech data and elicited data with nonverbal tests from a 
group of oral deaf children and a control group of normally developing, hearing children. To obtain 
spontaneous language data the children were confronted with mute cartoon videos of events that 
showed different instances of intention, desire and (false) belief. In order to follow the stories 
children had to postulate intentional states for the characters. The descriptions deaf children gave 
during and after the videos showed clearly that they had considerable problems to understand and 
formulate intentional descriptions of the protagonists' actions in comparison to the control group. In 
fact, the deaf test subjects conceptualized the events in a different way. For eliciting language two 
nonverbal tests were used that should test the children's FB understanding: 
i) Sticker Test (following Povinelli & DeBlois 1992): in this test the experimenter hides a sticker in 
one of two presented boxes. There are two experiment helpers one of which is watching this 
while the other one is out of sight together with the child (behind a screen). Then the two 
helpers will each point to one of the boxes and the child has to decide which helper's advice to 
take in order to find the sticker. De Villiers & de Villiers admit to this test being an ignorance 
task rather than a FB task, but they consider it fit given that the child needs to act upon the 
grounds of differing mental contents. This task is passed with minimally 8 correct out of 10. 
The average passing age in the deaf group was 7;3 years compared to 4;4 years in the control 
group and performance correlated with the performance on standard verbal ToM tasks. The 
children's skill to produce explanatory language for actions as results of cognitive states 
(measures taken from the narratives produced at viewing the silent videotapes) was the best 
predictor for the performance on the nonverbal ToM task.  
                                                          
6
 see de Villiers 2000 p. 107: a) the children could fail to understand the task as such because of linguistic inhibitions b) as 
they never/too rarely had language highlight FB events in their development they might not (yet) be able to form the 
necessary categories to encode and interpret them c) the children might be unable to encode those events in language 
which might lead to an inability to represent the distinction between someone else's mind's contents and the real world. 
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ii) Appropriate Facial Expressions Test (de Villiers & de Villiers 2000): the test subjects had to 
pick the final sequence for a cartoon story in which the protagonist experiences an unexpected 
contents situation. Children had to assign the correct facial expression ("surprised" vs. "not 
surprised") and could choose between two transparents showing the protagonist's face. This 
task was harder than standard FB tests for both hearing (average passing age 4.46) and deaf 
children (average passing age 8;5). Again, the nonverbal task showed that the delay in mastery 
of FB tests does not depend on external factors but is in fact highly correlated with the 
language delay of the test subjects. There was a significant contribution to performance by age 
though.  
The data were analyzed for vocabulary (with the PPVT), for MLU and two IPSyn measures: IPSyn 
complements and IPSyn Sentence Structure w/o complements. The data were then analyzed with 
regard to the influence of the different language measures and the IPSyn complement score turned 
out to be the only significant predictor for the standard FB reasoning tasks, for the surprise task both 
the complement score and age each were significant. Two conclusions have been drawn: 
1) FB reasoning is significantly delayed in oral deaf children both in verbal and nonverbal tasks 
2) command of complement syntax is a significant predictor for performance on any kind of FB 
task  
 
3.5.2.2 Emerging sign language in Nicaragua and ToM 
An investigation in extremely rare circumstances has been conducted by Jennie Pyers 2001 
(published as dissertational thesis in 2005). Pyers investigated the language and ToM abilities of a 
group of 1st generation signers who were not exposed to any kind of formal (sign) language in early 
childhood (i.e. in their critical age for language acquisition) and therefore had to develop their very 
own sign language. In the first generation this language lacks certain formal features and 
complexities fully-fledged natural languages usually have. This group of signers who were brought 
together from all over Nicaragua in the late 1970ies to go to the newly found school for the deaf 
developed the Nicaraguan Sign Language (NSL) which evolved over a period of ca. 15 years (and is 
still expanding and developing). In the founding years of the school the signers were taught to read 
lips in Spanish, but they were provided the opportunity to bring their rudimentary home sign7 
systems together which enabled them to start forming their own unified sign language. Populations 
like that are of course rare, especially in the first generation of the language. The so called first and 
                                                          
7
 The term home sign refers to "a fairly rich repertoire of iconic (pantomimic) gestures, pointing, and simple gesture 
'sentences' that they [deaf children] use in the home with hearing parents and siblings, who also use the same 'Home 
Sign'." (de Villiers 2000: 106) 
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second cohort show systematic differences along the lines of age of entry and year of entry. Younger 
children were able to outperform older adolescents linguistically if they entered the school before 
they reached age six and / or if they entered the school after 1986. This means that the language of 
the first cohort is systematically poorer (in complexity and variety) than the language of the second 
cohort although the latter exclusively got their linguistic input from the former. Basically, what Pyers 
says is that the 30-year old NSL-signers from the first cohort have a language that "is essentially a 
fossilized record of what the language looked like 15 years ago" (Pyers 2005: 155) because the older 
signers struggle with taking over rules and structures that are developed by the younger signers – 
after all, they have not been exposed to NSL in their critical language learning age(s) (note: this is 
although they live side by side with the younger group members). This way it is possible to track 
language change in this evolving language; what happened on a general note is that younger cohorts 
moved away from holistic representations of events (i.e. gestures) by pulling out different 
information into separate signs and expressing them sequentially – so the second cohort and each 
cohort following moved the NSL towards the combinatorial and systematic properties of a fully-
fledged natural language.  
The prediction. With complex structures missing even in adult language the prediction by 
linguistic determinism was that the first cohort of the Nicaraguan signers would not pass FB tests, 
not even in adulthood. With a population like that it is not possible to use the standard FB tasks (see 
Pyers 2005: 51) because of the high linguistic task demands.  
Assessing FB: predicting. Pyers developed a nonverbal picture completion version of the change 
in location task, a "minimally verbal false-belief test" as a first step to assess the signers' FB 
understanding. The test is a prediction of action task; participants were shown sequences of six 
pictures where the first five pictures depicted a typical change in location-situation. The children had 
to pick the sixth picture (2 candidates, 50% chance) for the sequence to be completed. One of the 
two final cards showed the protagonist looking in the current location (wrong answer), the other 
showed the protagonist looking in the old location (correct answer). Two training sessions with 
simple narratives introduced the participants to the test scheme, so little or no language was 
necessary for the actual testing. 12 deaf adults were tested (6 first cohort, 6 second cohort signers). 
The results showed that indeed first cohort signers did not have a command of FB understanding, 
not even in adulthood. As predicted the older cohort signers all failed the task whereas the signers of 
the second cohort all passed.  
Assessing FB: explaining. In the second step Pyers was interested in the explanation-of-action-
competence of the signers. In this test each cohort was represented by eight signers. The method 
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here was to elicit language by showing six short, silent videos two of which were targeted at desire 
and the remaining four at FB. In the FB videos the contents were either appearance-reality or change 
in location scenarios. After viewing each video twice the signers narrated it to a "confederate" ("an 
American hearing signer of NSL who had been working with the community for more than ten years" 
p. 78) who had not seen it. If the narrative did not refer to internal states the listener asked two 
probe questions, first: "Why did the man put the dog on his head?"8 and, if the explanation still didn't 
include mental reference, a second question was asked: "Did the man want to put the dog on his 
head?". In the analysis of the narratives failers were defined conservatively: only participants who 
failed all four FB tasks were counted as failers. In their explanations the failers only referred to 
physical and perceptual events that led to the erroneous action. Only one first cohort signer 
explained the "strange behavior" from a mental viewpoint, all the others did not use any instance of 
mental reference for explanation. These results give Pyers reason to contradict hypotheses that trace 
ToM back to biological maturation of inhibitory control because the failers had an average age of 
26;6, and furthermore hypotheses like Bartsch and Wellman's (1989) idea that predicting is harder 
than explaining (because in prediction children are always confronted with and misled by reality 
whereas in explaining they can overrule their bias towards reality easier because they already 
observed the behavior caused by the FB). Even though the first cohort showed normal social 
experience and interactional skills (and are on average ten years older than the second cohort) this 
could not enable them to understand FB situations, which suggests that lack of (certain) complex 
language structures leads to a lack of mature FB understanding rather than (lack of) social interaction 
being responsible for it. 
An a related note, first cohort signers were very well able to appreciate the relationship between 
desires or individual preferences and emotional responses, furthermore they had no difficulty in 
understanding under which circumstances knowledge about events arises. This means that it is 
indeed only FB reasoning that is impaired in the first cohort's ToM and ToM-related abilities. 
Assessing complementation competence. According to Pyers, understanding sentential 
complementation is hardly documented for sign language(s), let alone is it a clear case in NSL – on 
the one hand because it is an emerging and mostly undocumented language and on the other hand 
because the ways of expressing abstract features are very different from e.g. spoken English, for 
instance argument structure is expressed via space, a means which older NSL-signers (first cohort) 
are inconsistent with. What Pyers did in her assessment of complex mental verb syntax was to 
                                                          
8
 The FB story was: "a man puts his hat on a shelf and sits down to read a magazine. A young boy enters the scene and 
places his stuffed toy dog on the shelf, pushing the hat to the back in the process, all unbeknownst to the man. A few 
seconds later, after finishing his reading, the man reaches back without looking to get his hat. He grasps the stuffed dog, 
instead of his hat, and puts that on his head." (Pyers 2005: 78) 
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analyze the short narrative descriptions elicited in the Explanation-of-Action tasks. Pyers was looking 
for three different structures: a simple mental verb without complements or full propositions (which 
would roughly equal "He thinks." in spoken English), mental verbs with adjacent nouns (such as "I'm 
thinking ice cream.") and a mental verb followed by a proposition including another verb (which 
should roughly equal "He thinks that the boy has already left."). Two ways are assumed to determine 
whether a verb is related to an adjacent proposition: one was linguistic – Pyers calls it a "verb 
sandwich" and its structure looks like the example in (14): 
 (14) MAN DOESN’T_KNOW BOY HAT SWITCH DOESN’T_KNOW (Pyers 2005: 158) 
The fact that the inner proposition is flanked by two instances of the mental verb probably indicates 
that the complement is subordinate to this verb. A non-manual way of displaying (and detecting) 
correlation between two entities is e.g. by head positions being carried over from one part to the 
other; for instance in negation a headshake that is carried over from the mental verb to the 
proposition can indicate that those two are related.  
Passers and failers of the FB test did not differ in stand-alone mental verbs and mental verbs plus 
noun phrases, but in mental verbs plus subordinated propositions the passers significantly 
outperformed the failers (only one of the failers produced complex mental utterances at all). These 
findings, according to Pyers, underline the assumption that FB understanding and complement 
structures go hand in hand although a causal argument cannot be made with these data (rather they 
only prove that those competent in FB understanding also use more complex syntax in mental verb 
environments). Pyers concedes the findings also because they again resulted from mixed data – the 
language data that was analyzed was used to describe FB situations, so if first cohort signers do not 
perceive or understand FB at all they might not be urged or motivated to use (complex) mental 
language at all in this context.  
An interesting side-note is that in the NSL-data the majority of the mental verb + complement 
structures did not feature a false complement but rather a negated mental verb ("doesn't think") 
embedding a true proposition. Remember that linguistic determinism heavily relies on the 
acquisition of the falseness feature of embedded complement constructions being the crucial 
linguistic feature for FB understanding. Analyses looking for false complements, for the behavior of 
communication verb constructions and other issues could not be performed by Pyers within this 
dissertation, so they remain open. Also in structures used with desire verbs only a small subgroup of 
first cohort signers used complex language ("verb sandwiches" as in (14)) to do so although they had 
n problems with detecting and explaining desires. This means that not all instances of ToM are 
dependent on (complex) syntactic structures. Pyers concludes that:  
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"…given that the language of these two groups of signers differs in domains that are unrelated to false-belief 
understanding, it seems likely that the first cohort’s impoverished linguistic output, be it in conversational interaction, 
expression of mental-state verbs, or production of complex syntax, directly affects their ability to understand that 
people have thoughts and beliefs that are different from each other’s." (Pyers 2005: 171).  
Pyers also discusses other accounts in the language-matters group: 
i) Conversational accounts of FB development: both cohorts report that they "struggle 
extensively in communicating with hearing family members, but that they have satisfying 
conversations with their deaf peers" (Pyers 2005: 139). According to Pyers this contradicts 
Peterson and Siegal's account (2000) who claim that FB understanding relies on efficient 
communication in the home because this would mean that both cohorts should be 
equally impaired in FB understanding. 
ii) Mental Verb/Language Accounts: Pyers tested the mental state vocabulary of the subjects 
separately and found that of the FB task failers only four out of seven signed a mental 
state term (with a total of 9 tokens), amongst the passers 8 of 9 participants produced 
mental state terms (with a total of 57 tokens). A correlational analysis showed that the 
number of mental state terms used was highly correlated with the score on the minimally 
verbal FB test. This was just a preliminary result as the data came from analyzing elicited 
language from videos depicting FB, but a relationship between the two factors is 
indicated.  
On the grounds of these results Pyers argues that language is crucial for FB understanding and 
furthermore that the age at which these abilities are acquired matters. The concrete factors Pyers 
could single out were mental vocabulary and complement syntax. As the data for this study were 
collected in 2001, Pyers emphasizes that only after that the second cohort signers were old enough 
to be interested and active in the Deaf Association in Nicaragua and only then meta-linguistic 
interests arose for these signers. Pyers suggests that this new intense contact between first and 
second cohort could potentially change and influence the language of the first cohort which (see 
3.8.2). 
 
3.5.3 Training studies 
Another way to try and assess the influence of one cognitive ability on the other is to train those 
abilities in different settings. In the early 2000s two important training studies have been conducted 
to get a closer look at the potential influence of language on FB understanding.  
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3.5.3.1 Training study: Hale & Tager Flusberg (2003) 
The first was by Courtney Hale and Helen Tager-Flusberg (2003) who wanted to show that the 
syntactic and semantic properties of sentential complements in child language facilitate the 
development of a representational ToM, but with the important difference that they wanted to avoid 
test questions that contain mental state verbs – something that de Villiers and colleagues have failed 
to achieve up to that point (see Hale & Tager-Flusberg 2003: 348)9.  
The authors' goal was to test the effect of direct FB training in comparison to the effect of 
complement sentence training (with communication verbs only) on FB understanding, using a 
training paradigm that did not include any mental language in the language training (not even in the 
corrective feedback). Three training groups were formed: one group of preschoolers received 
sentential complements training (with communication verbs only), the second group FB training and 
the third group was a control group trained on restrictive relative clauses. Relative clauses are 
considered examples of complex syntax irrelevant to ToM (see e.g. de Villiers & Pyers 1997). Hale 
and Tager-Flusberg point out that relative clauses also involve embedded propositions which are – 
unlike embedded complements – embedded under a noun phrase, not a verb phrase and therefore 
categorically different. After making sure in language pretests (sentential complements group: 2 
complement comprehension tasks; relative clause group: distinguish two similar referents by 
attending to information given in restricted relative clauses) and FB pretests (one change in location 
task including one ignorance question and one FB prediction) that the test subjects have not yet 
acquired the competences to be trained, 60 children between 3;0 and 4;10 were entered into the 
study. Two training sessions were held within one week and each session had four rounds, so each 
child ended up being confronted with 8 different scenes.  
i) FB Training: A Change of Location story was enacted in front of the child who afterwards 
was asked to predict where the protagonist was going to look for the moved object. 
Corrective feedback and re-enactment were given for every incorrect answer, but no 
mental terms were ever used.  
ii) Sentential complements: A boy was shown doing something to another character (e.g. 
hit him) but falsely claiming later that he had done it to a different character. Children 
had to report what the boy actually said, urged by asking "What did he say?" or "Who did 
he say he hit?". Corrective feedback and re-enactment were provided.  
iii) Relative Clauses: A character acted out two different actions on a pair of identical twins, 
children had to report which action was done to which twin by asking "Who did Bert 
hug?". Corrective feedback was done by re-enactment and explanation.  
                                                          
9
 Criticism of the entanglement of language demands and language measures in test design should only start here. 
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Three to five days after the training post-tests were conducted. The language post-tests had the 
same formats as the pre-tests and training tasks, the FB post-tests additionally included an 
unexpected contents task and an appearance-reality task, so the post-tests were not only controlling 
for FB but ToM in general in order to see whether there was a general effect on ToM. For relative 
clause post-tests a story was given where Minnie was washing one plate and breaking another one. 
Note that children were asked "What did Minnie wash?" which would be felicitously answered with 
"a plate" and furthermore experimenters did not choose to rather enact something on two objects 
and then ask the child to hand it one of it over (i.e. avoid direct language). 
The analysis of the test scores included a comparison of the training groups from pre- to post-
tests. Both the FB and the sentential complement-training led to the same percentage of significant 
performance increase in ToM post-test measures (change in location, unexpected contents, 
appearance-reality); There were no significant differences in post-test performance between FB and 
sentential complement training. Furthermore, for the change in location-task ("Why will she look 
there?") the FB and sentential complements training groups "gave more appropriate justifications" 
(Hale & Tager-Flusberg 2003: 353) than the relative clause group. Interestingly performance increase 
on sentential complementation post-tests was only achieved by the children who received 
complementation training (they went from 17,5% correct to 74,8% correct), children who received 
FB training could only increase their complementation score from 20,0% correct to 26,4% correct. 
Both groups increased their FB score though (around 75% each). On relative clause post-tests only 
the relative clause training group showed any improvement at all. 
The authors conclude that sentential complements are indeed crucial for ToM development 
which is why specific training on sentential complements leads to improvement on ToM performance 
while the reverse does not hold (i.e. training on FBs does not increase language performance). They 
point out that sentential complements are unique in their syntactic properties (embeddedness) and 
semantic properties (independent truth value), but that they did not tease apart those two aspects in 
the analysis because "false" complements were used in their sentential complements training; they 
speculate that "it is the semantic properties that are crucial for providing the child with the means 
for explicitly representing the embedding of a false statement in the complement construction." 
(Hale & Tager-Flusberg 2003: 354) also admitting to the possibility of the training effect not coming 
from linguistic acquisition but merely from exposing the children to statements that are false with 
respect to events they had witnessed. An important inference is that it cannot be concluded that the 
acquisition of sentential complements is a necessary prerequisite for ToM development as the FB 
training made just as big an impact on post-test ToM scores as linguistic training did while it did not 
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have any effect on post-test language performance. So children could develop a 
metarepresentational ToM without acquiring the sentential complement structures. 
The maintenance of the test results was not controlled for – the whole experiment lasted two 
weeks. The authors mention that "training serves to make explicit conceptual and linguistic 
knowledge that was already represented albeit in a more implicit and less accessible way" (Hale & 
Tager-Flusberg 2003: 355). This once again suggests that ToM competence in children might actually 
not be a question of development, acquisition or other procedural mechanisms but rather a question 
of access to existing knowledge and of the level of explicitness of these in situ structures.  
 
3.5.3.2 Training study: Lohmann & Tomasello (2003) 
Lohmann & Tomasello argued that in Hale & Tager-Flusberg's study (2003) the language 
training contained deceptive situations. They hypothesized that it might be the deceptive 
character of the situations which led children to an increase of FB understanding rather than 
their linguistic features. Their goal was to test whether the effect language had on ToM in Hale & 
Tager-Flusberg's study was merely to scaffold the relevant input (and not a contentful ingredient 
for a successful acquisition of ToM). Lohmann and Tomasello conducted a training study 
(2003)with 138 German speaking children aged 3;3 to 3;10 in which they wanted to focus on two 
comparisons:  
- compare several training conditions with language to a training condition without any 
linguistic commentary during the training (except for exclamative sounds like "Oh!" "Ah!") 
- compare the training effect of three different linguistic conditions: 
1) rich perspective shifting discourse, mental state verbs and sentential 
complementation (the three major factors considered important for ToM)  
2) perspective shifting discourse using language free of mental terms or sentential 
complements 
3) sentential complement sentences without mental terms and without deceptive 
experience (in contrast to Hale & Tager-Flusberg 2003) 
Pretests secured that only children who had not yet acquired FB understanding and whose linguistic 
development was within a normal range were chosen for the training. They included a vocabulary 
test (Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children, Kaufman & Kaufman 1994), a FB test (an 
representational change task) and two sentential complements tasks (one based on Swettenham 
1996 where a story like "This boy thinks that it is sunny outside although it is really and truly raining 
outside." was followed up by two questions: "Will this boy now put his raincoat on?" and "What was 
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this boy thinking?", the other test based on Hale & Tager-Flusberg 2003 where the protagonist says 
that she was doing one thing but really did something else, followed up by "What did the girl say she 
was [doing]?"). Post-tests included three FB tests (appearance-reality, unexpected contents and 
change in location) and sentential complement tasks like in the pretests.  
In four sessions over 2 weeks children were presented a total amount of 16 deceptive objects. 
This happened in four different training groups that differed regarding the linguistic level: 
1) Full training group: the deceptive aspect of the object was visually and verbally highlighted 
either with mental or communication verb constructions; the experimenter presented the 
object and said "What do you think/say it is?". After the child examined the object, the real 
function was highlighted by the experimenter. Then children were asked about their first 
suspicion and their current knowledge. Then the experimenter provided a verbal summary 
and asked for a third person's opinion (a hand puppet) who would show a surprised reaction. 
Children then assisted the puppet to find out the real function. Test measures were divided 
between know/think and say training but apparently did not lead to different results. 
2) Discourse only training group: in this group there was neither any use of mental language 
nor of sentential complements (which lead to results supporting Harris' theory, see 3.1.1) 
3) No language training group: for this group the highlighting of the deceptive aspect happened 
completely nonverbally, also there were no questions asked and no feedback given except 
for attention getters like "Look!" "But now look!" "Oh!" "Alright!" 
4) Sentential complement only training group: the deceptive aspect was not highlighted for 
this group. A puppet interacted with the objects like they were normal objects, the 
experimenter commented it in mental and communication verb complementation structures 
(The puppet showed that X, … knows that X, Do you think that the puppet X, etc.). 
The authors looked at the effects of the four different training conditions on each FB post-test task 
separately (an appearance reality task, a representational change task (unexpected contents) and a 
change in location task) and ANOVAs were run for group comparisons (all FB post-test scores were 
summed up for that). 
Concerning the results on the FB post-tests the authors found the following: 
i) Representational change task (unexpected contents): For absolute post-test score group 
was a significant factor, the full training group outperformed all the others with 75% 
correct; the sentential complement group and the discourse group scored about 40% 
correct and the no language group only scored 25% correct. The increase of performance 
from pre- to post-test was significant for all groups except the no-language group.  
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ii) Location change task: here, too, group difference was a significant factor, although the 
authors decided to not exclude children who got the control questions wrong as it would 
remove the effect of group.  
iii) Appearance-reality task: there was no significant effect found for group and it seems that 
any training procedure advanced children's ability to understand appearance-reality 
objects (which after all were the training objects), so explicit deceptive experience was 
not mandatory for success (cf. the sentential complements group). The only difference 
found was for the score of a third person's belief prediction. Full training led to 
significantly more correct answers than the no language training. 
When collapsing the FB tasks into one measure the ANOVA showed that the full training group 
performed better at posttests and the other groups didn't differ from one another.  
Comparisons between the groups on FB posttests showed the following: 
i) The full training group outperformed both the discourse only group and the sentential 
complements group, so the deceptive experience included in the full training (and lacking 
in the other two conditions) must have been significant.  
ii) The complex language group with deceptive experience (full training) outperformed the 
group without it (sentential complements) and the authors conclude that the experience 
of changing perspectives on deceptive objects is an important factor in the acquisition of 
FB understanding. Still the sentential complement group showed a significant difference 
to the no language condition. Combining full and sentential complement training and 
contrasting it to the combined measure of discourse only and no language training 
showed that the measures with sentential complements outperform those without. 
Finally, the results of the sentential complement posttests revealed that sentential complements 
facilitated FB understanding significantly better than discourse only which is why the authors singled 
out sentential complements as an important factor for FB understanding development independent 
of the deceptive and perspective shifting experience. A significant effect of training condition and 
unsurprisingly the highest improvement was achieved by the sentential complement training group. 
For the no language group the scores did not change at all which means that linguistic competence is 
sensitive to training, too. The results showed an asymmetry: the children who improved sentential 
complement performance also improved their FB scores, whereas the increase on FB performance 
for the full training group was not reliably connected to linguistic scores, so other factors led to their 
improvement on FBs. 
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Concluding the authors claim: both perspective shifting (i.e. discourse about deceptive objects) 
and training on sentential complements independently had a facilitating effect on children's FB 
understanding, whereas experiencing deceptive situations alone did not administrate any progress. 
The combination of those two factors turned out to be the strongest facilitator of FB understanding 
(which was the case in the full training group). 
Lohmann and Tomasello were the first to explicitly show differences between discourse, 
sentential complements and no language by creating evidence with a training study. The authors 
refer to Clements et al. (2001) to justify that the minimal linguistic feedback in the so called "no 
language training group" does not play a role because feedback has to offer new information in order 
to facilitate the learning process. In the discourse condition (where mainly nouns were used to point 
out the deceptive nature of the objects, as in "First it is a flower, and now it is a pen.") the effective 
factor really was the discourse because no mental language was used. The visual experience does not 
suffice for understanding hidden processes; Evidence from deaf children of hearing parents opposed 
to deaf children with signing parents corroborate this insight.  
This study was the first to have a sentential complements measure free of deceptive resp. 
perspective shifting experience. Mental state verbs were used in one of the two sentential 
complement conditions, but the results on posttests were almost identical, so according to Lohmann 
and Tomasello the use or lack of mental state verbs does not have an influence on the overall effect 
of language which highlights (syntactic) structure rather than semantics.  
 
This was the first block of evidence that was brought about in favor of linguistic determinism or 
versions of it. The broad spectrum surely made it clear at the time that linguistic determinism is to be 
taken seriously in the field of ToM-research, so investigations and theories increased. 
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3.6 First reactions and counterarguments 
 
Up to this point the data collected in favor of linguistic determinism proved that the 
acquisition of complement sentences fosters the development of FB understanding in one way or the 
other. Sentential complements were defined as an independent (and therefore unambiguous) class 
of syntactic phenomena anchored along one distinctive feature. De Villiers and others singled out the 
subordinated complement sentence to be the only syntactic structure that was appropriate for and 
triggered by communication verbs and those mental state verbs that make a claim about the truth of 
something (e.g. think and believe) which also meant that this was the only complex syntactic 
structure that allowed for the embedded proposition to have a truth value independent from the 
matrix clause's truth value (in other words: the only type of sentence that can felicitously have a false 
proposition embedded in a true one). For researchers like de Villiers this characterization was 
sufficient to describe the crucial structures unambiguously for the data they collected, which enabled 
de Villiers and colleagues to exclude one very important mental verb and its structures from their 
claims about FB reasoning and language: the desire verb want. This is necessary because there is a 
well-acknowledged gap in children's language development between desire and belief (see e.g. 
Bartsch & Wellman 1995), i.e. children understand and actively use talk about desires significantly 
earlier than about beliefs. The desire verb want does not take fully tensed complement structures as 
complements but rather expresses the propositions which are mapped onto the subject via to + 
infinitive-phrases and the embedded proposition in desire constructions does not make a claim about 
truth. Considering this a valid enough explanation for the belief-desire gap linguistic determinists 
excluded desire from their considerations. In English indeed only communication verbs and mental 
state verbs like think and believe have a) the property of independent truth values and hence b) the 
embedding construction. Other researchers though started to investigate other languages with 
respect to the features and the make-up of the complementation construction and the verbs and 
concepts linked to it in the context of mental concepts, two studies that present threatening data for 
linguistic determinism are discussed here. 
 
3.6.1 Empirical counterevidence: Mandarin and Cantonese 
Intrigued by the findings of ToM-research concerning the correlations between the (assumed) 
sequence of ToM development from desire psychology to belief psychology and the sequence of 
complexity increase in children's complements from simple object complements over infinitival 
complements to complement clauses Tardif and Wellman wanted to undertake a study that would 
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for the first time look at this relationship in two languages quite different from English. In order to 
get to the cross-linguistic bottom of the issue they studied Mandarin and Cantonese children (Tardif 
& Wellman 2000). Chinese languages differ from English in two relevant aspects: Mandarin learning 
children are more likely to utter a verb for their first word than children acquiring English (in early 
language acquisition English speaking children acquire relatively few verbs compared to nouns; for 
Mandarin speaking children the ratio is roughly 50:50). Secondly, the morphology and syntax of 
propositional complementation in Mandarin and Cantonese is simpler than in English. The difference 
between sentences like (15a) and (15b) is not obligatorily marked (because finiteness is not 
grammaticized to the same extent as in English): 
(15)  a. Who did Big Bert forget that he invited? 
b. Who did Big Bert forget to invite?            (Roeper & de Villiers 1994: 384) 
In other words, even if it is possible to express the difference between these two questions overtly in 
Chinese (examples (16) and (17) in Mandarin), they usually are expressed with one underspecified 
version of it having either interpretation (example (18)) (from Tardif & Wellman 2000: 28): 
(16)  Big Bird wang4 le qing3 shei2?  
Big Bird forget ASP invite who (Bert) 
(17) Big Bird wang4 le qing3 le shei2? 
Big Bird forget ASP invite ASP who (Grover) 
(18) Big Bird wang4 le qing3 shei2 le? 
Big Bird forget ASP invite who ASP/SFP? (Bert/Grover) 
Another feature in Chinese is that there are polysemous words; for instance xiang3 (Mandarin) 
can mean "to think" or "to want to do something", "to believe/feel", "to imagine/conceive of" and "to 
miss somebody", so there is a new level on which desire and belief can be distinguished: the 
acquisition of the lexical terms and the conceptual understanding can be teased apart. This is not 
possible in English, desire and belief are uniquely expressed via different verbs.  
The expectations towards languages that are like Mandarin or Cantonese go two ways: either 
children will show the exact same time lag between desire and belief as English children – this would 
prove that it cannot be syntactic or morphological reasons that lead to the belief-desire gap but 
rather that we are dealing with a cognitive universality. Or the tested children could lack the lag 
between desire and belief, meaning that it is linguistic demands rather than the concept formation of 
belief being dependent on linguistic development. Either way, these languages promised to be a 
strong test for the universality claim of several findings in ToM and linguistic research. 
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Participants. Two studies were conducted to assess the use and emergence of mental state 
terms; this was done by analyzing naturalistic speech data recorded in the toddlers' homes. In the 
first study 10 Mandarin speaking children (starting age 21 months) were recorded over the time of 6 
months for the verbs yao4 (want), xiang3 (polysemous: want/think), hui4 (know-how), neng2 (have 
the ability to) and zhildao4 (know that). In the second study data from Lee, Wong, Leung, Man et al. 
's (1995) corpus of 8 Cantonese speaking children (starting age from 18 to 32 months) were analyzed 
for the same terms as in study one and additionally for the words nam5 (think/consider) and sikl 
(know how/ recognize). Children's use of the terms was correlated with their caregivers' input. The 
English data for comparison were taken from Bartsch and Wellman's study (1995). 
Prediction. As Mandarin/Cantonese speaking children acquire verbs earlier and relatively more 
of them than English speaking children this should also be true for mental verbs. Furthermore, if ToM 
universally develops in certain stages this should be true for all toddlers regardless of the language 
they acquire or the culture they grow up in. For the Chinese verbs this means that the verb yao4/jiu3 
(want) should be used before all the other mental verbs even if finiteness and syntax don't matter. 
For the polysemous verb xiang3/soeng2 the want-sense of the verb should be used (or understood) 
before the think-sense of it. Finally the quality of the caregivers' input should not influence the 
developmental pattern if the claim that this is a cognitive universal holds water. 
Findings. Already at 21 months of age the Mandarin toddlers showed usage of mental state 
verbs (in roughly 2% of all utterances for 21-month-olds, 5% for 27-month-olds) which is earlier and a 
higher score than for English children. Of these first mental-state verb usages the verb yao4 (want) 
constitutes the vast majority and clearly was the earliest mental verb to occur. The other mental 
state verbs started emerging shortly after 21 months although the mental reference-quality is at first 
doubtful. The first verbs positively coded to involve think occurred from age 2;0 onwards; the 
polysemous word xiang3 was only minimally used in its think-meaning throughout the whole testing 
time (it appeared around 24 months of age); if used at all it was more likely to refer to want. In the 
input of caregivers yao4 (want) was only used in 50% of mental state verbs, the other 50% were 
verbs of knowing or thinking, although caregivers hardly ever spoke to their children about thinking. 
The English speaking parents referred to thinking in about 21% of mental state references. Simple 
repetition can be ruled out as the acquisitional means because of what the authors found out about 
self vs. other-referencing: while the emerging mental state language in children started out with self-
reference, parents were more likely to refer to others (especially the child) in their mental language. 
So both parents and children were referring to the child which meant a perspective and pronoun 
shift for children. Again, mere imitation does not seem to be the (acquisitional) pattern. 
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The second study with data from Cantonese was conducted because think in Mandarin is 
expressed with a polysemous word (xiang3) whose think-meaning might emerge so late because 
children prefer one-to-one mapping (cf. the unifunctionality principle in Slobin 1985). Cantonese has, 
apart from the polysemous verb soeng2 (want/think), a mental state verb that uniquely refers to 
think (nam5). The results corroborate what was found for Mandarin (and English) speaking children: 
the verb for want is amongst the earliest mental verbs in child language, and think – even though 
there is a verb uniquely expressing it in Cantonese – emerges significantly later.  
Summarizing Tardif and Wellman made two major observations:  
i) in Cantonese/Mandarin belief and desire can be expressed by the same grammatical 
construction, a construction that is syntactically relatively simple and does not equal the 
complexness of embedded sentential complements and lacks the finiteness of English, 
ii) yet desires are talked about earlier and more frequently than belief. These data indicate 
that the desire-belief gap is a cognitive universality independent of language, culture and 
parental language input (English parents talked to their children about thinking in 21% of 
the mental state references, Chinese parents hardly did that), and that belief, even when 
expressed via simplex syntactic structures, is mastered later than desire.  
 
3.6.2 Empirical counterevidence: German 
As a follow-up Perner et al. (2003) conducted a study with German speaking preschoolers. 
Generally Perner defines language's role in FB reasoning as a minor one: language is merely the 
scaffolding for the input the child needs for developing FB understanding. Agreeing with de Villiers 
that around the age of 4 years children undergo a drastic change in their cognitive development 
(namely the step of FB understanding) he and his colleagues point out that the changes are due to a 
"conceptual progression" in the child's cognition.  
Concerning Tardif & Wellman's (2000) findings Perner et al. point out that even if their results 
threaten linguistic determinism, they were still compatible with de Villiers' claim that finite 
complements are crucial for developing a FB understanding because the Chinese and Mandarin data 
only proved that simplex linguistic structures do not contribute to ToM. Therefore Perner et al. 
intended to prove the reverse, too: they investigated the issue in German speaking children because 
German provides an interesting deviation from English (and Chinese) in mental language. Unlike 
English the grammatical structure of sentential complementation is not only used for communication 
verbs (like sagen (dass) = say (that)) and belief verbs (like glauben (dass) = believe (that)), it is also 
obligatory for a certain type of desire verb construction. This way Perner et al. could investigate the 
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emergence of the concepts of desire and belief and their relation to complement structures. The 
distribution of desire structures in German works like this: 
i) desires towards the subject of the sentence work just like the English version: the verb 
takes an infinite to-infinitive as its complement: 
(19) a. Mother wants to go to bed. 
 b. Mutter will ins Bett gehen. 
ii) desires towards the object of the sentence though obligatorily are expressed by 
embedding a sentential complement under the desire-verb which is where German (21) 
differs categorically from English (20): 
(20) a. Mother wants Andreas to go to bed. 
 b. * Mother wants that Andreas goes to bed. 
(21) a. * Mutter will Andreas ins Bett gehen. 
b. * Mutter will Andreas ins Bett zu gehen. 
 c. Mutter will, dass Andreas ins Bett geht 
Conceptually Perner et al. take on two aspects. For one they claim (in contrast to de Villiers) that 
all propositional attitudes share the feature that their embedded proposition can be false and the 
embedding matrix sentence can be true – this would include desires, too. The difference is rather 
that in the case of believe and say the truth value of the proposition renders the statement or the 
belief true or false whereas in the case of want it determines whether the desire is fulfilled or 
unfulfilled. Secondly, Perner et al. present two alternative ways of resolving the desire-belief gap. 
What de Villiers explains via syntactic complexity (i.e. that desire comes earlier because it's 
syntactically simpler) can be accounted for by an ecological explanation that assumes a greater 
pragmatic value in mastering desires earlier than belief (see Fodor 1992). The other alternative 
assumes a conceptual progress in children's understanding of mental states as representational (see 
Flavell 1988, Perner 1988;1991), so child development goes from understanding that people relate to 
either true or false propositions to the understanding that people can also relate to false 
propositions as true of the world (see Perner et al. 2003: 180). The difference to de Villiers' approach 
is that her explanation is based on the grammatical structures that the concepts are expressed by in 
a particular linguistic environment, which ultimately means that children who grow up in a linguistic 
environment where belief is implemented in simple and early-developing syntax the understanding 
of belief should emerge earlier. German children would be expected to understand object desires as 
late as belief because they are both expressed by finite complement structures. On the conceptual 
level de Villiers argues that it is natural for belief understanding to emerge later: the acquisition of 
belief syntax and the understanding of false propositions are based analogously on communication 
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events of misspeaking and lying (see de Villiers 2000); as speaking is overtly observable and directly 
perceivable it is valid for them to be understood earlier than the hidden and covert events of 
thinking. Perner et al. retort that desires are just as hidden and covert as beliefs, which means that 
desires should be understood significantly later than acts of misspeaking, too. Given the data 
presented above Perner et al. argue against the prediction that a different grammatical environment 
triggers a different order of concept understanding and test German children on the subject.  
Prediction. The prediction was that there is a significant lag between understanding complement 
structures in desires compared to communication and belief scenarios proving that complementation 
is not sufficient for the development of FB understanding in preschoolers.  
Testing. Two rounds of experiments were conducted, the first one with children aged between 
3;6 and 4;8 years, the second one with younger children aged between 2;5 and 4;5 years. The second 
experiment was necessary because the authors wanted to prove that the differences they found 
were not just small surface lags but really a substantial developmental difference in understanding 
mental concepts. For both experiments six memory for complements tasks were conducted to show 
a difference between verbs of desire, belief and communication (all test stories had a discrepancy 
with reality), for FB assessment two change of location tasks were used. For language assessment the 
sentential complement task was used (see 0). In experiment one children were confronted with 
sketches of two rooms; in experiment two an acted out version with a speaking doll in front of a 
cardboard wall was preferred. The three different conditions had three different types of questions 
followed by two control questions: 
i) Want scenario:  "What does Mom / the puppet want Andy / the rabbit to do?" 
   "Was will die Mutter, dass Andreas tut?" 
ii) Say scenario:  "What did Mom / the puppet say that Andy / the rabbit was doing?" 
   "Was hat die Mutter gesagt, dass Andreas tut?" 
iii) Think scenario: "What does Mom / the puppet think that Andy  / the rabbit is doing?" 
   "Was glaubt die Mutter, dass Andreas tut?" 
iv) Control Questions:  
a. Reality Question: What is Andy / the rabbit really doing? 
b. See question: Can Mom and Dad / Can the puppet see what he is doing? 
In the want-condition the mother/the puppet was asked what Andreas/the rabbit should do whereas 
in the say and think scenarios the mother/the puppet was asked what Andreas/the rabbit is doing. So 
what was actually said was either "Andreas/The rabbit should go to bed" or "Andreas/The rabbit is 
going to bed" which means that the children really had to infer the complement rather than merely 
remember it.  
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The FB scenarios were acted out with toy figures in which a book was transferred; when the 
character returned children were asked a FB question of prediction ("Where will Max look first for his 
book?") and two memory check questions ("Where did Max put the book in the beginning?" and 
"Who put it there?"). 
Results. Children found it much easier to remember what somebody wanted than what 
somebody said or thought. The complements for events of saying or thinking were about as difficult 
as mastering FB tasks. In experiment 2 the results showed that the want-condition was easier for 
children of all ages. In contrast to experiment 1 children in experiment 2 found it easier to 
understand (remember) the say-complements which might be due to the fact that acting out the 
scene with puppets (i.e. having an actual speaker and not merely a report on what somebody said) 
made it easier to spot what was actually said. Improvement over the age groups was significant for 
the think-condition and the FB tasks, but not for the want- and say-conditions as children scored high 
on those right away.  
In sum both experiments showed that the want-condition in the sentential complements task 
was substantially easier than the say- and think-condition although the syntactic constructions are 
the same. These facts are still compatible with what linguistic determinism says about English 
speaking children, but the German evidence is bad news for linguistic determinism because the 
complexity of language is the same for want and think. De Villiers' bootstrapping theory (i.e. syntactic 
structures for think are acquired via bootstrapping from communication verbs) is also threatened as 
want-complements were easier for children than say-complements (although in experiment 2 the lag 
between want and say was smaller). Perner et al. conclude that the mastery of mental state syntax 
cannot be the inevitable prerequisite for acquiring an understanding for mental states because these 
syntactic structures are mastered by German children significantly earlier than FB are understood. 
The authors mention the English verb pretend because it behaves like want in German: it takes a 
finite that-complement in object-directed pretense and is mastered by noticeably earlier than in 
development say and think. The data presented here confirm the developmental progression from a 
"desire psychology" to a "belief-desire psychology" (Wellman 1990) which is compatible with Chinese 
(Tardif & Wellman 2000) and English (Bartsch & Wellman 1995). 
The authors conclude that their approach of a "conceptual progress" in children's 
understanding of the mind as representational is confirmed: young children understand embedded 
propositions that refer to existing or non-existing situations; only later they understand embedded 
propositions that are false with respect to the world but represented to be true in someone's mind. 
Linguistic determinism has been limited strongly: cross-linguistic grammatical differences leave the 
developmental schedule for belief and desire unchanged.   
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3.7 Second Lap – 2005 
 
After ten years of intense research and controversy on the interface between language and ToM 
the conference "Why language matters for Theory of Mind" was held in Toronto in 2002 (published 
in book-form in 2005). This led to a kind of "second step" in theoretical discussion which will be 
represented in this overview by its protagonists, Jill de Villiers and Perner. The third article relevant 
to this thesis by Peter de Villiers contains only preliminary data of a study by Schick and colleagues 
(Schick, de Villiers, de Villiers & Hoffmeister 2007) which is why this will be discussed instead. 
 
3.7.1 J. de Villiers 2005 
It was de Villiers' turn to deal with the major problem discussed in section 3.6.1: the belief-desire 
gap. Her approach, whose central claim was that the acquisition of complementation syntax alone is 
responsible for developing a FB understanding, could not account for new data from languages like 
Chinese (because Mandarin and Cantonese have other ways of expressing belief) or German 
(because complementation emerges significantly earlier in development than FB understanding). De 
Villiers acknowledged that the structure of sentential complementation in its isolated form cannot be 
the one and only relevant component for developing FB understanding any more. She theorizes that 
it must be a combination of the embedding verb (which after all selects the complement sentence) 
and its class, the syntactic structure it projects and finally the unique semantic intricacies connected 
to them. In other words, neither mental vocabulary, semantic-conceptual structures nor syntactic 
configurations are responsible for FB reasoning – it is the combination of the three. To get the full-
fledged representation of a verb like think a child has to undergo three steps in language acquisition 
that are interdependent and only their combination unfolds the full nature of the verb (cf. J. de 
Villiers 2005):  
a) The lexical meaning. It refers to a hidden activity or state of mind and does not contain 
potential cues to its propositional nature yet; at this point it could still be a mere reflection of 
reality.  
b) The syntactic structure, acquired via syntactic bootstrapping (cf. Gleitman 1990) from 
communication verbs which hints the child that think takes propositions as its content. 
c) The (abstract) feature indicating potential falseness of the complement is the breakthrough 
in the mastery of the mental verb acquisition. De Villiers emphasizes that this is not only 
conceptual development because semantics and syntax are intertwined here and the 
consequences of this feature are by all means syntactic. 
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3.7.1.1 The developmental progression of verb acquisition 
De Villiers negates that the acquisition of verbs is of pure conceptual nature as different verbs 
show different syntactic behavior and operations, e.g. the sentences in (22a) and (22b) appear to 
have identical syntactic structures which would mean that the verbs belong to the same verb class: 
(22)  a. She forgot that he arrived late.  
 b. She thought that he arrived late. 
As soon as syntactic operations are taken into account though we see a different picture:  
(23)   a. * Wheni did she forget that he arrived ti?  
b. Wheni did she think that he arrived ti?              (J. de Villiers 2005: 194) 
Although in their declarative form it seems that sentence (22a) containing a factive verb (here: 
forget, others: remember, know) and sentence (22b) containing a non-factive verb (here: think, 
others: say, believe) have the same syntactic structure, when syntactic operations are applied (23) 
the picture changes: long distance WH-movement is only possible with sentence (22b) while it is 
ungrammatical with sentence (22a). Although they seem to have identical structures on the surface, 
their underlying syntactic configurations differ. This could potentially mean differences in acquisition 
and with respect to cognitive effect. De Villiers' hypothesis is that non-factive verbs form their very 
own verb class and are therefore categorically different from other verbs like want. Her claim is that 
there is a certain developmental progression in verb acquisition: initially all verbs are summed up in 
one verb class; in the course of development they differentiate and start forming sub-classes.  
To define say and think as a unique verb class, de Villiers refers to the theory of the realis/irrealis 
dichotomy in Bickerton's (1981) sense. If a sentence is in realis mode it means that it makes a claim 
to the truth of a proposition. Realis mode is usually expressed via finiteness (e.g. "He said she left") 
whereas the irrealis mode (when sentences make a claim to a potential situation) is expressed via 
infinite (e.g. "He wants to go") or modal (should, would) forms. The realis-irrealis distinction is 
universal to language and can even be found in Creole languages (cf. J. de Villiers 2005: 195).  
Want. It emerges very early in the child's vocabulary (one of the "most common 50 words in 
English" cf. Fenson et al. 1993). According to de Villiers the acquisition of want starts when the child 
perceives visible and physical struggle to get hold of an object (the a person shows a "yearning" 
towards an object and is reaching, pointing, struggling to get it and displaying despair, rage at its 
removal etc.) which leads to the first (partial) mapping onto the lexical item. In the next phase 
reference to invisible/absent objects becomes apparent which is the first step of want silhouetting 
against other verbs like kick and carry as it is directed towards a prospective target now. This renders 
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the verb's object to be irrealis. This irrealis character of want is part of its conceptual make-up and 
indicates that desires relate to the world in a different way than beliefs do. The most complex type of 
desire is only mastered at age 3 and is always irrealis. De Villiers mentions that e.g. German and 
Chinese do not have an overt linguistic means to mark this case of irrealis overtly.  
Say. The first context in which children will hear this verb is when it refers to the contents of an 
event of actual speech. This verb is a special case as it can be both realis (24a) and irrealis (24b): 
 (24) a. Mom said you liked the movie. 
  b. Mom said you should clean up.          (J. de Villiers 2005) 
As speech is observable (what is said and what is happening can be perceived directly) the mapping 
happens overtly, too. The relevant step is when mismatches between speech and act enter the 
child's perception. The first false complements that the child is confronted with are found in contexts 
in which what was said does not match reality. When first responding to sentences like "She said the 
apple was blue" children will probably simply reject the whole sentence saying 'No', but "with time 
and exposure" (p. 201) the child starts to understand that the whole sentence is true although it 
contains something false. This is the crucial step on the developmental path of say: the special nature 
of non-factive complements is understood at some point which is when say classifies into its own 
verb class, a special class of realis verbs with the potential of bearing a false complement.  
Think. This verb constitutes a challenge for the child as it is not manifest in behavior, so it is not 
directly observable. To be able to make inferences about the meaning of the verb behavioral cues 
like e.g. mistakes are necessary – but slipping on a banana peel won't do because not even grownups 
"make the effort" to ascribe the faller the FB that the floor was actually clean. Only intentional cause-
directed behavior that seems strange or is deviant from expectations makes it necessary to activate 
and reflect on the contents of beliefs. In child language think emerges significantly later than want 
which indicates that its meaning is not as easily deducible. First the child learns the label, the 
meaning of the verb that refers to something private, internal. Also, the child can observe that think 
behaves like say in a lot of ways, e.g. it can be realis as well as irrealis: 
 (25) a. He thinks you did a good job. 
  b. He thinks you should go tomorrow.  
Due to this syntactic overlap, think can be classified to be just like say and via analogy the child can 
have the insight that false complements are possible with think, too. In contrast to say the verb think 
only occurs in situations without overt utterances which enables the child to conclude that think 
refers to private inner events.  
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Pretend. As mentioned in Perner et al. (2003) the verb pretend behaves like wollen (want) in 
German. It occurs significantly earlier in child language than think and can take sentential 
complements. De Villiers points out that treating pretend like think and say would be short-sighted. 
Although they can all take a finite complement that is false with respect to the world (see (26a-c)): 
 (26) a. He pretended that the block was a car. 
  b. He said that the block was a car.  
  c. He thought that the block was a car. 
pretend is not part of the verb class that say and think form because it allows for infinitivals ("He 
pretended to be a bunny"), it cannot enter passivized forms ("*He was pretended to be a miser") and 
it is not combinable with direct complements ("*He pretended: "Come here, you villain!") (p. 203). 
De Villiers concludes that even if pretend shares certain syntactic properties with say and think these 
verbs would never be treated alike, not even if the child has not acquired verb meaning, syntactic 
consequences or verb classifications yet. The developmental path by de Villiers (p. 203-205): 
"*…+the child begins with all verbs having the same status, as realis connected to ongoing events. This is 
undoubtedly a brief period, because we know want is an early verb of the irrealis type. Want-NP splits off, 
and from that branch grow the extensions into propositional forms under want. Slightly later, pretend does 
the same thing, with the more frequent form pretend to leading to the still irrealis form pretend that. Soon 
thereafter, the child recognizes the distinction between the irrealis and realis forms of say, and then think. 
But the realis "say that" splits off, and the form is marked as special, in that false complements are now 
possible. By analogy, "think that" (realis) also splits off and is absorbed into that verb class."  
 
3.7.1.2 First evidence for the developmental path 
Preliminary evidence from an experiment de Villiers conducted shows that 3-year-old children 
never treat realis-sentences as irrealis. The questions listed below were used in a Complement 
Comprehension Task (see J. de Villiers 2005: 206, table 10.1):  
A. Mom says, "Tell Bella to play on the computer." while a picture shows that Bella is painting, 
i.e. in this situation we have an unfulfilled desire.  
 "Does Mom want Bella to play on the computer?"   Yes 
"Does Mom think Bella should play on the computer?"   Yes 
"Does Mom want Bella to paint a picture?"    No 
"Does Mom think Bella should paint a picture?"   No 
 
B. Mom says, "I'm so happy because Bella is playing on the computer." while a picture shows 
that Bella is painting, i.e. in this situation we have a FB. 
"Does Mom want Bella playing on the computer?   Yes 
"Does Mom think Bella is playing on the computer?"   Yes 
"Does Mom want Bella painting a picture?"    No 
"Does Mom think Bella is painting a picture?    No 
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The questions in scenario A are about a desire that Mum expressed, i.e. it is an irrealis setting. 
Scenario B is a FB setting in realis mode. The questions "Does Mom think Bella is playing on the 
computer?" and "Does Mom think Bella is painting a picture?" are in realis mode (questions of the 
type "think… is"), all the other questions are irrealis. If children would be blind towards the 
realis/irrealis-distinction one of the two assumptions would have to be active: 
a) they take a realis position: all questions that mention a currently false situation (i.e. Mum's 
desire/belief) would be rejected and the ones containing current reality would be accepted 
b) they take an irrealis position: all questions are judged irrespective of current reality  
The results show that children are sensitive towards the realis/irrealis-distinction: children at the age 
of 3 didn't experience any problems with the three irrealis scenarios, so they could answer 
"want…to" "want…that" and "think…should" correctly (3,5 out of 4 were answered correctly). The 
realis questions with "think…is" on the other hand were difficult for them (only 1,5 out of 4 were 
answered correctly). This means that children never took "think…is" to mean "think…should", i.e. 
they never treated the realis case as being irrealis. Because they cannot represent that Mum has a FB 
and therefore they rather say what Bella is actually doing. 
3.7.1.3 The Point of View-marker 
The third and last step in acquiring the linguistic means of expressing and understanding FB is the 
acquisition of an abstract syntactic feature that is located in the embedded CP of the syntactic 
construction. We already know that this feature is responsible for marking the CP as having an 
independent truth condition. In other words, the use of a non-factive mental verb in the matrix 
clause projects a point of view onto everything structurally subordinated to the verb, namely the 
point of view of the person bearing the mental state. The very general concept of "Point of View" 
(PoV) that can be found all across linguistic structures is used by de Villiers and colleagues to refer to 
the relation between a verb and its complement claiming that a complement introduces a different 
PoV (namely a subject-PoV) based on the verb that chooses the complement: 
 (27) Peter thinks PoV-subject CP[ a unicorn is dancing in the garden ] 
So here, think assigned a subject-Point-of-view on the complement (the "subject" of the matrix 
clause, "Peter") which accounts for the discrepancy that from our perspective the complement is 
false (because it was only the mule with an ice cone glued to his head dancing in the garden) and 
true from Peter's perspective (who actually believes in unicorns and therefore happily mistook the 
horned mule as a unicorn). This makes the subject-PoV a distinctive feature that is dictated by the 
say-think-class. In the broader sense this means that every clause is associated with a PoV, for the CP 
of main clauses it's the speaker-PoV, for embedded complements it's the subject-PoV. 
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This also affects noun phrases within the subordinated CP: a DP (so an NP with a definite article) has 
its own PoV but a bare noun phrase (NP) inherits the PoV of the CP. We are not entitled to say (28): 
 (28) Peter thought that a mule was dancing in the garden. 
because the NP inherits Peter's view which is: the animal in the garden is a unicorn. Correct is:  
(29)  PoV-speaker CP [ r Peter thought PoV-subject CP [ that PoV-speaker DP [ r the mule ] was dancing in DP 
[ the garden ] ] ] 
Of course when it comes to linguistic principles like c-command these implications and assumptions 
are endangered quickly (more in chapter 4). Summing up, the properties of the PoV-marker are: 
i) it is abstract and universal, in contrast to the complementizer that it is present in all CPs 
ii) the kind of PoV is dictated by the verb that chooses the complement (structure) 
iii) it refers either to the speaker or to the subject of the sentence 
iv) indefinite NPs inherit the PoV of their nearest CP while definite NPs (=DPs) have their own 
De Villiers stresses that this marker has direct syntactic relevance as it only occurs on certain types of 
phrases and might have effects on WH-extraction. It also helps to overcome "superficially identical 
complements under want and think" as in German and Mandarin/Cantonese.  
 
3.7.2 Perner, Zauner & Sprung 2005 
After de Villiers' syntactic argument (desire verbs only take infinite complements whereas mental 
verbs take tensed complements) was proven (partly) wrong by empirical evidence (Tardif & Wellman 
2000, Perner et al. 2003), she was trying to enforce the theoretical relevance of the desire-belief gap 
in child development showing evidence that preschoolers treat think…is categorically different from 
think…should and want…to. She backs this up by the conceptual distinction of realis and irrealis mode 
of utterances. This enables de Villiers to make desire categorically different from belief, which is 
exactly what she needs to prove that want can be neglected for investigating the development of FB 
understanding. In opposition to that, Perner et al. try to emphasize the insuperable link between 
want and think. First, they show that both desires and beliefs are propositional attitudes; looking at 
them as cognitive and conative attitudes their difference can be contained but the necessary link 
(that is oblivious to the realis-irrealis dichotomy) is also made visible. Secondly they point out a 
crucial observation in desire complexity: complex desires like wicked and differing desires are just as 
difficult for young children as beliefs are. 
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Propositional attitudes. The concept of "propositional attitude" is used whenever a state or an 
attitude is mapped onto a proposition, i.e. when it is described how something or someone relates to 
a certain proposition. This usually is encoded by a matrix clause embedding a complement sentence 
(i.e. sentential complementation), which creates an opaque or intensional context for the embedded 
sentence (a semantic independence of the matrix sentence). Propositional attitudes are not truth 
functional; according to de Villiers this is indicated by a syntactic feature (PoV marker) that causes a 
crucial difference between factive verbs (communication and mental verbs) and desire verbs. 
Because of this semantic uniqueness de Villiers' claim would have to be that only communication and 
mental verb constructions are propositional attitudes. Perner et al. argue that desires, too, are 
propositional attitudes because the truth value of matrix clause and embedded clause are 
independent of each another in desire constructions and the proposition of a desire can be 
unfulfilled which is an equivalent of false.  
Cognitive and conative attitudes. Following Hilgard (1980) Perner et al. distinguish cognitive 
from conative attitudes: cognitive attitudes represent the state of the world accurately and therefore 
make a claim about truth. In theoretical discussion about FB and statements there is a tendency to 
transfer the falseness of the proposition to the falsehood of the attitude. If de Villiers and de Villiers 
(2000: 198, cited after Perner et al. 2005: 225) claim that "only complements of mental and 
communication verbs can be 'false' propositions" they really refer to the falseness of the attitude 
rather than the falseness of the proposition. The purpose of cognitive attitudes is only fulfilled if their 
proposition is true, e.g. when someone says to own a piece of chocolate this is only true if the 
proposition "I own a piece of chocolate" is true. Conative attitudes on the other hand are expressed 
by mental states or statements that stipulate how the world is desired to be. The falseness of the 
embedded proposition is not translated into a "false desire" but an "unsatisfied desire", so falseness 
as such is reserved for mental and communication verbs. Conative states are only fulfilled if the 
world is adapting to those desires. "I want a piece of chocolate" is only fulfilled if "I own a piece of 
chocolate" is true. (see Perner et al. 2005: 225). So in a manner of speaking, "a piece of chocolate" 
mapped onto "I" via a desire verb construction is only true if there is a piece of chocolate that is 
eventually owned by "I". In a sentence like "I want to have a grass-green elephant" an attitude is 
discrepant with respect to reality or its ability to be fulfilled – yet the statement itself can be true.  
So both "He thinks that he owns a piece of chocolate" and "He wants to own a piece of 
chocolate" can be true statements irrespective of the fact that in both cases the embedded 
proposition can be false. Both cognitive and conative verbs can bear false propositions, only the 
falseness of attitudes is exclusive to cognitive verbs. Perner et al. draw the conclusion that the 
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property of an independent truth value has to be extended to desire verbs and needs further 
explanation (i.e. de Villiers' PoV-marker would also be relevant for desire verbs).  
Differing perspectives – complex desires. Different perspectives can occur in realis but – as 
Perner et al. point out – also in irrealis situations and sentences, e.g.: "I want myself to win and him 
to lose while he wants himself to win and me to lose" (Perner et al. 2005: 232). Interestingly, desires 
like that are only understood by children around the age they start understanding beliefs although 
there is no cross-linguistic syntactic backup to explain this (no complementation and supposedly no 
PoV-marker). A perspective difference is constituted by two different representations of one and the 
same situation or target. When we deal with two different representations, the easiest way to find 
out if there is a perspective problem according to Perner et al (2005: 233 ff.) is trying to integrate the 
two representations into one. If this is possible without contradiction ("within the powers of our 
imagination" p. 234), the representational targets of the two representations are different ones; only 
when the representational target is one and the same, integration resp. conjunction of two different 
representations fails and points towards a perspective problem. Simple desires usually don't create a 
perspective problem, not even when they differ (e.g. if Abe wants a banana and Bea wants an apple, 
the two desired propositions can simply be conjoined). With incompatible desires, as in e.g. the 
penny hiding game, this is not possible any more: "you find the penny" and "you do not find the 
penny" cannot be conjoined without contradiction. Studies have shown that children show 
competitive behavior (the desire to find the penny, not helping the opponent finding it and 
disappointment when not finding it resp. when the opponent found it) only rather late – following 
Gratch (1964) children aged 2;9 did not show any competitive behavior at all, only around the age of 
4;6 a bit more than half of the test group did. Only at 6 years of age all children showed competitive 
behavior. Perner et al. interpret these and similar data like this: younger children are not able to 
represent what the opponent wants when they themselves want something else. It is not merely an 
inability "to inhibit their preoccupation with their own desire and own knowledge of the world and 
that failure makes it difficult to focus on what someone else wants or believes" (p. 234), as this 
would mean that children should be hypercompetitive in the penny hiding game. The perspective 
problem cannot be integrated unless points of view ("I want to find the penny and he wants me to 
not find the penny") are brought in. In Moore et al.'s study (1995) young children, when asked about 
the opponent's desire, would always answer with their own desire which shows that there is a 
perspective problem about one particular representational target – otherwise there would be no 
problem in acknowledging a different desire. Proof for that assumption comes from studies where 
the representational targets are two different ones: in a study by Daxeder & Feichtinger (2003) 
children had to play an opponent where two dice and two pegs were used; at the age of 3;8 over 
80% of the children were able to correctly answer what color the opponent wants his die to show 
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and what color they themselves want their die to show ("my die shows blue" and "the other's die 
shows red" are perfectly integrable). Another aspect in complex desires are wicked desires: when 
somebody wants an objectively undesirable outcome children have difficulties projecting the correct 
emotions. Young children understand that happiness is a function of goal satisfaction when dealing 
with neutral goals, but if the protagonist e.g. wants to hit somebody, children fail to conclude that 
the protagonist will be happy if he hit the desired target (cf. Yuill, Perner, Pearson, Peerbhoy et al. 
1996). Being bodily hurt is "unnegotiably bad *…+ the protagonist is involved in an 'objectively' 
undesirable situation and won't be happy" (Perner et al. 2005: 238).  
Looking at subjective preferences interesting findings have been made: Bartsch and Wellman 
(1995) point out that 3 year olds are able to say things like "I don't like shaving cream…Daddy likes 
shaving cream". In experiments with yucky and yummy food (e.g. broccoli and crackers in Repacholi 
& Gopnik 1997) children older than 18 months are able to hand the experimenter the food they 
themselves find undesireable (e.g. broccoli) when the experimenter expressed earlier that he 
preferred that to the other food (cracker), even when the child's preference was the other way 
round. Perner et al. explain that this is not a problem for what was claimed earlier: children can 
capture different individuals being part of situations which can be seen as "objectively" desirable or 
undesirable – so "Shaving cream applied to daddy" is objectively desirable while "shaving cream 
applied to my cheeks" is then objectively undesirable. Subsequently this does not require an 
understanding of point of view or perspectives. For Perner et al. the question remains why this 
cannot be applied to wicked desires: if children create a combination of "protagonist" + "hitting" and 
apply it to an objective desirability they should be able to predict the protagonists' happiness. This 
might be because a third person, a "hittee", is involved. 
 
3.7.3 Deaf children: Schick et al. 2007 
Schick et al. (2007) conducted a longitudinal study to assess deaf children's scores on the 
language and ToM interface more closely. The authors seek to investigate three predictions (p. 381): 
1) "If language skills do not contribute to the understanding of cognitive states, then language-
delayed deaf children should not be delayed in ToM as long as the language demands of the tasks 
are irrelevant. 
2) If general language skills do matter, then either vocabulary or general grammar should predict 
how well children do on ToM reasoning, whether the task is low or high verbal. 
3) If grammar contributes as a representational tool, then complement mastery with communication 
verbs should predict reasoning about others' beliefs and knowledge states, whether the task is 
verbal or low-verbal." 
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In contrast to previous studies Schick et al. wanted to avoid methodological flaws: in previous 
studies interpreters with questionable status of fluency were used for the testing; children were 
required to look at material and watch the interpreter talk at the same time; in most studies only 
verbal tasks were used to assess ToM abilities which might lead to limited mastery due to language 
limitations rather than ToM limitations. Previous studies often did not use sophisticated language 
measures (e.g. only a language proficiency profile was used, filled out by teachers – e.g. Lundy 2002). 
Schick et al. therefore wanted to examine the possible connection between complement syntax10 (in 
ASL) and performance on FB tasks. Although many previous studies have shown to a certain extent 
that deaf children with language delays are also delayed in FB understanding, none has shown the 
specific role of language for that delay.  
Study Design. Four groups of children between 4 and 7 years of age were tested for measures of 
nonverbal IQ and memory, ToM measures and language measures – orally taught deaf children of 
hearing parents (DoH-oral; aged 6.06 on average) and ASL signing children of hearing parents (DoH-
ASL; aged 6.11 on average) as both groups usually show significant language delays (Schick et al. 
2007: 379); ASL signing children of deaf parents (DoD, "native" signers; aged 6.07 on average) who 
don't show significant language delays and therefore "provide a natural control for any effects of 
deafness per se" (p. 379). As a control hearing children were tested on the ToM-tasks only. Deaf 
children were tested in four to six rounds, hearing children in two rounds.  
Nonverbal IQ was assessed with the Pattern Construction subtest of the Differential Ability Scales 
(DAS; Elliott 1990) and Knox’s Cube Test of nonverbal sequence memory (Stone & Wright 1979). For 
FB assessment the following methods were used:  
- 3 unseen-change-in-location tasks in the form of picture sequences (children were asked 
where the protagonist would "first look" when getting the memory check questions correct) 
- 2 unexpected contents tasks (questions: own previous belief and a friend's supposed belief) 
- Low verbal ToM tasks: the hidden sticker task and the surprise face game. 
Oral deaf children assigned the following language assessment measures: 
- Spoken one-word vocabulary comprehension and production was assessed via a picture-
based tests of word knowledge (PPVT-R Dunn & Dunn 1981)  
- Spoken English syntax comprehension without complement clauses (Clinical Evaluation of 
Language Function for preschoolers – CELF-Preschool Wiig, Secord & Semel 1992) 
                                                          
10
 In ASL communication and mental verbs can take embedded propositions as their complements which can also be false 
(but there is no overt complementizer) and there is a distinction between realis and irrealis form shown by explicit lexical 
tense markers, lexical modals and nonverbal markers (cf. Schick et al. 2007: 380). 
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- Comprehension of false complement clauses (Memory for complements task cf. de Villiers & 
Pyers 2002): A two-sentenced anecdote was accompanied by two photographs in which a 
character tells a lie or makes a mistake. The question then was "What did s/he tell X?". 
The ASL children, too, got tested in the three language competences like the oral deaf children but 
the tests had to be designed for the occasion as there are no standardized tests for ASL signers: 
- Receptive ASL Vocabulary Test (ASLVT) (the PPVT-R couldn't be used because of the iconicity 
of some signs of the corresponding English version). 
- Comprehension of ASL syntax: the experimenter signed a sentence and the child had to pick 
the correct picture out of three or four. The test "included sentences in which a syntactic 
object was topicalized and moved to a sentence-initial position *…+ complex forms of verb 
agreement, a morphological marker for person, with several participants in a scene." (p. 385) 
- Comprehension of false complement clauses could be assessed by translating the 
communication verb items from English into ASL.  
Results. The results showed that for the verbal FB tasks hearing children's scores were 
indistinguishable from DoD-ASL children, while both groups of DoH scored significantly worse. This 
rules out that language of instruction and testing (ASL vs. English) matters in this respect. For the low 
verbal tasks, too, children with normal language development performed equally and significantly 
outperformed children with language delays (DoH-ASL and DoH-oral). For all children all the language 
measures were significantly correlated with the verbal FB scores. For the low-verbal score only 
vocabulary and complementation were significantly related to ToM scores. A regression analysis 
showed that for the verbal FB score background measures like age were significant predictors and for 
both ASL native and oral deaf children a significant percentage of ToM variance could be accounted 
for by language skills (except general syntax). For low verbal tasks again the background measures 
were significant predictors and also language added significantly to ToM variance, communication 
verb complementation being the only independent significant predictor. Schick et al. draw the 
following conclusions: 
i) The delay in FB reasoning of deaf children of hearing parents is not due to deafness per 
se as ASL has proven to be just as well suited to communicate ToM as any spoken 
language. Prediction one (if language does not contribute to ToM then language delayed 
children's ToM should not be affected) was disconfirmed as regardless of tasks' language 
demands deaf children with language delays turned out to also be significantly delayed in 
FB reasoning and knowledge vs. ignorance understanding, a finding true for deaf children 
irrespective of their instructional language being English (oral deaf children) or ASL. ASL 
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natives and hearing children showed no significant differences on the verbal or low-
verbal ToM tasks, contrasts between ages 4, 5 and 6 showed no differences. 
ii) Failure in traditional FB tasks is not due to general meta-representational problems and 
also not to the tendency to give reality answers in test questions. Deaf children have a 
rich understanding of other kinds of mental states in other people like desires and 
emotions (cf. e.g. Rieffe & Terwogt 2000) (as long as the emotions are not based on FBs). 
This study has also shown that understanding simple emotions is not predicted by 
language measures but by age and nonverbal IQ. Deaf children also do not have a 
problem with physical representations (photographs) that depict a situation differing 
from present reality (false photography task – see de Villiers & Pyers 2001).  
iii) Delays in the inhibitory control features or in working memory being responsible for the 
deaf children's ToM delay cannot be ruled out completely but performance on Knox's 
cube task (which has "some loading on at least working memory" p. 391) was not 
affected by deafness, it has also been shown that deaf children are not delayed on 
executive function tasks (P. de Villiers 2005).  
iv) Prediction 2 (general language fosters ToM) wins over Prediction 3 (complement mastery 
only fosters ToM): general grammar skills did not predict ToM in this study, so language 
is not "a proxy (like age) for maturation" but necessary for ToM development. This is 
contradictory to Ruffman et al.'s (2003) findings in their longitudinal study that general 
language skills are better at predicting FB performance than an embedded clause 
measure11. Schick et al. claim that using communication verbs is a better way of getting 
the right complements without having to use FB related material, but this argument will 
not hold water in the discussion section of this thesis.  
v) The fact that vocabulary skills was also an independent predictor of ToM but general 
language wasn't is explained as follows: according to Schick et al. vocabulary acquisition 
is more directly related to conversation and discourse than general grammatical ability 
and is therefore a proxy for the exposure to conversation children experience. Of course, 
also de Villiers' claim that the mental terms are crucial in subsequently acquiring the 
syntactic structures is a possible explanation for this correlation.  
Schick et al. define "the optimal kind of input for a child to learn about others' false beliefs" (p. 392):  
1) time with exposure to ordinary life (it is insufficient, but probably necessary)  
                                                          
11
 note that  Ruffman et al. (2003) did not make use of embedded complements under a verb but embeddings like "The 
shoe that is above the triangle is red" (Ruffman et al. 2003: 147). They did not use complement clauses as they "entail false 
belief reasoning" (cf. Schick et al. 2007: 392).  
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2) language modality is irrelevant: both spoken and signed input foster FB understanding as 
long as it is complete (native) and the child is exposed to it early enough. 
3) sufficient access to language  
4) the ability to understand complement syntax 
They state that their data is not sufficient to settle the question whether prerequisite 4 – the 
understanding of complement syntax – is there because language gives access to the evidence about 
minds or because it bootstraps the necessary representations, but in combination with other 
evidence (e.g. training studies) the latter seems more plausible to Schick et al.  
In their closing paragraph they reveal something rather crucial. Assuming that "hearing full sentences 
or mental verbs and complements, together with some claim about their truth value, in the presence 
of a behavioral discrepancy, is the optimum condition for learning" (p. 393) Schick et al. admit that it 
might be the input of the parents that lacks certain conditions of this optimum – parents might not 
have the sign language abilities to engage in elaborate mental state talk, they might think it is too 
difficult for their impaired children, it might be limited due to reasons of time, cultural norms etc. 
"Without a way to connect the sentence structures to truth values, much of the linguistic input might 
be uninformative." (p. 393). The claim here should not be that language per se is sufficient without 
contents, semantics or counterparts in the real world, but this is yet another confession that it is 
more than syntactic structure that is important for FB reasoning development: semantics (i.e. truth 
values) and subsequently concepts. 
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3.8 Recent developments 
3.8.1 de Villiers & de Villiers 2009 
In this report de Villiers & de Villiers go back to the roots of linguistic determinism (de Villiers 
1995b) and sum up the crucial elements of what they call the "complement construct", assuming 
that every language has complements or at least a syntactically overt way of capturing others' 
mental states. The elements in which complements differ from all other complex syntactic structures 
are: Verb Types (complements only occur under communication and mental state verbs, which are 
responsible for syntactic bootstrapping), Truth (complements can be false independently of the truth 
of the matrix sentence), Reference (referential opacity is particular in complements as terms used 
within the complement are relative to the subject and not the speaker, unlike in other complex 
syntax like adjuncts), Wh-movement (only communication and mental state verb complements allow 
for WH-extraction as they impose a point of view – in contrast to factive complements like e.g. with 
forget) and Recursion (complements allow for recursion (one 'X thought that Y' can be embedded in 
another one etc.) whose meaning cannot be borne by e.g. discourse, so "Bill believed that Mary 
thought that John was ill" cannot be fully represented by "John was ill. Mary thought that. Bill 
believed that."). The current stance on the PoV-Marker is that "complements *…+ introduce a Point-
of-View on the clause" (it used to be the mental state verbs that introduce the PoV, cf. J. de Villiers 
2005) which renders the truth of the lower clause and the designation of objects in the lower clause 
relative to the subject. De Villiers and de Villiers rank the feature of Point of View the most crucial 
one for a representational ToM because it enables the representation of a false belief; it can be 
realized in different forms (for instance voice or pitch in tonal languages or propositions in languages 
lacking WH-movement; postural role shift in sign language might be another way to mark PoV).  
Empirical evidence. The authors sum up the most important evidence in favor of complement 
mastery fostering ToM development. They claim that is has been positively affirmed for languages 
with WH-movement like English and ASL, for non-WH-movement languages like Tibetan, 
furthermore for Turkish, Nicaraguan Sign Language and many more. The exception is Cantonese: 
Tardif et al. (2007) found that Cantonese speaking children showed correlations between 
complements and FB but children were generally doing very badly on the complement 
comprehension test even with 6 years of age. Another newer longitudinal study they mention is 
Tager-Flusberg & Joseph's (2005) which showed that in autistic children communication verb 
complement structures were the best predictor for changes in children's FB competence. De Villiers 
& de Villiers declare the results of the two training studies (Hale & Tager-Flusberg 2003 and Lohmann 
& Tomasello 2003) the most striking evidence for their case. Interestingly they mention that "the 
prediction is that mastery of complements open the doors to FB reasoning, but it does not say that 
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FB reasoning will inevitably follow" (p. 18) because training studies can fail although the theory 
behind them is correct. As for Perner et al.'s study on German children (2003) the authors 
acknowledge the point that the development really is conceptual rather than linguistic given the 
German data (also referring to the idea that memory for complement tasks are nothing but slightly 
simpler FB tasks cf. Ruffman et al. 2003) but declare the findings with deaf children too striking to be 
overcome by Perner's arguments. De Villiers & de Villiers argue that the desire-belief complex is 
polygenic, they think that "understanding desire seems to have no obvious linguistic prerequisites" 
(p. 20). Deaf children and children with SLI do not show delays on understanding desire and the 
according language (cf. P. de Villiers 2005) and furthermore the "semantics" of desire and belief 
sentences are categorically different as "there is no 'truth' index on the clause under want. It is an 
event that has yet to occur: it is an irrealis clause." (p. 20). Third, the modal interpretation of think 
("John thinks that she should go to bed") is categorically different from think…did and more like 
desires (i.e. think…should is also irrealis). Under the light of these observations de Villiers & de Villiers 
refine the nature of the crucial ingredient (i.e. complements) as "realis tensed complements" which 
is a concept available in both English and German.  
Communication verbs. On the role of communication verbs de Villiers & de Villiers emphasize 
that it is not enough for children to be exposed to people saying false things – these utterances must 
be encoded in the crucial syntactic embedding, the grammar enables the processing of the utterance 
in the situation and finally the understanding. Cross-linguistically the concept of complements varies, 
so the linguistic route via communication verbs is central in this developmental process. As for 
Cantonese de Villiers & de Villiers suggest that the children's poor performance on the complement 
comprehension tasks is due to the fact that the language does not have WH-movement and 
therefore Cantonese speaking children are prone to answer long distance WH-questions with respect 
to the lower clause only (in accordance to the locality constraint cf. Chomsky 2008). De Villiers and 
de Villiers suggest a test with a polar question such as: 
(30) Woman say bought apple? 
The question arises if this test is not removed from linguistic determinism's purpose completely then: 
now the only thing that is actually tested is whether the children understood the contents, not if the 
syntactic structure is available or understood. 
As for FB reasoning the authors cover the following points: 
Testing methods: the tasks used to assess children's understanding of FBs have been criticized as 
being "too unnatural" (Nelson 2005), as demanding more than just FB understanding (such as 
resisting the impulse to answer according to reality, working memory demands and other executive 
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function-related demands, see Carlson & Moses 2001), but de Villiers & de Villiers see this overruled 
by the findings in recent studies with deaf children (e.g. P. de Villiers 2005) where it was shown that 
a) deaf children do not lag behind in executive function tasks like they do in according language and 
FB tasks and b) high-verbal FB tasks are just as difficult for deaf children as their low-verbal 
analogues. 
Innateness and performance demands: Theories like Leslie's (1994) and Fodor's (1992) and 
empirical evidence as shown in Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) represent the view that children's 
innate FB reasoning competence is only clouded by performance demands. Onishi & Baillargeon 
showed in an eye-tracking study that 15 month old toddlers' expectancies are significantly distorted 
when protagonists in an unseen displacement task look in the new location of an object although 
they only witnessed the old location. De Villiers & de Villiers see these results as problematic as they 
are taken out of any behavioral context. They cite an older study (Clements & Perner 1994) in which 
children's looking direction was measured in a verbal unexpected transfer task before they were 
asked the FB reasoning question ("Where will the mouse look for his cheese?") with the result that 
children not younger than 2;11 looked in the correct direction above chance (but still failed the 
question itself). This study therefore establishes implicit understanding of FBs as emerging just 
before the explicit use of the knowledge. Perner and Ruffman (2005) ascribe the findings of Onishi & 
Baillargeon to primitive event cues: the toddlers form "lower-stimulus associations" between 
character&object&location and if any parameter is changed the gaze time increases. Then again, de 
Villiers & de Villiers report that a recent nonverbal version of Perner and Ruffman's (1994) study by 
Southgate, Senju & Csibra (2007) showed that 24 months old-children's eye gaze predicted correctly 
where a person would look for an object. The question crucial to de Villiers and de Villiers remains: 
"But why then does explicit 'deciding' where the person will look then take two more years?" (p. 27)  
Primates and FB: The discussion if primates have ToM at their command just as humans do is 
more or less closed – but with subcategories or neighboring capacities it is still alive in nowadays 
research. Povinelli & Vonk (2004) found that chimpanzees as well as children form a generalization of 
social cognition such as "A person seeking an object generally goes back to where they left it" – so a 
problem solving strategy that does not involve reference to mental states. De Villiers & de Villiers 
argue though that while these less sophisticated strategies only demand minimal tracking of what 
someone was watching respectively where someone has been last, their definition of FB reasoning 
includes true mental state social cognition (the person attends to where they believe for the object 
to be). The main difference between what Clements & Perner (1994), Onishi & Baillargeon (2005), 
Southgate et al. (2007) did is that linguistic determinism defines full competence in FB reasoning via 
a conscious explicit decision on the subject's part - for nonverbal assessment the sticker test by 
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Povinelli is widely used by linguistic determinists. As the latest studies with language delayed deaf 
children (P. de Villiers 2005; Schick et al. 2007) showed they are not able to solve this task before 
they master standard FB tasks although they are older and more socially adept than the normally 
developing control groups.  
New evidence with adults: Recently Newton & de Villiers (2007) made a new attempt at 
investigating typical adults' FB reasoning performance in connection with language. The subjects 
were confronted with video scenarios with unseen change in location tasks; the subjects then had to 
choose the appropriate ending sequence. During watching the video the subjects either had to a) 
follow varied rhythmic tapping and repeat it with a drumstick or b) repeat a voice telling a story. It 
turned out that the adults busy with the verbal shadowing chose the video with the true location (i.e. 
the incorrect answer) and only the adults busy with rhythmic tapping were able to pick the correct 
ending sequences. So when the brain is busy with language, unconscious FB reasoning is blocked – 
the blocking does not seem to be due to attention capacity. 
In order to reconcile this spectrum of results Carruthers (2007) for instance suggests that there 
are two different systems at work: system one is "fast, automatic and unconscious processing" and 
system two is the "slow, reflective and decision-making" instance of ToM. But with Carruthers 
believing in innateness and in language having a control function rather than a representational 
function de Villiers and de Villiers eventually are not satisfied. They acknowledge that there must be 
something to the eye-gaze tracking evidence piling up in favor of early FB understanding, but are 
very doubtful as to its range; looking time might be the "leading edge" of concept formation, but 
"any time a decision must be made, however nonverbal, and however simple a response, it looks as 
if FBs are not 'understood' until later" (p. 32). Furthermore, they doubt that it is only "a function of 
performance limitations" that cause the gap between implicit and explicit FB understanding, 
especially as hearing adults have everything fully developed but still cannot master understanding 
nonverbal FB videos when their language faculty is busy.  
 
3.8.2 Recent developments: Nicaraguan signers 
The latest report on Nicaraguan signers and their FB performance (related to their mental 
language) is by J. Pyers and A. Senghas (2009) comparing two testing periods. The findings Pyers 
made in 2001 with Nicaraguan signers of the first and second generation (see Pyers 2005, see section 
3.5.2.2) were compared to the developments these signers made over the course of two years –in 
2003 a second testing period was held. Having tested the participants for mental language by looking 
at the production of mental-state verbs ("because it correlates with the acquisition of sentential 
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complements, increases with general language ability" Pyers & Senghas 2009: 806) and for FB 
understanding by using a low-verbal picture-completion task based on the unseen displacement task 
the authors came to the following results. At time 1 (2001) first cohort signers used significantly less 
mental state terms than their second-cohort equivalents but the authors found no significant 
difference in use of desire-state verbs (both cohorts used them). In FB tests the second cohort (so 
the younger participants) significantly outperformed the first cohort participants and additionally all 
signers of the first cohort who did not sign any mental verbs also failed the FB tests. Interestingly, at 
testing time two the gap was gone: first cohort participants did no longer produce significantly less 
mental state verbs than the second cohort (every participant used at least one mental verb) and also 
the FB understanding improved accordingly. The authors' assumptions were the following: first of all, 
their findings are yet another proof that FB understanding is dependent on specific linguistic 
structures and furthermore that this is true also for adults lacking these structures. They conclude 
that "even 25 years of social experience" cannot compensate this. In no case FB understanding was 
observed first (i.e. before the respective language mastery) but overall they "do not argue that it 
[language development] is sufficient to enable this cognitive development" (Pyers & Senghas 2009: 
810). The surprising change from time one to time two in first cohort signers (namely that they would 
go from no FB reasoning and sentence complementation to successful versions of that) is explained 
by the fact that within those two years that lay between time one and two second cohort signers 
started socially interacting with first cohort signers and therefore Pyers and Senghas "hypothesize 
that  *…+ first-cohort signers were exposed to a form of NSL that was richer than their own and that 
included the new mental-state words produced by their younger peers" (Pyers & Senghas 2009: 810). 
Pyers' hypothesis (2005) that first cohort signers previously relied on emotion and desire 
understanding to function socially was proven to be feasible by these new data and findings. The 
authors rule out that mere information exchange as a social process (cf. Hobson 2004) or observing 
others making mistakes due to ignorance as sole triggers for cognitive maturation. The authors' 
central observation is that the first-cohort signers were able to both acquire new linguistic structures 
and subsequently mature cognitively between ages 26 and 28 – an age which is not usually known 
for specific cognitive maturation or development. This would also render these language and 
cognitive structures as time-insensitive regarding their development. An implicit claim that is quite 
strong.  
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3.9 Summary  
3.9.1  The quintessence of linguistic determinism 
Summing up we can say that linguistic determinism nowadays relies on two major factors: 
theoretically and conceptually it depends on the semantic and syntactic factors of a polygeneous set 
of linguistic variables: verbs and its meanings, their supposed acquisitional powers (i.e. syntactic 
bootstrapping), syntactic configurations and again their semantic intricacies. Furthermore, the 
seemingly radical difference between desires and beliefs in child development (cf. belief-desire gap) 
cognitively and linguistically seem to corroborate the firmness of linguistic determinism's arguments. 
Empirically the strongest evidence supporting linguistic determinism on the one hand comes from 
training studies such as Hale & Tager-Flusberg's (2003) and Lohmann & Tomasello's (2003) and on 
the other hand from deaf populations with language delays (e.g. Pyers 2005, Schick et al. 2007). The 
arguments that weaken those two basic arguments come from different directions. The conceptual 
weaknesses concern general cognitive issues. The belief-desire gap is not as deep as it seems: 
especially Perner (see Perner et al. 2003, 2005) put a lot of effort into pointing out that desires and 
beliefs do share conceptual properties (e.g. they both are expressed in propositional attitudes and 
therefore (can) have the same representational complexity) and especially in their complex forms are 
equally hard for children to understand. Empirically data that make the clear linguistic difference 
between beliefs and desire mushy are a serious threat to linguistic determinism (see data from 
Mandarin and German). Also the fact that different studies find different aspects of language to be 
the nurturing factor for FB reasoning (Lohmann & Tomasello 2003: discourse and semantics, 
Astington & Jenkins 1999.: general language ability; Hale & Tager-Flusberg 2003: semantics of 
complements; and many more) in contrast to complementation syntax alone is also not helping.  
 
3.9.2 Two camps: what they share, where they differ 
In this chapter we came across two major "camps" that shared an interactional discourse about 
language and theory of mind. On the one hand we have linguistic determinism, most prominently 
represented by Jill de Villiers, and on the other hand representationalist views denying language the 
crucial status, represented by Josef Perner and his colleagues.  
A) Similarities 
The two different frameworks that were extensively discussed in this chapter more or less agree 
on the following points. 
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a. Age: both de Villiers and Perner assume a drastic change in children's cognitive 
understanding (ToM) around the age of four – according to them FB reasoning only 
emerges around this age. In other words both frameworks negate the possibility of 
ToM being innate; it emerges stepwise in the course of development. Other 
frameworks claim differently (see above): innativism and early development within 
the 1st year of life are common theories aside the main linguistic determinism 
discussion. 
b. Domain specificity: both de Villiers and Perner share the view that ToM is not a 
domain specific module, they deny ToM the module-specific feature of being 
impenetrable. The substantial changes within a child's ToM can only happen because 
of "domain general changes in understanding perspective" (see Perner et al. 2005).  
 
B) Differences 
The substantial divergence between linguistic determinism and Perner's view is the role of 
language for Theory of Mind. In short, Perner and his colleagues are convinced that language merely 
provides the scaffolding for ToM in language input for children and in expressing cognitive 
progressions. Linguistic determinism on the other hand is known for putting language first, in the 
chronology of development as well as in the relevance for Tom development. 
 
In chapter 4 we will attempt a thorough and critical analysis of linguistic determinism. This critical 
review will contain a closer look at experiment design and conduction in this interface of research, a 
commentary on complement syntax in general and it will focus on studies and theoretical arguments 
that were dismissed by linguistic determinism but reveal interesting insights and new perspectives on 
our issues. Furthermore we will get to see studies that tap ToM abilities in toddlers (from 15 months 
onwards) which is contradicting both Perner's and de Villiers' claims. 
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4 Discussion and Criticism 
 
In this chapter we will evaluate linguistic determinism in three blocks: in the first section we will 
look at data that constitute potential threats to the theory. In the second section we will analyze the 
methods for ToM and language assessment to see if their design and conception are adequate a) for 
the test subjects (children) and b) for the competences that were intended to be assessed. The last 
block will deal with conceptual assumptions that are relevant for linguistic determinism and the 
related problems that arise or remained unanswered and neglected.  
 
4.1 Empirical Issues – Data 
4.1.1 Theory of Mind in young Toddlers and infants – spontaneous response tasks 
It is clear that young infants cannot be tested for ToM in a verbal way. Joint attention behaviors 
are assessed by analyzing behavioral cues and eye gaze, but for FB understanding it has always been 
assumed that children definitely do not have a command of it as even linguistically advanced children 
(3 to 4-year-olds) could not master standard tasks. Representatives of the innateness hypothesis of 
ToM though insist that even FB reasoning is existent in infants in some form. In order to assess FB in 
infants and toddlers the established testing methods needed to undergo a drastic redesign because 
the standard tasks are not adequate for infants. This is when spontaneous-response tasks entered 
the picture: anticipatory looking (AL) and violation-of-expectation tasks were adapted to test infants' 
mental understanding. In AL tasks children's eye gaze is tracked to see where they expect the agent 
to look for his object (all the experimenter says is something like "I wonder where he will look"). In 
violation-of-expectation tasks children are also exposed to transfer tasks but here both the expected 
as well as the unexpected outcome are enacted and looking times are compared. For both methods 
it is vital that true and false beliefs resp. expected and unexpected outcomes are compared and 
investigated because only contrasting the looking times can lead to meaningful results.  
4.1.1.1 Beginnings of spontaneous response tasks 
The first attempt to assess children's mental understanding completely non-verbally took place 
relatively early: Clements & Perner (1994) conducted an experiment with toddlers aged 2;11 to 3;7 to 
see if their AL would give insight into earlier forms of FB understanding than expected (i.e. younger 
than 4). They found that indeed according to their looking patterns children expected the agent of 
the story to look in the belief-consistent location, but they nevertheless failed verbal follow-up 
95 
 
questions. The authors assumed that some sort of implicit FB understanding might be active, but 
concluded that it is not a full-fledged ability. After that the FB understanding assessment in young 
toddlers was neglected again; only in the early 2000s the issue reappeared: Garnham & Ruffman 
(2001) wanted to prove that AL is actually a genuine measure for FB understanding and to do so they 
had to overrule two common alternative interpretations of AL. The first is that AL merely reflects the 
understanding of the causal relation seeing = knowing, in an unexpected transfer task the child might 
look to the empty container (i.e. the previous location of the object) because she expects the agent 
to do the wrong thing (instead of assigning a think-state to him). The other assumption the authors 
had to overcome was the associative strategy hypothesis that says that the child forms an association 
bundle of agent, location and object and therefore expects this association to reappear as soon as 
the agent comes back. In their experiment the authors used three instead of two hiding locations for 
their unexpected transfer task: one location would be the old one (i.e. the agent's one, the FB 
location), one would be the new location (the actual location the object has been moved to) and the 
third location would either remain completely neutral or, more importantly, would be a location that 
the agent interacts with prior to and independent of the object being hidden in a different location. 
Indeed, their results proved them correct. First of all, no matter if children failed all verbal questions, 
just the memory or the FB question or no question at all, in all of these subgroups children looked to 
the correct location way above chance. Garnham & Ruffman ruled out the seeing = knowing 
hypothesis because children did not look at the third irrelevant location. If seeing = knowing and 
therefore not seeing = doing the wrong thing applied, children's expectations would be equally 
distributed between the two empty locations, but children always looked at the location previously 
containing the object. As for the association bias the same conclusion can be made: as the character 
interacted with both the irrelevant location and the one first containing the object, the AL afterwards 
should be equally spread over the two empty locations, but it was not. The authors conclude that AL 
is indeed an expression of implicit and language-independent understanding of FB. 
4.1.1.2 First proof for false belief understanding in infants 
Onishi & Baillargeon (2005) undertook a radically new attempt to assess FB understanding in 
children. The attempt was "radical" in two ways: they explored the options of eye-gaze-tracking as a 
method of proving FB understanding and they looked for that measure in infants as young as 15 
months. The basic principle in eye-gaze tracking is that if a situation takes an unexpected turn the 
looking time increases significantly. In our field this means that children are expected to look longer if 
the protagonist of an unseen-displacement scene searches for the object in the new, actual location 
of the hidden object. Onishi & Baillargeon's assumption that FB understanding exists in infancy 
already is based on studies like the ones mentioned above (i.e. Clements & Perner 1994; Garnham & 
Ruffman 2001); they used a violation-of-expectation method and exposed 15-month-olds to a scene 
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where an actor hides a toy in one of two possible locations (two boxes), then a change that renders 
the actor's belief either true or false occurred and an retrieving action by the agent followed. The 
experiment should show whether the infants would adapt their expectancies to the respective belief. 
Method. Children sat in front of a scene consisting of two boxes (one green, one yellow) behind 
which was an opening that was shut with removable panels. Behind the panels was the actor; she 
would remove the panels or put them back on depending on what was needed for the condition. She 
was hidden completely when the panels were shut. First the initial location of the object and the 
actors' urge to retrieve it were established: the actor played with a toy and then put it in the green 
box. She disappeared; when she came back she would reach into the green box to retrieve the toy. 
Then in a single belief induction trial four conditions of belief were tested: two true belief (TB) and 
two FB conditions. In the first TB condition the object was put in the green box; the yellow box 
moved a bit towards the green box and then back while the actor was watching. In the second TB 
condition the actor watched the object move from the green into the yellow box. In the first FB 
condition again the object moved from the green box to the yellow box, but this time the actor was 
hidden behind the panels throughout the change of location. In the second FB condition the actor 
watched the object move from the green into the yellow box, but then the panels were closed and 
the object returned to the green box. After the belief was induced the children experienced a test 
trial; the actor would reach into one of the two boxes. Half of the test trials were carried out with the 
unexpected behavior, the other half with the expected outcome. The authors expected the children 
to look reliably longer when the actor's expected belief was violated. The authors tested 56 infants (8 
groups á 7 children) in 4 conditions with 2 possible test trials each.  
Results. On all four conditions children expected the actor to behave according to her belief and 
looked reliably longer if the actor searched for the object in the location that violated her belief. So 
irrespective of whether the belief was true or false, the object was believed to be in the yellow or the 
green box, the object was actually in the green or yellow box, the actor searched for it in the 
expected or unexpected location, children's looking times were according to the hiding location, the 
actor's belief and the actor's retrieval action. These results suggest that infants as young as 15 
months already have a representational ToM, even if it is implicit or rudimentary. This extends 
O'Neill's (2005) findings that 2-year-olds can take into consideration the knowledge or ignorance of 
their parents when trying to make them retrieve a toy: Onishi & Baillargeon could prove that young 
children not only take others' ignorance into consideration but even react appropriately when 
someone is mistaken; this exceeds mere keeping track of others' perceptions. The authors plead for a 
mental interpretation of their findings: theoretically, this is grounded on the widespread assumption 
that "children are born with an abstract computational system that guides their interpretation of 
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others' behavior." (p. 257). In development, children rather learn "which states underlie which 
actions" (p. 257), not that these states exist at all. Empirically, these findings lead Onishi & 
Baillargeon to conclude that it is more parsimonious to assume that children assign mental states to 
others that can be shaped and updated by information rather than they create a huge set of 
superficial inferences about perceptions linked to actions.  
4.1.1.3 Review of studies concerning FB understanding in infants 
Baillargeon, Scott & He (2010) reviewed the current situation in research concerning infants' 
ToM and how the assumption that FB understanding is present in infants is corroborated. For FB 
about location their own findings (2005) were confirmed by a violation-of-expectation study by 
Träuble et al. (2010) and by Surian et al.'s (2007) study with 13-month-olds. Song et al. (2008) could 
prove that 18-month-olds are sensitive towards corrective feedback: if the protagonist of an 
unexpected transfer task comes back to look for his object, the experimenter would tell him either 
"The ball is in the cup!" or "I like the cup!". The children were able to detect which utterance would 
correct the agent's FB. In false perception situations the agent has an erroneous conclusion about 
the type of object he or she is facing (similar to the appearance-reality tasks). Song & Baillargeon 
(2008) showed an agent having a preference for a blue-haired doll over a pink stuffed skunk. Both 
objects were hidden in boxes and the box with the skunk in it misleadingly had blue hair on top. 
When the agent came back children as young as 14,5 months expected the agent to look for the doll 
in the box with the blue lock on it. Baillargeon et al. (2010) explain the blatant difference between 
spontaneous-response tasks and elicited-response tasks with the following reasoning: in the latter 
the child has to undergo at least three processes (from Baillargeon et al. 2010: 115 f): 
i) a FB-representation process  
ii) a response-selection process (when asked the test question, children must access their representation of the 
agent's FB to select a response) 
iii) a response-inhibition process (when selecting a response, children must inhibit any prepotent tendency to 
answer the test question based on their own knowledge) 
In contrast Baillargeon et al. claim that spontaneous-response tasks only require the child to undergo 
a false-belief-representation process. They conclude that elicited-response tasks are more difficult 
because executing all three demands at the same time overwhelms children's resources; strikingly, 
neuroscience backs this up: FB-representation is linked to the right temporo-parietal junction while 
for response-selection processes parts of the anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortex are important; 
the neural connection between those regions mature later and more slowly than other connections. 
Startling results could also be found in indirect-elicited-response tasks; Southgate et al. (2010) 
studied 17-month-old infants: the agent hid two different stuffed animals in two lidded boxes and 
then left. Then the experimenter swapped the toys; on return the agent pointed to one box and 
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declared that the toy inside was a 'sefo'. When the child was asked to retrieve the sefo, most 
children approached the other box – they understood that the agent had a FB about the location of 
the toys which made them realize that the agent actually intended to refer to the other toy. This is a 
complex FB situation: the children not only represented the agent's belief correctly, they also used it 
to infer which goal the agent had in mind and how the FB would influence other FBs. 
Perner & Ruffman (2005) account for findings of FB reasoning in infants with primitive event cues 
(see 3.8.1): toddlers form "lower-stimulus associations" between character&object&location and if 
any parameter is changed gaze time increases. But this does not hold water: as long as it is belief-
consistent children do not look longer in Onishi & Baillargeon's (2005) task if the agent looks in the 
yellow box even if she only interacted with the green box before. Secondly, in familiarization events 
where the agent repeatedly only interacted with object A, children only look longer at the first 
interaction with object B if it was left aside in all these events – so children react to the agent's 
preference, not to the new combination of character&object&location. Baillargeon et al. (2010) can 
also contradict other alternative suggestions to their hypothesis, e.g. an ignorance interpretation 
would suggest that an ignorant agent either (a) makes the wrong action or (b) is uncertain in his 
behavior. In an experiment Scott & Baillargeon (2009) showed that children did not expect the agent 
to look in the wrong location (contradicting error) and were not surprised when the agent 
approached one of the two containers confidently (contradicting uncertainty). 
 
4.1.2 Impaired language, intact Theory of Mind? Or: the case of SLI 
As mentioned before, populations that show deviations in language or ToM development are 
highly interesting for investigating causality, influence and correlations between ToM and language. 
Linguistic determinists have already looked into deaf children with and without language delays and 
claim to have found evidence in favor of their framework. Here we will exemplarily look at specific 
language impairment (SLI) which is an isolated, language-specific syndrome; this means that SLI is not 
related to or caused by other cognitive impairments or retardations, neurological impairments, 
anatomical damages like hearing loss, emotional, social or psychological problems or any other 
developmental or intellectual disorders (non-linguistic intelligence usually is within the normal range) 
(cf. Schaner-Wolles 2005: 9). Children with SLI have great difficulty with grammar while semantics 
and pragmatics are usually not affected that strongly. Different classifications can be made (cf. 
Kauschke & Siegmüller 2002): either one linguistic area is affected, all linguistic areas are affected 
equally (and the language equals that of a younger child) or different areas of language are affected 
in different intensities (asynchronously). Furthermore (cf. Swoboda 2006) there is a difference 
between purely expressive SLI (children only having problems in language production but managing 
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language comprehension rather well) or expressive combined with receptive SLI. It is disputed 
whether SLI is merely delayed language development (parallelism and continuity hypothesis) or it 
shows deviations in language acquisition that are not part of normal language development. 
4.1.2.1 Miller's study: a weak language-first hypothesis (?) 
Miller (2001) conducted a study with children with SLI coming from a weak version of the 
"language-first" hypothesis which claims that language is needed to master FB tasks rather than to 
develop ToM itself. The study was conducted with three groups of children: the first group consisted 
of 10 children with SLI, average age 5;6 – their neurological, auditory and social functioning were 
tested to be in the normal range for their age, their language scores had to be below average 
significantly to qualify for the study. The other two groups were control groups: one group matched 
the SLI-children in age (but was otherwise normally developing, i.e. had better language competence, 
average age 5;6) and the other group matched the SLI children in language competence (but was 
otherwise normally developing, i.e. was significantly younger than the SLI-group, average age 3;9). 
Miller tested the children in three rounds, each round containing four different conditions of one 
type of FB task (an unseen displacement task) that differed in the complexity of language and the 
vocabulary (see Miller 2001: 76 ff): 
1) Think-condition: a standard FB task with the FB- question being "Where does [puppet] think the [toy] is?". Urging 
questions like "Which one?" if the child did not respond were used in all conditions, memory check questions ruled 
out chance. 
2) Look-condition: the FB- question was: "Where will [puppet] look for the [toy]?" which is syntactically less complex 
(it doesn't involve a sentential embedding) and could potentially be simpler conceptually because the behavior has 
to be predicted, not a mental state.  
3) Show-condition: this condition is different such that it does not rely on a question-and-answer pattern but rather 
on showing (acting out) what is going to happen. The child receives the puppet and the experimenter says "You be 
[puppet] now. Show me what he'll do/Show me what happens.". So this condition has minimal linguistic demands.  
4) Pretend-condition: as 3-year-olds have a "reality bias" (they tend to answer questions with the truth rather than 
what the question actually interrogates, see e.g. Saltmarsh, Mitchell & Robinson 1995) Miller (following Cassidy 
1998) designed this condition such that the puppet would form a belief about something it pretends about. The 
child was told e.g. about a block that the puppet liked to pretend for it to be either a racecar or a drum. One was 
picked and child, puppet and experimenter engaged in pretending it was e.g. a car. Next the puppet left the room 
saying "Don't change what we're pretending while I'm gone!"; then the experimenter changed the pretense to the 
other object, i.e. drum. After acting out on the new pretense, the puppet comes back and the experimenter asks 
"What does [puppet] think we're pretending the [object] is?" (which is more complex than any other condition). 
Analyzing all three testing rounds Miller comes to the following conclusions: the age-matched 
group performed significantly above chance in all conditions, the SLI-group performed significantly 
above chance in the look- and show-conditions only, the language-matched group did not perform 
above chance in any condition. In the linguistically more demanding conditions (the think- and 
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pretend-conditions) the age-matched group significantly outperformed both the SLI-group and the 
language-matched group, but in the show- and look-conditions the SLI-scores grouped together with 
the age-matched group; both outperformed the language-matched younger children. Miller states 
that "the children with SLI were conceptually more mature than the NDC group [i.e. language-
matched group] but were less able to demonstrate this maturity when the language demands of the 
task were too great." (p. 81). She legitimately concludes that for children with SLI it seems that the 
linguistic demands of a FB task determine whether they can master it or not. She sees this finding as 
corroboration to the weak language-first hypothesis, but this conclusion falls one important step 
short. The results show that children with SLI can master FB situations; their failure does not make a 
statement about their ToM-competence but their linguistic competence to process complex 
structures. The conclusion that Miller should have drawn is that her data contradicts linguistic 
determinism. De Villiers and others criticized two points with SLI-data: 
1) SLI is generally described to be an impairment that mostly affects morphology and other 
domains of language, but not (complex) syntax, so SLI-children are actually not impaired in 
the linguistic domain relevant for linguistic determinism 
2) Miller did not measure the sentential complementation-competence of her probands 
But both these attempts to nullify Miller's findings can be overridden by one very robust finding in 
Miller's data (which is the most important finding in this study): children with SLI could not master 
the think-condition which means that they have no (full) command of belief-language and even more 
importantly, of sentential complementation. The fact that they actually passed low-verbal conditions 
with the same cognitive complexity as the high-verbal condition cannot be accounted for by linguistic 
determinism. Finally, from my point of view the "weak language-first hypothesis" is in fact not a 
hypothesis at all: to claim that a verbal test needs linguistic skills in order to pass it is tautological and 
does not show any theoretical commitment or value. It is indeed mysterious why researchers not 
only admitting to this fact but even showing data that prove only this language effect and no other 
linguistic influence on ToM stick to the claim that there is a theoretical hypothesis behind their 
findings which is what Miller does. After all, we are not trying to find out who is best at the tests we 
design; we try to design tests that assess the processes in our brain best and most directly.  
In a later study Miller (2004) assessed children's competence in sentential complementation and 
she found that children with SLI all perform poorly on sentential complementation but could still 
solve the low-verbal FB tasks. Miller analyzed spontaneous language data and added a complement 
comprehension test to her test battery, but this test again based on representation-reality-
discrepancies which are the core of FB understanding and therefore not fit to test language 
competence independently. Miller did find correlations between FB understanding and linguistic 
101 
 
competence but the main observation (children with SLI and poor complementation competence can 
pass FB tasks if the linguistic demands aren't too high) remained the same. 
4.1.2.2 Swoboda's findings on SLI and Theory of Mind 
Swoboda (2006) attempted to shed light on the language-ToM-interface by investigating 
(Austrian German-speaking) children with SLI and, based on the assumption that SLI is an impairment 
affecting both language production and perception, wanted to show that success or failure on 
standard FB tasks is dependent on language comprehension (a similar claim was made by Miller 
2001). Swoboda claims some relevant linguistic issues children with SLI suffer from:  
- Children with SLI generally neglect the prefield of the sentence and therefore have problems 
with processing question words correctly (especially crucial in probe questions) and matrix 
sentences of embedded complementation structures. 
- They have problems mastering questions and WH-pronouns can be found sentence internally 
rather than moved to the left sphere of the sentence in SLI children's utterances (e.g. "die kuh 
wo überhaupt hinghört?" the cow where actually belong.3sg.present).  
- The syntactic operation "move" seems to be problematic for children with SLI, Swoboda refers 
to Van der Lely & Battell (2003) who established that the movement of sentence constituents is 
particularly difficult for children with SLI, they only use it occasionally while in normally 
developing language movement is assumed to be a principle.  
- General problems they have with syntactic configurations: Swoboda observed that verbs are 
often individualized in SLI and the integration of verbs into new contexts goes slowly. Children 
with SLI have problems and delays in the acquisition of finiteness and temporal markings which 
leads to morpho-syntactic problems. Conjunctions and subjunctions are acquired considerably 
later and less reliably, this makes it difficult to represent complex syntactic structures correctly.  
The prediction linguistic determinism would have to make is that considering these linguistic 
limitations children with SLI are not able to master FB reasoning. According to Swoboda studies 
concerning ToM and language in children with SLI could not present decisive data yet; a study 
mentioned in Harris (2005) by Van der Lely, Hennessey & Battell (2002, unpublished) apparently 
provides evidence that children with SLI master FB without the command of complementation. De 
Villiers, Burns & Pearson (2003) though claim the opposite. To prove that ToM development is not 
significantly determined by the acquisitions of complementation Swoboda used ToM tests based on 
Wellman & Liu's (2004) scaling of ToM tasks and several means of language assessment methods. 
She investigated two hypotheses: 1) SLI children's ToM does not deviate significantly from normally 
developing children, i.e. linguistic determinism is wrong 2) the acquisition of complement structures 
is not of direct causal effect for the development of ToM. 
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Experiment. For language testing Swoboda used a quantitative lexicon assessment test (Aktiver 
Wortschatz Test für 3-6jährige Kinder, Kiese & Kozielski 1996); a language development test with a 
subtest for language understanding (SETK 3-5, Grimm, Aktas & Frevert 2001); a screening procedure 
for phonological and phonetic aspects (SVA, Hacker & Wilgermein 2001); a test for nonverbal 
intelligence assessment (CMM, Bondy, Cohen, Eggert & Lüer 1975) and finally an extensive elicitation 
test for sentences with that-complements with the verbs denken (think), wissen (know), glauben 
(believe), wollen (want), sagen (say) and sehen (see) as a control. In this test children are confronted 
with a leading in of a sentential complementation structure, i.e. the experimenter leads with the 
matrix clause e.g. "Die Sarah will aber, …" and then the child is urged to finish the sentence, so a) the 
child does not have to repeat something she heard earlier and b) there is no complementizer in the 
lead-in, so a full complement is not the only grammatically correct option. Children have different 
options for answering (Swoboda 2006: 162):  
a) Correct or incorrect with an embedded clause (correct: "Anna denkt, dass die Mama nichts sieht" incorrect "Anna 
denkt Mama nicht merken") 
b) Correct or incorrect without an embedded clause (correct: "Anna will ein Zuckerl" incorrect: "Mama glaubt krank")  
c) No answer 
For ToM testing Swoboda enhanced the scaling developed by Wellman & Liu (2004). She used 7 
items with increasing complexity (from Swoboda 2006: 164 ff): 
1) Diverse desires: "Look, this is Pauli. He is going to kindergarten and takes a snack with him." Own desire question: 
"What would you prefer? Would you prefer a tomato or a banana?" child e.g. "banana" – "Pauli does not like 
bananas. He prefers tomatoes." Goal question: "Pauli may choose something, what will he pick?"" 
2) Diverse beliefs: "Anna is looking for her bunny. The bunny is either hiding in the house or in the garden" Own 
belief question "What do you think? Where is the bunny? In the garden or in the house?" child e.g. "in the garden" 
– "Yes, you think that the bunny is in the garden, but Anna thinks the bunny is in the house" Goal question: "Where 
is Anna going to look for the bunny? In the garden or in the house?" 
3) Knowledge Access: a neutral white can is presented "What do you think is in the can?" child guesses something, 
can is opened and contents are revealed. "Now Anna is coming" Memory check question "Did Anna already take a 
look inside the can?" Goal Question: "Does Anna know what is in the can?" 
4) Contents FB: a familiar box is presented, e.g. chewing gum "Do you know what is in there?" child "chewing gum" – 
"Open it!" Own belief Question: "What is it? What did you first think? And what is really in there?" Goal Question: 
"If your sister comes in later and we show her the box what will she think is in there?" 
5) Explicit FB: "Pauli is looking for his crayons. They could either be in the schoolbag or in the desk. In reality they are 
in the desk but Pauli thinks they are in the schoolbag." Goal question: "Where is Pauli going to look for the 
crayons?" Reality check question: "Where are the crayons actually?" 
6) Belief-Emotion: in this task the child is informed about the preference of the protagonist for certain food, then a 
box that usually contains this is presented but turns out to contain something else; Memory check question: "What 
does Pezi like so much?" Goal Question: "Is Pezi going to be happy or sad when we give him this box?" and after 
opening the container "Is Pezi now happy or sad?" 
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7) Real Emotion: two protagonists (dolls) are competing and the one fails in fulfilling his previous claims to be the 
faster runner. When he falls, he suppresses his urge to cry/look sad to impress the other character. Goal question 
"What face will Pauli make when he is hurting after falling?" child chooses between three facial expressions "What 
face will Pauli make if Anna should not realize that he wants to cry?" 
Results. The data revealed that both children with SLI and normally developing children (NDC) 
were able to pass ToM tasks up to item 4 (cf. unexpected contents). The scores were: items 1 & 2 
were passed by virtually all children, item 3 passed 97% of NDC and 88% of children with SLI. Item 4, 
contents FB, was passed by 78% of NDC and a significant percentage of 67% with SLI children 
(remember, the verb used in this task is think) and the difference between the scores has no 
statistical significance which is proof for children with SLI having some command of FB 
understanding. Item 5 (explicit FB) was passed by 54% of NDC and 16% of children with SLI. Item 6 
was passed by half of NDC and still 27% of SLI children, and item 7 by 17% of NDC and 6% of SLI 
children. Swoboda claims that the problems children with SLI had with the more complex ToM tasks 
can be lead back to their perceptive language deficiencies. This means that language understanding 
and especially the understanding and correct interpretation of questions is a crucial prerequisite for 
mastering ToM tasks. They could not follow the complex stories and the mere amount of questions 
was too high, their general problems concerning the left sphere of the sentence (see above) and WH-
pronouns had an effect, too. The lower the linguistic demands for a task the more likely it is for 
children with SLI to pass it including full-fledged FB tasks.  
As for the language findings, Swoboda found correct forms of sentential complementation in 
both NDC and children with SLI. This sounds like a confirmation of de Villiers' claims, but a closer look 
reveals that this is not the case. Children with SLI could only score 22% on "glauben, dass" (believe 
that) and 17% on "denken, dass" (think that); the best score goes to "sehen, dass" (see that) with 
33%. Most striking is that out of 8 children with SLI (18 children with SLI participated in total) who did 
not form a single correct that-complement 5 children mastered item 4 of the ToM task (contents FB 
including think); 3 NDC had bad scores on complementation but were able to pass item 4, too. 3 NDC 
had good scores on complementation but did not pass item 4 (contents FB) or any other FB task. 
Moreover, children with SLI only scored 11% on "sagen, dass" which contradicts de Villiers' 
bootstrapping theory (de Villiers 2000; J. de Villiers 2005) because the score on both think, that (and 
believe, that) and know, that are higher, so the idea that the syntax for think is acquired in analogy to 
the structure of say does not hold water. All in all children with SLI did not get higher scores on that-
complements than 33% (with "sehen, dass") which stands in stark contrast to a passing score of 67% 
on the FB task item 4. (It is important to point out though that Swoboda uses elicited data from 
sentence lead-ins that grammatically allowed for structures without any complementation. These 
percentages do not reflect children's mastery of that-complementation in a direct or strict sense. Still 
the distribution of the different complementation types is interesting.) Another observation 
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Swoboda makes (p. 244) is that children with SLI have no problems with the verb last-position but 
they struggle with verb second. Unfortunately she fails to make the conclusions that a) this confirms 
generative grammarians claiming that the underlying (in-situ) position of the verb is verb-last and 
that children who acquire verb-second-languages (like German) have to learn the movement from 
verb last to verb second in matrix clauses (which causes verb second to come later in development, 
see e.g. Rothweiler 1993) and b) based on observation a) she has another piece of evidence for SLI to 
show delayed language development rather than deviant development.  
Swoboda concludes that her data indicate a parallel development of language and ToM. 
Language and cognition-specific capacities can emerge simultaneously, they can at times correlate 
and have reciprocal influences (like e.g. with mental representations), but this does not prove a 
determining relationship. Swoboda states that children with SLI have deficient grammar also 
affecting their syntax. Complementation is often impaired or incomplete, and children use"syntactic 
minimal structures" like: "Die Mama hat gesagt, zsammräumen!" (the mother had said tidy-up.INF), 
"Mama glaubt, krank is" (mother believes ill is), Q: "Was glaubt der Pauli, dass der Wuffi tut?" A: 
"obn is" (Q: what believes the pauli that the wuffi does? A: above/up is.) "Die Kinder wissen, keks hat" 
(the children know.1stPersonPlural cookie has) which are in no way felicitous complement 
constructions, yet in Swoboda's study children with SLI mastered a contents FB task and some even 
an explicit FB task (item 5). Swoboda concludes that language has a structuring function; it helps to 
represent, structure and reflect upon cognitive contents and knowledge. 
 
These studies with children with SLI show that performance demands are highly relevant in the 
investigation of a potential relationship between ToM and language. Both Miller (2001;2004) and 
Swoboda (2006) found proof that children lacking the full-fledged mastery of complementation 
syntax which is the unconditional prerequisite for FB understanding according to de Villiers could still 
pass FB tests if the test design included little linguistic demands.   
105 
 
4.2 Empirical Issues – Experiment Design 
4.2.1 What literature tells us 
The linguistic (see 4.1.2) and general demands (e.g. on attention, executive function, working 
memory, story coherence etc.) of FB tests are most crucial to success or failure in FB understanding 
in preschoolers. Miller (2001) found that the lower verbal demands are the better children with SLI 
will score on FB tests although their language impairments affect exactly those linguistic abilities that 
are considered crucial in linguistic determinism. Swoboda (2006) stripped down FB reasoning tests to 
their minimum whilst maintaining their conceptual intricacies and complexities. The design of 
experiments and tests in the ToM-language-interface has been explicitly criticized but linguistic 
determinism rarely attempted to adapt its test design accordingly. This section will sum up several 
critical stances on experiment design; the criticism is twofold: on the one hand FB tests are too 
demanding linguistically which probably is the major reason for the correlations between language 
and ToM scores. On the other hand the tests for assessing complementation, contain mental 
references and therefore the prerequisite of mental understanding in order to succeed. 
4.2.1.1 The entanglement of linguistic and ToM competences in test design 
A compact overview of what might be wrong with experiment design in the ToM-and-language 
discussion is presented by Adler (2002). She claims that de Villiers' testing methods for complement 
structures "in fact rely upon the child's ToM ability; thus it is neither surprising nor significant that 
scores *…+ are correlated" (Adler 2002: 1; her italics) and that scores on ToM tests might be worse 
than the child's actual understanding due to linguistic limitations. Adler's two major points are that, 
for one, in spontaneous speech data like presented by Shatz et al. (1983) both cognitively and 
linguistically complex utterances with real mental reference can be found in very young children 
(younger than 3 years) e.g. "I thought there wasn't any socks, but when I looked I saw them" and 
"The people thought Dracula was mean, but he was nice." (Shatz et al. 1983: 309) both uttered by a 
toddler aged 2;8. This is proof that children are perfectly capable of establishing mental reference 
more than a year before they start passing standard FB tasks above chance. Secondly, the test design 
of both language and FB assessment methods is criticized. Complementation tasks have two flaws: 
they very often make use of mental state verbs (think or believe) and they "require[d] that the child 
mentally manipulate a representation of reality." (Adler 2002: 5). In a footnote she mentions a fact 
that I want to stress: "Even in the test cases using say, the child must be able to represent and 
manipulate two incompatible versions of reality, a skill which arguably draws upon the same meta-
representational capacity as theory of mind." (Adler 2002: page 5). This, according to Adler, is a 
straightforward explanation as to why the score on memory for complements task is neatly 
106 
 
correlated with the score on FB tasks. The scores on FB tasks in de Villiers & Pyers (2002) not being 
highly correlated Adler takes to be a hint that these tests might not test the same ability.  
4.2.1.2 Manipulating test questions 
Adler found proof for the assumption that wording and linguistic demands of test questions are 
also crucial for FB tests in several sources: Lewis & Osborne (1990) experimented with different 
formulations of test questions and found that integrating "before" into questions in unexpected 
contents tasks enabled children as young as 3 years to pass the task reliably. The authors pointed out 
that a question like "Where will [name of protagonist] look for the object?" (p. 1515) is 
underdetermined concerning its temporal reference; they emphasize that the challenge is the 
spatiotemporal sequence of events because the task here is "the understanding of being in the 
wrong place at the right time" (p. 1515, cf. Chandler 1988). They claim that the question only entails 
implicitly that the child has to judge the protagonist's belief about here and now (e.g. before being 
informed about the actual unexpected contents of a container). This is why the authors paid 
particular attention to the temporal contexts they would use for their FB questions and in which 
syntactic configuration they would present them to three different test groups (from Lewis & 
Osborne 1990: 1516): 
(31) a. Standard FB test group: 
     "What do you/did you think is inside the box?" 
     "What will [name of friend] think is in the box?" 
  b. "When"-group: 
     "What did you think was in the box when the top was still on it?" 
     "What will [name of friend] think is in the box when the top is still on it?" 
  c. "Before"-group: 
     "What did you think was in the box before I took the top off?" 
     "What will [name of friend] think is in the box before I take the top off?" 
The test subjects were divided in three age groups; the results showed that on both the self and 
other question children did significantly better in the before-condition; they performed significantly 
above chance in the second age group (3;6-4 years) and also in the youngest age group more children 
scored correctly than incorrectly which was not the case for the standard and when-condition 
children. Even more so, the incorrect responses on the other-attribution question of standard- and 
when-group children were significantly above chance. The question type was the crucial factor in 
these results. Why the when-condition was harder than the other conditions is not entirely clear to 
the authors but they speculate that the temporal adverb still in the when-condition is difficult for 
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children and the when-question highlights the static container rather than the actions of the 
experimenter and their effects. 
Miller (2001) showed that low verbal FB tasks are easier than highly verbal ones and the choice 
of words matters, too. Miller confronted the children with the following question types: 
(32) a. Where will X look for the toy? 
  b. Where does X think the toy is? 
  c. Show me what X will do/what happens (the child manipulates the puppet) 
On the look and show me-conditions children with SLI scored within normally-developing range 
and only the think question was mastered at or below chance although in all three conditions the 
child has to consider the protagonist's knowledge and belief (more on Miller's study in 4.1.2).  
Another question manipulation got Siegal & Beattie (1991) to achieve better scores with younger 
children: instead of asking "Where will X look for the toy?" they changed the question to "Where will 
the person look first?" (my italics) because in the first question the intention of the experimenter is 
not clear: children might interpret this question to mean "Where will X have to look to find the toy?" 
which would test the child's own knowledge rather than somebody else's wrong mental state. Adler 
hypothesizes that Siegal & Beattie's finding could mean that children assign the modal will a deontic 
or root interpretation instead of an epistemic one which is a common pattern for children concerning 
modals (Adler refers this fact back to Hirst & Weil 1982 and Gee 1985). This would mean that a child 
takes "where will he look" as something that the character needs to obey rather than a guess about 
what might happen. In other words: the deontic reading of a modal refers to permission and 
obligation whereas the epistemic reading has an existential interpretation. If children were to take 
the "will" in FB test questions deontic, this could impact scores on FB testing significantly. Children 
could take "Where will X look for…?" to mean "Where should X look for…?" which concurs perfectly 
with the answers younger children give. Adler points to the assumption that the acquisition of 
modals might actually depend on the acquisition of ToM but this claim has been revoked by Schmitt 
(2006). Nevertheless the mix up of deontic and epistemic readings is crucial to the test results but 
has not been regarded by linguistic determinists so far. Adler suggests reformulating the standard FB 
question with using the phrase "is going to" instead of will because it does not have the distinction of 
deontic and epistemic interpretation, it avoids sentential complementation and mental state verbs. 
On this basis Adler formulates an updated version of an unexpected displacement task in which the 
story's intrinsic motivation for moving the object is more straightforward and the test question is 
"Where is Billy going to first look for his toy car?". 
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Adler also criticizes the status quo of non-verbal tests; she emphasizes how important accessible 
low- and non-verbal tests would be for investigating ToM. The tests have to be more than merely 
language-free, they would also have to be significantly simpler. What Adler criticizes with the 
nonverbal FB tasks (sticker hiding test and appropriate facial expressions test) is that they suffer from 
an "artificial increase in difficulty as a result of avoiding the use of complex language" (Adler 2002: 
12) and generally, that a person might be able to reason about FBs but is not capable of sufficiently 
communicating what they know due to linguistic limitations. The fact that in de Villiers & Pyers' study 
(2001) deaf children of deaf parents' scores on FB tasks drop drastically when looking at the results 
of low-verbal tasks in comparison to their performance on standard verbal FB tasks corroborates 
Adler's speculation that these tests are actually not equivalent to standard tests. 
4.2.1.3 Issues with standard FB tests and their role in ToM assessment 
A meta-view on the FB test is provided by Bloom & German (2000)who claim that the standard 
FB test should be abandoned as a measure of ToM altogether. Their reasoning is that the FB test is 
inherently too difficult to display the actual ToM competence of children. Following Leslie (1994) 
they claim that "beliefs are supposed to be true. This is what they are for" (Bloom & German 2000: 
B27, their italics) which is why even for a child who understands that a belief can be false it is not 
trivial to get the answer right. Useful, simple heuristics that help children process and understand the 
major amount of events in their lives have to be knocked on the head. Their next argument is that 3-
year-olds also fail other representational tasks that do not have any mental reference like e.g. the 
false photograph task. In a study by Riggs et al. (1998) children had to answer a question about an 
alternative state of a present situation (the whereabouts of an object that would have been placed 
differently if some event had not happened) at which they perform poorly even though there is no 
representational content in this task. Older autistic children though pass these kinds of tasks and still 
fail standard FB-tasks indicating that they actually have specific problems with understanding FBs 
which is not what is going on with 3-year-olds. Bloom & German argue that "normal 3-year-olds are 
nothing like older children with autism" (p. B29) in every other social or communicative respect 
(following Happé 1995). Bloom & German claim that 3-year-olds have a ToM meaning that they have 
a general understanding of mental states; the poor performance on FB tasks might be due to task 
demands, the dominance of the main function of beliefs or other related problems. They conclude 
that failing the FB test is not informative about a child's ToM, but they admit to success on FB tests 
might be in another context. Bloom & German emphasize that there is plenty of evidence that 
children can attribute mental states at a very young age, e.g. 2-year-olds can take their parents' 
knowledge into consideration and accordingly use or omit linguistic cues to get them to retrieve a 
desired object (O'Neill 1996;2005). 
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4.2.1.4 The scaling of Theory of Mind-tests by Wellman & Liu 
Wellman & Liu (2004) systematized and categorized FB tests because they found that a lot of 
tests are used synonymously although they actually test different stages of ToM and therefore give 
an awry view on the child's ToM. The authors worked out 7 items for preschoolers to test their 
mental understanding. The mental states Wellman & Liu integrated are desires, emotions, 
knowledge and beliefs. The material in the tasks is pictures in combination with verbal input; the 
questions consisted of a control question and a goal question. The following order of ToM-test-stages 
could be established (for test design see Swoboda 2006; here: 4.1.2.2): 1) Diverse Desires 2) Diverse 
Beliefs 3) Knowledge access 4) FB contents 5) FB explicit 6) Belief-Emotion 7) Real-Apparent-Emotion. 
Their study showed that the scaling gave the expected results and supported the claim that ToM 
development happens in predictable developmental sequences. 
 
4.2.2 Observations and criticism 
Assessing children's abilities and cognitive states probably is the toughest empirical context in 
cognition and linguistics. First of all, it is virtually impossible to engage children in conscious meta-
talk about the ability or state in question. In other words it is of no use to ask a child if he or she 
knows what a sentential complement is or to describe in which way they interpret a sentence like 
that. Secondly, the most common experimental tool – the question – is not very adequate to assess 
children's knowledge because the younger a child is the less language she has at command. Third, a 
child's (linguistic) output is usually ambiguous; what they tell us and the utterances they make are 
fragmentary and theoretically there is no consensus yet what a child's language system actually looks 
like. A child's knowledge and abilities are most implicit and normally children are not aware of what 
they know or are capable of. This means that we need to make use of alternative ways of assessing 
children's brains, take for instance studies that track the child's eye gaze, analyze habituation and 
dishabituation patterns, display and interpret brain activity etc. But still, even these methods leave a 
lot of space for speculation and the majority of researchers looking into cognitive development still 
stick with verbal methods. This is why experiments have to be designed carefully and small mistakes 
can cause serious problems for the credibility of the results, correlations and the conclusions that are 
drawn. In our particular field of research the linguistic aspect is especially delicate: language is not 
merely an error-prone methodological crutch we use for investigating our test subjects, on a 
different level it is also what we actually have to assess independently of the supposedly correlated 
measure. The fact that the experimental methods might be designed such that the assumed 
correlations are circular casts doubt upon that the correlations and relationships that were pointed 
out for language and ToM. Consider the following sequence of inferences linguistic determinism: 
110 
 
(33) a. Children only master FB understanding once they have command of complement 
     syntax 
  b. These complex mental states can only be expressed in complex linguistic  
     structures (see J. de Villiers 2005: 187: "*…+ the reasoning we engage in around the 
     contents of other minds must have the same degree and precision of propositional 
     complexity as is contained in our natural language descriptions of such events. 
     Anything less precise won't fit the bill, that is, it will not allow us to predict  
     behavior.") 
  c. Questions that are aimed at these complex mental conditions can therefore only 
     be asked and answered in complex linguistic constructions  
This is the methodological basis de Villiers and colleagues work with and in step c) it is obvious that 
there are methodological entanglements that potentially have a major influence on the results. One 
major difficulty in linguistic research often is that the target of research is identical with the means of 
scientific investigation and description, so it is necessary to seek largest independence possible. In 
the ToM-and-language interface this translates as: the argumentative basis equals a performance 
demand (i.e. complementation syntax). To be able to make claims about this correlation at all it is 
mandatory to assess FB nonverbally and assess both measures independently. In this section we will 
look at the potential problems in the experiment situation and its conditions, at the make-up of the 
linguistic tests and what they actually measure and at FB tests. 
4.2.2.1 Experiment situations: potential problems 
As mentioned above investigating infants' and toddlers' cognition is a tricky task. Swoboda 
(2006) for instance sums up the most prominent problems for the experiment situation as follows: 
1) children in their 4th year of life are easily overstrained with verbal perception 
2) they rarely manage to realize more than 1 part of the question 
3) young children tend to concentrate on objects and persons rather than stories or processes 
Considering that in the standard FB task a child has to process long stories (especially in the 
unexpected transfer task), that test questions usually consist of syntactically complex, multilayered 
linguistic utterances and that FB reasoning is genuinely based on a sequence of events that are 
interrelated Swoboda's claims constitute profound problems for the average FB task . Some issues in 
the general experiment design of standard FB tests are the following: 
a) Expressing ToM overtly, consciously and linguistically contradicts core ToM because it is 
effortless, fast and unconscious. Obviously there is a difference between the average 3-year-
old and the average 5-year-old as the latter is capable of passing standard FB tests and the 
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former is not, but it is crucial to establish what is actually measured here. The discussion in 
this chapter shows that it most probably is not the core functioning of ToM. 
b) Young children are most likely to report their knowledge, especially if they have just learnt 
something new, in the literature this is called a "reality bias" (Mitchell & Lacohée (1991), 
Russell et al. (1991), Saltmarsh et al. (1995) etc.): children are prone to answer questions true 
to fact (reality) and will try and find the hidden object. This is a problem because in FB tasks 
the correct answer is the one contradicting current reality or knowledge. 
c) At the age at which children are tested for FB reasoning, i.e. around 3 years of life, their 
everyday life relies heavily on routines and rituals and these routines are determined by their 
social environment. Children (at home and e.g. in kindergarten) are encouraged to report on 
what they know and what they have learned. They are eager to answer questions correctly 
and receive positive attention if they do; this is potentially dangerous in FB questions 
especially as young children have a limited command of language, and question structures 
and semantic nuances, sequence of time etc. might not be all that obvious to them. It is 
dangerous to make their answers, behavior, overt reasoning etc. out as biunique. In linguistic 
research child language data is always evaluated as being very ambiguous and fuzzy, e.g. 
"Mama dinkn" (Mum drink.INF) in German can mean: Mum should drink. Mum is drinking. 
Mum wants to drink. Mum is going to drink. Mum, I want to drink. etc.  
d) This speculation about routines is even shown by (probably non-significant, but at least 
observable) tendencies in Schick et al.'s (2007) data: the passing numbers show that hearing 
children are better on verbal tests than they are on low-verbal tests. ASL natives are better 
on low-verbal tasks (and can solve them earlier) than verbal tasks.  
This is not to say that FB reasoning is dependent on social factors or discourse but it is very important 
to distinguish what children are used to (which routines they follow), how they interact, what 
responses they are taught to favor (for instance by positive feedback in the family, from the 
kindergarten teacher etc.). We have to bear in mind that children do not have self-reflection, meta-
knowledge about their knowledge and capabilities and similar tools that help grown-ups overcome 
their intuitive, unconscious reactions and behavior and reflect upon them. 
4.2.2.2 Language assessment: the complement comprehension lie 
The central test for assessing the child's command of complementation syntax is the 
Complement Comprehension task (de Villiers & Pyers 1997). We saw its basic form in (5):  
(5) (story) "The Mom said she bought apples, but look, she really bought oranges." 
 (question) What did the Mom say she bought?  
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In earlier work de Villiers used communication and belief verbs equally for the memory for 
complements task because "this task does not require the child to “read” the character’s state of 
mind, but merely to represent it by holding the sentence in mind and then repeating the relevant 
piece back." (de Villiers & Pyers 2002: 1043). This assumption was backed up by their data: "We 
separated the mental and communication verbs in the Memory for Complements task but collapsed 
across tokens within each type as there were no significant differences." (p. 1045). This means that 
the later adjustments of this test being reduced to communication verbs only for the reason that 
only those don't contain any mental reference were a farce. Fact is that even if one "only" uses a 
communication verb, as long as the proposition embedded under it is false the child must 
understand that a person can bear an incorrect representation of the world. In 4.2.1 we already 
encountered this important aspect of criticism in Adler's (2002) comments. The complement 
comprehension task is most praised by its inventors for exactly one supposed feature: namely its 
total independence of mental reference. If one takes a closer look at this task though, it is actually 
very clear that the assumption this test is based on is wrong: Up to today every complement 
comprehension task consisted of a situation in which somebody says "X" but does "Y" and children 
had to recall what this somebody actually said. The problems start right here with the verb say: In 
numerous works of linguistic determinists we can literally read that communication verbs and belief 
verbs together form a special class of verbs that share one thing in particular: the potential to 
syntactically embed false propositions without being rendered false by it (see J. de Villiers 2005) 
which is syntactically manifest in the PoV-feature that is set to subject-PoV for all non-factive verbs 
like say and think. It is considered a fact in linguistic determinism that the last and most important 
step in FB understanding is when children acquire this PoV-feature. There is even proof from inside 
the linguistic determinism camp that say-complements and think-complements are the same: in 
Lohmann & Tomasello's (2003) training study the sentential complements-only training group was 
divided into communication verbs and mental verbs only to be collapsed again later because there 
was no significant difference in the scores.  
So, what is wrong the complement comprehension task? In all the different scenarios no one 
ever used a true statement to test children's ability for complementation; it is always a false 
statement that needs to be processed by children and this is a major problem: false statements 
(statements that are contradicted by reality or follow-up behavior) can – according to linguistic 
determinism theory itself! – only be understood if children have already acquired the PoV-marker. 
But of course, this discussion is only relevant if we assume the PoV-marker to be real. To put the 
substantial problem discussed here in more general terms, in the common complement 
comprehension task a child has to be able to integrate that somebody can say something that is 
contradictory to reality, or to say it in Adler's words the child has to integrate "incompatible versions 
113 
 
of reality, a skill which arguably draws upon the same metarepresentational capacity as theory of 
mind." (Adler 2002: 5). Children have to be able to understand that an utterance can be false. In 
standard linguistic determinism this property of the complement comprehension task is completely 
ignored, researchers even claim the exact opposite, e.g. Schick et al 2007: "The task in this study 
never requires the child to represent anything about the content of anyone else's mind." (p. 392) 
Furthermore, on a general methodological note, it is not that straightforward that processing a 
question structure (e.g. long distance WH-question) is direct proof for the complete command of a 
related, but different structure (i.e. an embedded complement construction) in child language. From 
a language acquisitional point of view it is mere stipulation that the understanding of one form 
proves the productive competence of another form, after all we are dealing with two different 
syntactic operations and linguistic determinism has failed to attend to the need of investigating the 
relations between these two syntactic structures resp. operations and proving a direct correlation 
between the two competences. Potentially the questions might be even harder for children to 
process than the syntactic form they are derived from. de Villiers (1995b) herself dedicated a book 
chapter to the fact that children have a particularly hard time with long distance WH-questions in 
comparison with other questions; children tend to treat them like they are short distance. 
4.2.2.3 Standard FB tests 
We have already discussed many reasons why the tools to assess FB understanding in toddlers 
should not be language-intensive or probably should not contain any language whatsoever: 
1) To be able to investigate the correlations between language competence and cognitive 
development (e.g. ToM) it is necessary to assess both competences independently and free 
of each another (for the language tests we have already discussed this aspect at length). 
2) Infants and young toddlers (3-year-olds), are still in the process of acquiring language, 
therefore it is not valid to rely on verbal questioning and answering to access a non-linguistic 
cognitive domain, especially if the child's understanding of the relevant questions structures 
is not investigated intensively and could therefore lead to misunderstandings on the child's 
side that are not present in the adult understanding. Moreover, to prove the "linguistic-ness" 
of a cognitive domain it is even more important to get language-independent measures. 
Adler (2002), Lewis & Osborne (1990), Siegal & Beattie (1991), Miller (2001) etc. have 
suggested and shown that changes in the wording of questions have drastic influence on 
performance. 
3) Even if language is necessary to explicitly communicate explicit ToM-knowledge like it is the 
case in the standard FB tests it is not granted that this actually makes a statement about the 
constitution of ToM as such: this might simply be task demand-specific; a basic, if you will 
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implicit, understanding of FB can nevertheless be existent way earlier. I will suggest later (see 
section 4.3) that FB tests actually test an interface ability. 
4) Not all FB tests assess the same kind of FB and they differ in their complexity. The scaling of 
ToM-tasks by Wellman & Liu (2004) and tests with children with SLI show best that not all 
ToM tasks are the same: there is indeed a chronological order according to which children 
acquire ToM (see 4.2.1.4); unexpected contents tasks are mastered by children earlier than 
explicit FB (cf. unseen transfer) or belief-emotion tasks. In 2.2.1 we have discussed the fact 
that passive understanding of FB is categorically different from explanation of FB which again 
differs significantly from predicting behavior based on FB; this is backed up by e.g. Bartsch & 
Wellman (1989). 
It is important to keep one thing in mind: the need for nonverbal assessment methods is crucial. 
The most important reason for this is that one of the biggest quests in ToM-research is to find out 
when children master ToM (especially FB reasoning) or if ToM could be an innate capacity. But in 
order to establish this we will have to test children as young as possible. The linguistic abilities of 4-
year-olds are good enough to have conversations like the ones described in standard verbal FB tasks, 
but the real question is if younger children have the same ToM-competences and if so, when this 
competence really emerges, and if they are hindered by other factors to score correctly on standard 
FB tests. We cannot expect 2-year-olds to stand any chance in a standard verbal FB test because the 
linguistic task demands are simply too high, so with the methodological tools that are currently used 
we cannot honestly assess the 2-year-old's capabilities in this domain. 
4.2.2.4 Nonverbal FB tests 
In linguistic determinism not much emphasis was put on non-verbal FB assessment. If it was 
undertaken at all, it was usually done with the sticker test (cf. Povinelli & DeBlois 1992) that tests 
ignorance-understanding (the child has to decide whether to trust someone who saw the hiding 
process or someone who didn't) and the facial expressions tests in which the child has to assign the 
adequate facial expression in the last scene of a picture story. Several aspects have to be criticized. 
Both nonverbal tests are no real FB tests; the sticker test is rather an ignorance test and more 
importantly there is no FB included and actually no belief in the strict sense at all; the test is even 
counter-intuitive: why would the person who did not see where the sticker was hidden have an 
opinion on where it is at all? And why does this person not follow the knowing person's clue himself? 
Especially for young children competitive behavior is not active yet which was discussed in 3.7.2; the 
facial expression test is rather a test of emotion understanding (the scaling of Wellman & Liu (2004) 
showed that emotion is understood significantly later than FB). Also passing age expresses this: both 
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normally developing children and language delayed oral death children passed this test significantly 
later relative to scores on other FB tests (de Villiers 2000: 113). 
A different attempt at nonverbal tasks came from Pyers (2005) who worked with the Nicaraguan 
1st generation signers. She also used picture completion tasks but instead of focusing on facial 
expressions she let the child choose between two possible pictures that showed the protagonist 
looking in either the old (correct picture) or the new (incorrect picture) location of the hidden object 
an unseen displacement task. Her second nonverbal method was to expose her probands to silent 
videos about FB induced behavior and then let them narrate the videos. If the crucial words and 
linguistic constructions were not included in the narratives, the experimenter tried to elicit them with 
questions. It is important to emphasize that in this special case Pyers was working with teenagers 
and adults which changes the prerequisites for test explanation and meta-communication. 
The nonverbal tests used are not fit to be equivalents to standard FB tests. If we consider the 
problems verbal FB tests cause we would expect for the nonverbal tests to be better and more 
reliable (and less distorted by external effects like language) but as results have shown so far, these 
tests are harder for children. First of all, as experimenters cannot use language to explain and 
highlight what is going on, the nonverbal tests are even more complex and take longer. This is 
probably because what researchers tried was to do the standard tests without verbal explanations. 
Instead, we would need a new way of assessing the cognitive competence of children. To do this, 
tests cannot be based on children's answers any more – the alternatives are: 
- Spontaneous-response tasks rather than elicited response tasks e.g. observe (track) and 
analyze children's eye gaze. Onishi & Baillargeon (2005) have already shown how this can be 
done and conducted full-fledged FB tests devoid of any language, linguistic cues and 
linguistic answers with 15-months-olds; Garnham & Ruffman (2001) provide evidence that 
anticipatory looking (AL) is a robust and reliable measure of FB understanding. 
- Analyze children's spontaneous behavioral and linguistic reactions – this might only be an 
option for older children (infants will not show facial expressions for e.g. surprise as clearly as 
3-year-olds do) but still this could be an auxiliary method to see what behavior children 
willingly accept (e.g. looking in the old location of the object because the protagonist has a 
FB) and what they will protest to or be surprised and puzzled about. 
- Triggering spontaneous behavior – like the study by O'Neill (1996) showed it is possible to set 
up contexts in which children will naturally attend to others' mental states (Children needed 
their parents' assistance to fetch a stuffed animal from a high shelf. Depending on whether 
the parent saw before which object is the relevant one and where it is children adapted their 
requests to the knowledge of their parent.   
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4.3 Conceptual Issues 
4.3.1 Language and Thinking 
The question if language and thinking are one and the same thing or if they are at least 
connected in some way has concerned scholars probably forever. In linguistic research there are 
famous examples of scientists trying to argue that it is language that determines our thinking; the 
Sapir-Whorf-hypothesis for instance claims that the categories language provides form people's 
thoughts and as Pinker (1995) summed it up it relies on oft-quoted factoids collected by Whorf and 
colleagues, like "the languages that carve the spectrum into color words at different places, the 
fundamentally different Hopi concept of time, the dozens of Eskimo words for snow" (Pinker 1995: 
57). Pinker provides a plentiful of antidotes to being drawn into the magic of Whorf's exotic 
kaleidoscope of linguistic orchids. He reminds the reader that we all know the feeling of coming to a 
halt in the middle of writing a sentence because it does not quite express what we wanted to say; 
that usually we remember the gist of stories or films rather than word-by-word-summaries; that like 
in Orwell's horror vision of the brainwash by Newspeak politicians use euphemisms on a daily basis 
but that "once a euphemism is pointed out, people are not so brainwashed that they have trouble 
understanding the deception" (Pinker 1995: 59); in the end, that translation from one language into 
another would be virtually impossible if Whorf's hypothesis was correct. Apart from these pieces-of-
wisdom Pinker also calls upon some hard facts. The fact that specific colors are labeled differently in 
different languages and therefore grouped together in different ways (just think of the spectrum 
between green and blue) was interpreted as proof that language determines our concept-formation. 
Pinker points out that for physiologists this assumption is null and void because it is not the 
continuous and boundary-less wavelengths that determine how we perceive colors but it is three 
different kinds of cones located in our eyes and that "it would seem preposterous to a physiologist 
that [language] could reach down into the retina and rewire the ganglion cells" (Pinker 1995: 62). 
Also, when tested for color prototypes and not shades of one part of the spectrum it turns out that 
all languages differentiate along the same boarders – fire-engine red, grass green and lemon yellow 
are identified equally in experiments. There are plenty of counterarguments concerning the 
mysterious time referencing (or lack thereof) by the Hopi, the outrageous Eskimos'-words-for-snow-
myth etc. but we don't have the space here to discuss them all. In general what we will try to use 
from Pinker's insights for our purposes in this thesis is a) his three examples of language-less beings 
or reasoning and b) his argumentation for why any natural, human language "is hopelessly unsuited 
to serve as our internal medium of computation" (Pinker 1995: 79). But first we should consider the 
stance de Villiers' framework takes on linguistic determinism in the bigger picture and which 
implications are made for language, thinking and the human brain although de Villiers never actually 
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tried to contribute to the bigger picture. For some reason de Villiers insists on her framework proving 
a linguistic determinism but fails to integrate her findings and assumptions into a holistic linguistic 
and/or cognitive and/or neurological understanding. Let's see what this might look like if they did: 
- Linguistic determinism claims that language comes first in (ontogenetic) development; 
language precedes concepts and thinking and determinatively forms them (except for some 
basic object-level categories, see de Villiers' stance in 3.4.2.1) 
- Thinking and reasoning do not have their own "mentalese" or "language of thought" (cf. e.g. 
Fodor 1975, Pinker 1995 etc.), i.e. they do not have their own representational system, which 
ultimately boils down to the conclusion that our thinking and brain do not possess any other 
representational system or means than language.  
- The only relevant way in which competence in FB reasoning is expressed (and therefore 
proven to be acquired fully) is via conscious (and verbal) reasoning (see 4.3.1.3). 
How can we prove that language is not determining thinking? Ethical reasons make it 
impossible to conduct experiments that would bereave human beings of language or deprive 
language-less humans of language, but we can try to assess what is going on in language-less beings; 
Pinker discusses infants, primates and certain mental processes in human adults that cannot rely on 
language: 1) infants show understanding of e.g. number in experiments by Karen Wynn (more on 
mental understanding in infants in section 4.1.1); 2) primates show understanding of relations like "X 
is sister-of Y" in an experiment Cheney & Seyfarth with vervet monkeys; when a male monkey of one 
group attacked the male monkey of another group, a short time later the victim's sister would 
approach the attacker's sister and revenge the attack; 3) in human adults there is certain relations 
whose processing would take longer if it was done in language. If adults have to judge if certain 
depictions of a letter of the alphabet (e.g. "R" and "Я") are the real thing or a mirror image, a slightly 
lopsided or flipped version of it, test subjects report that they mentally rotate the image to get the 
correct judgment; their reaction times corroborate this claim. The degree of change to the verbal 
description of the correct prototypical letter (for this "F" would be something like "an upright spine 
with one horizontal segment that extends rightwards from the top and another horizontal segment 
that extends rightwards from the middle") would predict certain versions of the letter to be 
processed faster than the others but the actual reaction times suggest a different order of difficulty. 
Why is language not fit to rule thinking? In order to find out if language could be the only means 
of thought Pinker assumes thinking to be a processor that creeps over language only able to perform 
certain automated inferences, e.g. if it finds an "X", a "Y" and an "is a" in-between it would map 
everything that is true for "X" onto "Y". Pinker found the following problems (Pinker 1995: 78 fff): 
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- Language is ambiguous. Like in this headline "Drunk Gets Nine Months in Violin Case" 
language contains ambiguity, but the underlying thoughts are never ambiguous, they always 
refer to one meaning. "violin case" here is a law suit concerning a violin, not a container for 
it. The ambiguity lies in language, thought does not suffer from this impreciseness. 
- Language lacks logical explicitness. In Pinker's example (cf. Drew McDermott) the two 
premises lead to conclusions that are not expressed in language: 
(34) Ralph is an elephant. Elephants live in Africa. Elephants have tusks. 
The intelligent reader knows that there is only one Africa that all elephants live in, but that 
each elephant has its own, discrete tusk. A Turing-like inference-making device could not 
deduct this from the language given above. 
- Linguistic co-reference is not logically well-defined. The fact that we can call one and the 
same man "a tall blonde man with glasses", "the man" and "him" is possible in language only; 
the brain has to find a way to treat the three expressions as one and the same thing. A 
related problem is linguistic deixis, e.g. the indefinite determiner "a" and its definite 
counterpart "the" can refer to the same thing or two different entities depending on the 
context. The phrases "killed a policeman" and "killed the policeman" can denote the same 
but in the right context they refer to two different policemen. Compare (35a) and (35b): 
(35) a. "A policeman's 14-year-old son *…+ opened fire from his house, killing a policeman 
     and wounding three people *…+" 
 b. "A policeman's 14-year-old son *…+ opened fire from his house, killing the  
    policeman and wounding three people *…+"            (Pinker 1995: 80) 
Although the policeman in (35a) is not identified precisely it cannot refer to the teenager's 
father which is the exact opposite of what (35b) denotes. Pinker emphasizes that "a" and 
"the" don't have a particular meaning in "one's permanent mental database" (Pinker 1995: 
80) and are meaningless outside of a particular context; they are "conversation-specific". 
- Synonymy is not reflected in thinking. We understand that sentences like (36) 
(36) a. "Sam sprayed paint onto the wall." 
 b. "The wall was sprayed with paint by Sam." 
denote one and the same state in the world, but a simple processor would not be able to find 
that out. Something else must represent this and it cannot be through (a variation of) (36).  
Pinker concludes that even if mentalese looks a bit like a language (it probably has symbols and 
certain ways to arrange them) it would still be simpler in some ways and richer in others.  
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4.3.1.1 Representations 
Representations play a major role in the discussion about ToM. Representationalists like Perner 
(e.g. 1991) assume that FB understanding depends on meta-representational structures while de 
Villiers assumes that the representations crucial for ToM are of linguistic nature and that FB 
understanding is the understanding of misrepresentations. Smith et al. (2003) manage to contradict 
de Villiers' stance and expand Perner's. They present evidence that FB reasoning in fact can be 
correlated with mastery of relative clauses; de Villiers argues that "complex sentences of different 
forms won't suffice, because each individual proposition is true (or irrealis), for example in *…+ 
relative clauses" (de Villiers & Pyers 1997: 136), i.e. relative clauses as in (37) cannot be false: 
(37) The postman ran away from the dog that bit him.  
But Perner et al. (2003) argue that children not only have troubles understanding misrepresentations 
but also non-false meta-representations (like complex desires, see 3.7.2) which means that children 
actually lack the understanding for meta-representations (constructs that represent both an event 
and the representation of an event). Smith et al. apply this reasoning onto relative clauses and claim 
that they can have the same complexity and are just as difficult for children as sentential 
complements and FB reasoning, namely double event relative clauses as in (38):  
(38) The cow bumped the horse that tickled the cat. 
Hamburger and Crain (1982) claim that children have troubles with sentences like (38) because they 
do not grasp the relative relation but rather interpret it as a coordination like (39): 
(39) The cow bumped the horse and the horse tickled the cat.  
which is incorrect as the fixed chronological sequence of coordinations is not congruent with the 
relative interpretation. In their experiment Smith et al. used the Truth Value Judgment Test (Crain & 
Thornton 1998) in which children had to judge if a sentence that was read to them was congruent 
with a scene acted out in front of them with sentences like: 
(40) The girl kicked the man that jumped over the wall. 
(41) The girl kicked the man that is wearing a hat. 
(42) The girl jumped on the chair and the pig chased the ball.  
(40) is a double event relative clause, (41) a single event relative clause and (42) a simple 
conjunction, and two FB tasks were conducted. The results showed that 3-year-olds did not master 
FB tasks and double-event relative clauses like (40) yet, but they were very well able to interpret 
single event relative clauses (41) and double event conjunctions (42). Both FB and double-event 
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relative clauses were mainly mastered by the age of four years, and even more importantly, the 
scores on FB and double-event relative clauses were significantly correlated. They conclude that "FB 
reasoning depends on the prior acquisition of non-formal rather than formal aspects of linguistic 
structures" (Smith et al. 2003: 1717). With their data proving that certain relative clauses are 
cognitively equal to sentential complements they present evidence that contradicts linguistic 
determinism even stronger than the data with desire-constructions in German (Perner et al. 2003) 
and Mandarin and Cantonese (Tardif & Wellman 2000). They argue that the only common 
denominator for FB understanding, complex relative clauses and sentential complementation is of a 
general-cognitive nature and is probably based on a representational level. 
4.3.1.2 The acquisition of concepts 
To corroborate her claim that concepts cannot be formed pre-linguistically and that the ability to 
conceptualize A-ness versus B-ness is a process of summing up stimuli along a certain dimension (not 
the mere differentiation of stimuli A vs. B) which can only be done by language de Villiers (2000, see 
3.4.2.1) brought the example that readers cannot conceptualize the difference between a list of 
"tight fit" cases vs. a list of "loose fit" cases (a concept active in Korean) if the concept is not 
linguistically highlighted. The problem with de Villiers' example is that she addresses adult readers 
who have completed concept and language acquisition (and whose brain structurally differs from an 
infant's brain) so the reader behaving like she predicts does not prove her point. The only valid 
subjects for investigating conceptual formation and if it is dependent on language are infants. The 
concept of critical age in child language learning is put at stake by de Villiers' argumentation. The 
critical period hypothesis (Lenneberg 1967) says that language acquisition has sensitive phases that 
cannot be repeated or caught up with later (i.e. when the critical period for language acquisition has 
passed certain linguistic elements cannot be acquired natively any more). Second language 
acquisition is proven to take a different course than first language acquisition when it takes place 
after the critical period in development (literature differs as to when the critical period is definitely 
over, the spectrum ranges from 6 years to 13 years); the differences show neurologically, i.e. brain 
activity is different for first and second language acquisition in language production and processing, 
and they show language-internally, i.e. language is not acquired as fast, the acquisition (and probably 
also usage) of a second language (L2) is conscious and an L2 is comparatively deficient or at least 
insufficient with respect to grammaticality intuitions and nuances. This is something we cannot claim 
for concept formation: it seems that concepts, as shockingly new they might seem to the learner, can 
be understood and used productively in our thinking system without delay or limitations once we 
grasped what they're all about. When we learn a second language, to understand and learn the 
concepts this language entertains and expresses is not an insurmountable problem. In English "tight 
fit – loose fit" can only be expressed by a lexical circumscription for each A and each B – there is no 
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abstract linguistic form or regularity for this concept. Nonetheless the concept is understood when it 
is pointed out to an English speaking person, so to form and use a concept we do not need a 
linguistic form. In fact, if we decided to learn Korean we would probably make no mistakes with 
assigning entities to either tight or loose fit but most probably will we struggle with getting the 
linguistic forms right. A native English adult might have problems applying the newly acquired 
concepts in linguistic reality (i.e. in finding the right morphological or syntactical ways of expressing 
the concepts) but the concept of e.g. "tight fit – loose fit" is perfectly understood in no time. If 
concepts are learnt only through language and if language acquisition has sensitive phases how 
would it be possible to even grasp new concepts quickly, easily and without mistakes, independently 
of the developmental state of the learner (i.e. age)? We are very well able to think up new universes, 
parallel worlds etc. without words guiding us. 
Pyers & Senghas (2009) reported that the first cohort of the Nicaraguan signers (remember: they 
started forming their language only after the age of 6, an age that is often considered the first 
important boarder for the critical period in language acquisition) were able to grasp the concept of 
FB after all because they started interacting with the (linguistically superior) second cohort more 
intensely between testing point one (Pyers 2005) and two (Pyers & Senghas 2009). The authors 
reported that the first cohort had also caught up on the linguistic side, i.e. they started using 
complements, too, but at the same time they do not cancel the earlier declaration that first cohort 
signers have an impoverished language system that expresses things holistically and graphically, 
lacking a certain level of system and abstractness. So even if first cohort signers started using what 
resembles the sentential complementation structures of the second cohort signers it is most likely 
that this is not the real, full-fledged, wh-movement-capable thing which is what linguistic 
determinism depends on so desperately but a simpler form with less (abstract) structure in it. If this 
assumption is correct (at this point there is no way of corroborating this statement any further due 
to lack of data) the ability to understand FB emerged differently in the first cohort signers. Even if we 
assume that first cohort signers indeed acquired a relatively full version of complementation, we 
know late language acquisition works differently in the brain; the assumption that two things like L1 
and L2 that activate different regions of the brain, are acquired in different ways and are produced 
and processed differently in on-line language usage could both be the crucial and only possible 
trigger for one certain cognitive concept seems unlikely to say the least. Additionally, let's not forget 
that e.g. Apperly et al. (2006) have shown that a patient suffering from severely impaired grammar 
(aphasia) after his full and typical L1-acquisition was able to pass FB tests which at least shows that 
once ToM is in place it does not depend on language any more. Can we really expect that ToM can 
still develop from scratch in adults just because they learn to use a certain syntactic configuration?  
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Another aspect concerns de Villiers agreeing with Premack (1983) that second order categories 
such as "same", "different", "to the left of" etc. are based on a symbolic medium for their formation. 
De Villiers takes this as strong evidence that language is not only a stimulus for forming concepts but 
indeed the only way of enabling that. What doesn't seem to be taken into consideration is the fact 
that people can have (IQ-independent) problems with applying second order categories although 
their language acquisition was normal. A very prominent example are people with "left-right-
impairment" which cannot be explained by the lack of the corresponding language because the 
labels and linguistic equipment for left and right are usually in place and the concept is understood in 
principle, an example of this effect is dyslexia. How does something like this fit into the picture?  
Let's also consider cultural concepts: if you see a picture of a bunch of ancient Greeks praying to 
a heaven full of gods you might be able to grasp the concept of polytheism even if you had never 
heard of it before. It would probably help if these gods were depicted in an iconic or symbolic way 
but as Pinker (1995) already said mentalese will probably have or rely on symbols just like language 
does; this does not mean that language is the only symbolic code humans possess. As Fodor (1975) 
argued it is conceptually incoherent to assume that language comes first – especially so, if this is only 
assumed for some concepts and some linguistic expressions. If we can use (i.e. repeat) an 
approximate version of a new term, it is for phonetic reasons. Once we start noticing it in meaningful 
linguistic strings we assume that it must have a certain meaning (cf. the Gricean maxim of relevance). 
This is simply not enough to assume that concepts depend on language. 
4.3.1.3 Implicit vs. Explicit Theory of Mind 
If we talk about ToM in general it is most likely to be described as a subconscious, fast and 
effortless ability but as soon as the scientific focus narrows down to how children acquire ToM it 
seems that these characteristics are not relevant or defining for ToM any more, particularly in the 
field of FB reasoning research. In fact what is looked for and tested in children is a very explicit and 
conscious way of reasoning about mental states which is also reflected in the methods and test 
design for assessing this; the fact that linguistic performance demands are discussed as frequently 
indicates that FB reasoning is not assessed in its most natural and straightforward occurrence but in 
a rather mediated one. Interestingly, children are never asked about their knowledge of grammar. 
They acquire, use and know it but nobody would ever try and ask a child how an embedded sentence 
works because we would not get anything out of this, especially not data that should be utilized 
empirically. As it is widely agreed upon that children acquire language unconsciously (even adults are 
usually not able to spontaneously explain their mother tongue's grammar) even more attention 
should be paid to the infant acquisition pattern of ToM. Thanks to the analyses we made in sections 
4.1 and 4.2 we can conclude the following:  
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- The standard tasks used to assess FB reasoning are highly verbal and put a heavy load on 
processing abilities and working memory which is why they probably test linguistic 
knowledge or the interface (the mapping) between language and ToM rather than ToM itself. 
- Delicately designed experiments with infants have shown that there is FB understanding in 
children as young as 13 months who do not have any command of language yet (apart from 
first phonological forms). 
Linguistic determinism tries to get rid of these rather serious threats by claiming that what is found in 
infants is some kind of implicit, rudimentary and instinctive response-pattern that might be a 
preliminary stage of ToM; the idea of implicit ToM is probably modeled on Karmiloff-Smith's (1992) 
theory that what is happening is a developmental process from implicit to explicit knowledge. She 
distinguishes three types of knowledge that develop through a "redescription" process: procedural 
knowledge that turns into implicit knowledge (a form of representation) which develops into explicit 
(conscious) knowledge which usually is verbal. Karmiloff-Smith, too, assumes a substantial change 
around the age of 4, but unlike others she does not assume that at the age of 4 children go from 
having no knowledge or ability to having it, she rather assumes a change in the quality or structure of 
this knowledge. In general it is not clear how implicit and explicit ToM differ and how – if at all – they 
are defined. ToM is usually defined as a way to deal with or manipulate mental states, such as 
represent, conceptualize and reason about them but if we want to make a distinction between an 
implicit (early, subconscious and/or nonverbal) ToM and an explicit (late, conscious and/or verbal) 
ToM we need to be more precise. How does implicit ToM work in the brain if it is indeed not 
representational (in contrast to a representational explicit ToM) which would mean that it only works 
with direct images of reality? In other words, if language implements the necessary structures for 
representation and embedding in the brain, how would a language-less infant be able to process 
anything that is more complex than a 1:1 copy of observable reality? If ToM is dependent on 
language structurally and representationally, implicit ToM either does not exist or has to be 
categorically different from explicit ToM. Both options have been proven wrong. Pinker (1995) 
formulated the most important arguments why language is not fit to be the only representational 
device of thinking (see 4.3.1) and recent experiments with spontaneous-response tasks can put this 
issue to rest. The major criticism of the hypothesis that infants have a full ToM was that it is not 
manifest in any kind of behavior but Southgate et al.'s (2010) study proves that 17-month-olds are 
able to let their implicit reasoning be followed by explicit, active behavior based on that reasoning. 
In section 4.2 we concluded that what is actually tested and therefore what it is that is changing 
at the age of 4 is not a device of ToM itself. It is rather the ability to map cognitive knowledge onto 
language, i.e. an interfacial ability. One reason for this claim are the prominent correlations between 
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performance on language and FB tasks in addition to the effects that linguistic complexity of FB tasks 
has on performance (see 4.2). The second reason is that the fine-grained data we have about infant's 
ToM suggest that everything that is needed for FB reasoning is already there in infants, so what is 
missing until the age of 4 is the ability to externalize the subconscious knowledge. Indeed, we cannot 
deny that something is different between 3 and 4 years of age; after all we find significant 
differences in FB understanding tests. Given the discussion in this thesis though I do not see grounds 
to assume that the ToM-specific knowledge in a 15-month-old is categorically different from the one 
in a 4-year-old; it does not seem reasonable to assume two categorically different stages in children's 
ToM. I propose that the differences captured by FB tests do not tap differences in ToM. 
 
4.3.2 Linguistic Elements – Complements, Features and Mental Verbs 
4.3.2.1 Point of View-Marker 
The PoV-marker is still a powerful detail in de Villiers' theory (see de Villiers & de Villiers 2009); 
according to her the PoV-feature is the most crucial step in the acquisition of the linguistic aspects 
relevant for FB reasoning as it is the semantic-syntactic difference that renders non-factive verbs (say 
and think) unique. In this section we will uncover why there is doubt that this marker actually exists. 
For one, there is no evidence that this PoV-marker is existent and active in grammar and of how it is 
acquired and how it fits into linguistic theory. The only indication of what happens when the PoV-
feature is acquired is given in the verb acquisition path (see 3.7.1.1) but no explicit assumptions or 
evidence are given. De Villiers at no point corroborates the PoV-marker with actual empirical 
evidence for different phases, mistakes with or overgeneralization of rules in acquisition (which are 
common phenomena in child language acquisition). The PoV-marker remains to be mere stipulation.  
Summing up the conceptual make-up of the PoV-marker we can say that it occurs obligatorily on 
every CP as well as every DP. It either has to bear the PoV of the speaker of the utterance which is 
the unmarked case or it bears the PoV of the grammatical subject which is the case for embedded 
complements of non-factive verbs. Apart from that it is unclear how the PoV-feature works: why and 
how only speaker and subject can fill this feature while nothing else can, how this feature is 
"transferred" from the speaker/subject onto the subsequent CPs and DPs, which syntactic operations 
or relations take care of establishing the PoV etc. PoV seems to have different triggers or sources: 
subject-PoV is triggered by non-factive realis verbs (i.e. say, think etc.) which assign the PoV-feature 
to the embedded CP, all other CPs do not need to be assigned a PoV, it is the speaker-PoV by default. 
How is the default PoV, i.e. the speaker-PoV (cf. J. de Villiers 2005) overridden by the verb-assigned 
subject-PoV? If the PoV-feature is always present in all CPs and DPs, why does it only have an impact 
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in a very restricted and marked area and why is only one very specific verb class able to influence it? 
How is the relation between subject/speaker, verb and CP established? A very strange aspect of the 
PoV-feature is that in DPs the PoV can only be changed to subject-PoV if it is an indefinite DP; in 
definite DPs the PoV stays subject-PoV no matter what the embedding verb is or which PoV the 
containing CP has. Let's have a look at de Villiers' example: 
(43) a. PoV-speaker CP [Peter thought PoV-subject CP[that NP
12[a unicorn] was dancing in DP [the 
      garden]]]  
  b. PoV-speaker CP[Peter thought PoV-subject CP [that POV-speaker DP[the mule] was dancing in 
      DP[the garden]]]                (J. de Villiers 2005: 212) 
The context for example (43) is that Peter watches the family's mule who wears an ice cream cone on 
its forehead dancing in the garden which leads Peter to believe that the dancing animal in the garden 
is actually a unicorn (which is a FB). In (43a) the subject-PoV is assigned to the embedded CP and the 
DP "a unicorn" whereas in (43b) it cannot penetrate the DP "the mule". De Villiers refers to the 
difference between "a unicorn" and "the mule" as referential opacity and claims that her theory 
about PoV can explain how referential opacity arises.  But all in all this reasoning seems odd: 
a) The matrix verb is the same in both (43a) and (43b) and should therefore have the same 
effect on what comes "beneath" it; it is a PoV-assigning, non-factive realis verb, namely 
think. 
b) The subject is the same in both (43a) and (43b) and we don't have reason to assume that the 
speakers are different in (43a) and (43b). 
c) The sentences in (43a) and (43b) do not denote the same, so comparing them is not helpful 
d) The DP in (43b) "the mule" is c-commanded by both the matrix verb and the containing CP 
Ad c). De Villiers suggests that (43a) and(43b) are the same in contrast to "Peter thought that a 
mule was dancing in the garden." (J. de Villiers 2005: 212), but if we reconsider (43) it becomes 
obvious that in (43a) the presupposition is "an animal is dancing in the garden", i.e. Peter thinks that 
it is a unicorn but in reality it's a mule with a cone on his head; there is definitely a dancing animal in 
the garden and the FB concerns the nature of this animal. In (43b) on the other hand we are not 
dealing with a different configuration: depending on which constituent we stress we can render 
different presuppositions and subsequent FBs; for instance if we stress "the MULE" it means that 
Peter's false belief actually is "the mule" which in reality is something else like "aunt Berta"; if we 
stress "DANCING" it means that the presupposition is "the mule is currently in the garden" but Peter 
                                                          
12
 De Villiers refers to noun phrases with indefinite articles like as NPs and noun phrases with definite articles as 
DPs which is outdated as both phrases contain determiners which have to be located in D°. Therefore I will 
refer to both instances as DPs because the two notions do not have an impact on De Villiers' reasoning.   
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bears the FB that this mule (not a/the unicorn!) is actually dancing when in reality the mule is just 
trying to stand up. All in all, these two sentences might both be correct, but they are not the same. 
Ad d). It is a fact that the PoV-marker is not overt in language; it is an abstract feature that has 
influence on other syntactic entities, i.e. it has scope over them which in syntax can be established by 
c-command (Reinhart 1976;1983), which is originally defined as follows: 
(44) "Node A c(constituent)-commands node B if neither A nor B dominates the other and 
  the first branching node which dominates A dominates B." (Reinhart 1976: 32) 
where domination is defined as being directly above in the syntactic tree. The concept of c-command 
is used to describe relations and dependencies between constituents in the syntactic configuration. 
For our purposes the prediction is that the PoV-feature has to c-command the relevant constituents 
in order to establish a robust syntactic relation, for a relevant syntactic tree see (45): 
(45)  
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In (45) we find a standard syntactic interpretation of a sentence like (43a) The subject needed for 
subject-PoV is "Peter" located in N° as a child node to the matrix CP. The verb assigning subject-PoV 
in the embedded CP is "think" located in V° in the matrix sentence. In (45) subject-PoV (i.e. Peter's 
PoV) would be assigned to the embedded CP as think is a PoV-assigning verb. Assuming that the PoV-
marker indeed sits in C° we can see that the PoV-marker c-commands everything that de Villiers 
claims to be influenced by the PoV-feature, but also things it should not c-command: in (43b) the 
definite DP "the mule" should have its own PoV-feature but the higher PoV-feature sitting in CP is c-
commanding the DP "the mule" just as it c-commands "a unicorn" and therefore has semantic scope 
over it. As c-command seems like the only reasonable way for the CP's PoV-feature to be passed on 
to the indefinite DP it is completely unclear why it is not passed on to a definite DP. It is already very 
doubtful how the verb alone can attend to its subject and project it onto the CP but if we want a 
definite DP to be immune to what is above it would need a barrier or some other sort of syntactic 
"blocking device" which it does not have. de Villiers never managed to shed any light on the relation 
between the definite determiner and PoV. It is especially unclear how the – as de Villiers calls it – 
"simple NP" which is actually a DP with an indefinite article differs syntactically from a "DP" (i.e. a DP 
with a definite article). The asymmetry that de Villiers is trying to call upon does not exist like that in 
syntax. In the bigger picture it seems weird that this feature would sit in every CP and every DP 
although it is not expressed overtly and does not have any other effect than rendering one special 
subclass of clause non-factive. It seems that linguistic determinism has to look somewhere else and 
apparently they don't even fight it: De Villiers & de Villiers (2009) have "nothing particularly at stake 
in agreeing that Point of View is fundamentally semantic and that the only kind of complements that 
matters is that subtype realis that capture truth in another's mind" (de Villiers & de Villiers 2009: 21) 
all of which does not show in syntax. 
4.3.2.2 Complements 
In the discussion about ToM and language researchers seem to agree on the assumption that FBs 
can be expressed by embedded sentential complements only. We have learned earlier that the roles 
ascribed to this structure differ tremendously throughout the literature: some frameworks merely 
see it as the scaffolding that enables talk about mental states, for others it is the crucial trigger and 
basis for developing ToM. Let's see which aspects are the relevant ones according to de Villiers: 
i) Sentential complementation is the only way to contain meta-thoughts (i.e. propositional 
attitudes) about (false) beliefs linguistically 
ii) All CPs (the abstract projections containing clauses like sentential complements) have a 
PoV-feature which by default bears a speaker-PoV but is altered to subject-PoV when the 
embedding verb is of a particular verb class (non-factive realis verbs like say and think) 
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iii) This special type of sentential complement is syntactically different from other 
complements even when they show accordance superficially, like e.g. complements of 
factive verbs like regret. de Villiers finds proof for that in the fact that long-distance WH-
movement is only possible with non-factive verbs. 
Ad i) Sentential complementation is probably the most common way to express propositional 
attitudes such as FBs. This does not mean though that there is no other way to express them, actually 
we can use several different constructions to contain what needs to be said:  
 (46) a. According to John the iron's plug was pulled when we left. 
  b. John confused the cheese with the soap (that's why he washed his face with it). 
  c. John took the mule with the ice cream cone on its head to be a unicorn. 
  d. Somebody switched the soap with the cheese without John knowing.  
  e. Somebody switched the soap with the cheese and John did not see it.  
  f. It is raining outside. At least John thinks that. 
We can observe that the examples in (46) do not contain any full-fledged sentential complements 
but are perfectly apt to express what is going on taking mental states into account. They might be 
limited in their ability to fully substitute what sentential complements of non-factive verbs can do, 
but the fact that de Villiers' sentential complementation is not so unique after all already weakens 
her point drastically. In (46) f. pragmatics is used to express what sentential embedding does. Even 
though it contains syntactic relations (demonstrative "that" referring to the first sentence) this is not 
sentential embedding and there is no PoV-feature. Last but not least, to claim that all languages have 
sentential complementation with the same power and complexity as in English is a daring claim; but 
even cross-linguistic surveys will probably not change that the claim under i) does not hold water.  
Ad ii) We have already discussed in 4.3.2.1 why the PoV-feature is questionable.  
Ad iii) The most important property of sentential complementation for de Villiers and her 
colleagues is that "verbs of mental state and communication are unique in the complements they 
take" (de Villiers 2007: 1868). At first sight de Villiers is attempting a description of the syntactic 
behavior of mental verbs but actually the claimed uniqueness somehow refers to two syntactic 
domains at the same time and in both cases it is not entirely true. The first domain is syntactic 
behavior of mental verbs. The claim is that verbs like think and say need sentential complementation 
for their syntax but this does not hold water. Simplex syntactic configurations with mental verbs 
might be comparatively rare but it is not hard to come up with examples. Although things like "I think 
blue" or "I'm thinking leather couch" are elliptic in some way or another they are perfectly 
grammatical sentences without the need to implement complementation syntax. With the mental 
verb believe it even gets easier to find examples that can do without sentential complementation:  
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 (47) a. Wir glaubten ihn tot. (German) 
      we thought.1stPerson.PL him.ACC dead = we thought that he was dead 
  b. John believes him to be innocent.  
These examples are not syntactically simplex; generally constructions like (47) are considered to be a 
case of ECM (exceptional case marking): the constituent in italics contains a semantic subject (agent 
theta-role) that cannot receive case from its verb because either there is no verb as in (47a) or the 
verb is infinite as in (47b), so the case is "exceptionally" assigned by the higher matrix verb/sentence. 
What is crucial for us here is that the constituents in italics do not constitute full-fledged syntactic 
complements. Let's see which consequences this has: 
a) Sentences like this don't embed CPs: In sentence (47a) we don't even have a verb in the 
embedded part, this is known as a "small clause"-construction in syntactic theory (a subset of 
ECM-constructions) and the embedded constituent (the one in italics) is usually an Adjective 
or Adverb Phrase, a Noun Phrase etc. depending on the head of the argument.  
b) The embedded arguments don't meet de Villiers' syntactic demands for complements. 
Example (47b) is assumed to not be a full CP with sentential value, and even more crucially it 
lacks what was singled out as a defining element of complements: it lacks finiteness and is 
therefore on the same level as the complements desire verbs take (sic!). This crushes de 
Villiers' theory because the difference between want and think according to her are syntactic 
markers like finiteness (in other languages modality, conditional etc.) and the PoV-marker. 
c) The PoV-marker does not have a site any more. Both (47a) and (47b) are clear-cut cases of 
sentences expressing individual mental states that can potentially be wrong just like any 
think-sentence with an embedded complement. We stated in a) that these sentences though 
lack what a CP. This is the final straw for de Villiers' framework because the CP is where the 
PoV-marker is located. Thus, the sentences in (47) are not allowed to have independent PoV 
or truth values. But somehow, miraculously, these sentences nevertheless manage to 
contain propositions that belong to another possible world or mind than the speaker's. 
The second domain where de Villiers is wrong is when it comes to sentential complements of 
other verbs that are not part of the non-factive realis-verb-class (e.g. regret, forget). De Villiers claims 
that – though superficially concordant – the complement of think and the complement of regret are 
different on a syntactic level (see 3.7.1.1), de Villiers used the following examples: 
(22)  a. She forgot that he arrived late.  
 b. She thought that he arrived late. 
De Villiers claims that as soon as syntactic operations are taken into account the picture changes: 
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(23)   a. * Wheni did she forget that he arrived ti?  
b.    Wheni did she think that he arrived ti?              (J. de Villiers 2005: 194) 
De Villiers thinks that the sentences in (22) only look the same in their S-structure (surface structure) 
but are different in reality (i.e. in their D-structure, the deep structure or the in-situ configuration). 
But this stipulation is problematic. Indeed, the difference in (23a) and  is linguistic reality but the 
inferences de Villiers is drawing are highly doubtful and most probably wrong. First of all, she does 
not state what the syntactic difference between the complement with think and with forget actually 
is. She shows that different combinations and operations are possible with the two, but this does not 
render the examples in (22) to have two different kinds of complements or CPs. Restrictions on 
factive verbs like forget exemplified in (23) are purely semantic restrictions that lead back to the 
concepts of the according verbs. If what de Villiers says were true this would mean that think or say 
and regret can never be conjoined; if they feature different syntactic structures they cannot be 
syntactically merged. But the superficial accordance that de Villiers suggests is not so superficial; take 
into consideration an example like (48):  
 (48) John said and Harry regretted that Mary came. 
Now, it is clear that these examples can only be grammatical if the proposition about Mary is true 
(i.e. that she actually came); if the proposition is false, these sentences crush. The point I make here 
is that if it is the syntax that is different for think and regret, also the sentence in (48) should be 
ungrammatical, but it is not. If we add a context to (48) like "but actually she didn't show up because 
she was ill" the sentences are not acceptable any more. But why is that? Is de Villiers really trying to 
make us believe that the syntax of (48) suddenly changes because of a pragmatics (!) change of 
scene? This seems absurd because if these complements are indeed different in their syntax we 
expect this coordination to be bad irrespective of presuppositions, context and pragmatics. (NB: 
furthermore, the sentence under (48) will have a PoV-feature clash because say requires subject-PoV 
and regret requires speaker-PoV). 
 
Summing up we can say that the major assumptions about complements that carry de Villiers' 
framework of linguistic determinism are highly doubtful if not wrong. In chapter 5 I will give a 
compact overview over the arguments discussed in this chapter and will conclude what these 
arguments can lead us to believe about linguistic determinism.   
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5 Conclusion 
 
5.1 Summary 
 
This thesis served the two aims to both give an exhaustive overview of the starting point, 
development and status quo of linguistic determinism and an in-depth analysis and criticism of the 
framework. After establishing general features of ToM in chapter 2, chapter 3 introduced the main 
ideas of linguistic determinism (especially concentrating on Jill de Villiers' work); a chronological 
progression in describing the framework allowed for presenting the starting point of linguistic 
determinism and the reasons why and how arguments came forward and were developed or 
changed. On the one hand empirical findings led to new research questions and studies, for instance 
the methodological change from longitudinal studies to cross-sectional studies or the focus on 
deviant populations (e.g. deaf populations), and on the other hand criticism from different directions 
triggered new challenges and reformulations of the basic principles that linguistic determinism foots 
upon. In section 3.5 we saw different empirical approaches to proving one and the same claim: that 
language matters essentially for developing FB reasoning and ToM. This chapter also included 
criticism and counter-arguments of linguistic determinism that actually were heard and reacted to by 
the scholars in favor of linguistic determinism. The second and main aim of this thesis was to analyze 
and criticize this linguistic determinism in several dimensions. Data-related, methodological and 
theoretical problems were discussed separately with using both existing literature that was not taken 
into account by linguistic determinism and new observations and arguments that potentially pose a 
threat to the framework. 
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5.2 Conclusion 
 
Considering the arguments, data and theoretical discussions that were laid out in this thesis I 
conclude that linguistic determinism in its present form is a seriously flawed hypothesis and 
potentially wrong and heading for a dead end.. 
Linguistic determinism relies heavily on data and empirical observations. The theory's strongest 
case is data from deaf populations with delayed language acquisition: it seems that both FB tests and 
complementation tests are mastered years later than by normally developing children and the scores 
on FB and language tests still correlate. Preliminary data on language and ToM in adults in de Villiers 
& de Villiers (2009) suggested that language and ToM cannot be processed simultaneously which the 
authors took to be further proof that language and ToM are causally related. I claim though that 
eventually both these empirical correlations can be explained by e.g. a third, linking capability that 
both ToM and language rely on. An alternative explanation of the findings with deaf children will be 
necessary because although every discipline examining children's development struggles with 
interpreting data from infants and toddlers and extracting the kind of information that is meaningful 
to theoretical considerations the latest data from spontaneous-response tasks show that infants 
already have a complex understanding of belief and FB which poses the greatest threat on linguistic 
determinism: the complex language that is claimed to be the unconditional precursor to FB 
understanding is indeed developed and mastered only years after these instances of FB reasoning 
can be found (see 4.1.1). Furthermore data from children with SLI contradict what linguistic 
determinism propagates to be universally true and unconditional (see 4.1.2). 
Taking an even closer look and examining the methodology of obtaining and assessing children's 
ToM and language abilities we found that there are a lot of inaccuracies in the design of tests and 
experiments especially on a linguistic level. Even the slightest changes on the surface in e.g. test 
questions of FB tasks can have major impacts on the scores of preschoolers and the discussion in 4.2 
made clear that tests that rely heavily on linguistic competence or are otherwise highly complex, long 
and/or complicated and straining on e.g. working memory will be failed by infants and young 
children. Considering that the basic assumption that is to be tested in linguistic determinism is how 
much the "pure" ability to understand FB is correlated and relies on language, this is not only a 
dangerous entanglement, experimenting with different experiment designs and situations and 
manipulating test questions etc. led to the insight that performance demands actually have a 
significant impact on test scores. This suggests that the correlations found between FB and 
complementation syntax only show the relationship between performance demands and FB 
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understanding and not the actual linguistic ability in question. When it comes to language testing the 
one major task used for syntax assessing (complement comprehension task) turned out to include 
highly mental contents and story lines and must be excluded as a proper method to assess 
"complementation only". The analysis of the experimental methods strongly suggests that the tests 
and experiments widely used amongst linguistic determinists should be reviewed and adapted 
accordingly. We have to keep in mind that we are not trying to find out who scores best at the tests 
we design; we try to design tests that assess the processes in our brain best and most directly. 
Theoretically, linguistic determinism already lost consistency and strength in the course of time: 
taking into account Perner's and other critics' work de Villiers had to rephrase her argumentation and 
resort to non-structural elements of syntax and non-syntactic elements of language (e.g. semantics) 
more and more; the PoV-feature as such is already a semantic feature that is filled with pragmatic 
contents, with the verb acquisition path and the considerations concerning the difference between 
want and think de Villiers is already right in the middle of semantic reasoning etc. Even if the 
acquisition of such concepts and features is facilitated by syntactic and linguistic cues such as 
syntactic bootstrapping (see J. de Villiers 2005) these syntactic aspects cannot be argued for being 
the central aspect in ToM developing processes. The syntactic configuration is in fact not the one 
feature that singles out the linguistic constructions for false belief reasoning, it is the semantics of 
the verb – in de Villiers' theory it is what the verb fills the PoV-feature with. Apart from the 
arguments speaking against its existence (see 4.3.2.1) the PoV-feature is blind; a container to be 
filled with semantic contents by something else, namely the verb. It is not a syntactic configuration 
that singles out non-factive verbs, it is the semantics of the verbs themselves. Furthermore, in 4.3.2.2 
we established that de Villiers was not able to show how the syntax of "I think that…" is different 
from the syntax of "I regret that…" or even "Ich will, dass…" (German "I want that…") and I claim that 
this is because it isn't different. The difference between these syntactic configurations lies in 
semantics and the conceptual basis and the viable and realistic options these leave for syntax. Even 
more strikingly we found that there are syntactic configurations capable of expressing propositional 
attitudes (constructions with mental verbs) that do not include any kind of syntactic embedding but 
are completely different syntactic structures. Finally, I want to refer back to Pinker (1995) once more 
(see 4.3.1) who shows that expressing and representing are two categorically different things and 
language cannot achieve what mental representations need to achieve. Language is not explicit 
enough, it is imprecise and uses mechanisms that do not suffice to properly contain what humans' 
minds are proven to be capable of.  
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5.3 Outlook 
 
Considering the conclusion drawn in 5.2 I do not see a future for linguistic determinism in its 
present form. The causal relationship between language and ToM has been contradicted for both 
directions (see Schmitt 2006 for contradicting the claim that ToM determines language and chapter 4 
for contradicting that language determines ToM). On a different note of course it is worthwhile to 
proceed investigating the semantic and conceptual intricacies of ToM and its translation into 
linguistic terms and systems. After all, as we have observed in 2.3, there are surprisingly many 
analogies between language and ToM with regards to complexity and temporal, structural and 
thematic aspects. The relationship between thought and language, the friction it causes in everyday 
life and in science, will always be of interest for researchers because it is highly relevant to find out 
how thinking works and how humans handle and express their thoughts and translate them into 
language. One interesting point for future research can for instance be found in the claim made in 
4.3.2.2 that sentences like (48) 
 (48) John said and Harry regretted that Mary came. 
are actually grammatical, contradicting de Villiers' claim that the syntax of non-factive verbs like say 
and factive verbs like regret are categorically different: this is only a preliminary hypothesis that 
needs further testing and theoretical consideration.  
An open issue in the linguistic determinism discussion is the evidence that was collected in 
studies with deaf populations with language delays (de Villiers & de Villiers 2000; Pyers 2005; P. de 
Villiers 2005; Schick et al. 2007 etc.) that all reported a robust and significant delay in both language 
acquisition and FB reasoning and furthermore again showed correlations between the two measures. 
In 5.2 I suggested that this might be an indicator for a third factor that influences both cognitive 
entities; whatever it is that causes this deviation it should be investigated further. In future research 
concerning this issue it would be most important to take the criticism passed in this thesis into 
account and optimize methods and theoretical background. 
Regardless of what happens to linguistic determinism and the related claims the intricacies that 
lie in mental language and its semantics and underlying concepts, the linking between the concepts 
and the language and the friction between mental representations and contents and the way they 
are expressed will always pose a major challenge to science. 
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Abstract (in German) 
 
In der Theory of Mind-Forschung der letzten 20 Jahre prägten Jill de Villiers und Kollegen den 
Begriff des "sprachlichen Determinismus" (linguistic determinism) für ihre Hypothese, dass die 
Fähigkeit zum Verständnis von sogenannten "falschen Überzeugungen" (false beliefs) kausal vom 
erfolgreichen Erwerb und vom aktiven Beherrschen einer gewissen syntaktischen Struktur abhängt 
und bedingt wird: der eingebetteten Komplementsatzstruktur. Diese Hypothese basiert vor allem auf 
empirischen Daten von Studien mit Kleinkindern und Kindern im Vorschulalter und im weiteren 
Studien mit sprachverzögerten tauben Testpersonen, Trainingsstudien u.v.m., in denen statistisch 
und temporal signifikante Korrelationen zwischen dem Meistern von Komplementsatzstrukturen und 
Tests mit falschen Überzeugungen nachgewiesen werden konnten. Seit einiger Zeit erfährt diese 
Hypothese des sprachlichen Determinismus auch Kritik und muss mit Gegenevidenz umgehen, doch 
nur wenige Aspekte der Kritik und problematischen Gegenentwürfe werden tatsächlich von den 
Vertretern des sprachlichen Determinismus aufgegriffen und innerhalb der Theorie behandelt.  
In dieser Arbeit wurden zwei Aspekte erfüllt: zum einen bietet sie einen ausführlichen und 
erschöpfenden Überblick über die Theorie des sprachlichen Determinismus, seinen Anfängen, der 
Evidenz, die zur Argumentation herangezogen wird und der Entwicklung über die mehr als 15 Jahre 
seines Bestehens. Das Hauptaugenmerk dieser Arbeit lag allerdings auf dem Bemühen, den 
sprachlichen Determinismus erstmals auch von einer linguistisch-theoretischen Seite sorgfältig zu 
durchleuchten, die losen Enden der mannigfaltigen Kritik zusammenzufassen und eine umfassende 
Analyse der kritischen Punkte und problematischen Evidenz zu liefern und auf neue Einsichten vor 
allem auf der Ebene der linguistischen Argumentation und Beweisführung erstmals hinzuweisen.  
Die Kritik am sprachlichen Determinismus setzt hierbei an drei Hauptpunkten an: an der dem 
sprachlichen Determinismus widersprechenden Evidenz, die sich in verschiedenen Studien und 
Abhandlungen der letzten 10 Jahre finden lässt, am Experimentdesign sowohl von Testaufgaben im 
Bereich der falschen Überzeugungen als auch von Testaufgaben, die die Kompetenz in 
Komplementsyntax messen sollen und letztlich an den linguistischen Annahmen und Grundlagen, die 
der sprachliche Determinismus annimmt und behauptet.  
Die Analyse zeigte in allen drei Punkten, dass der sprachliche Determinismus in der bisherigen 
Form eine nicht haltbare Hypothese darstellt: Das Verständnis für falsche Überzeugungen ist 
erwiesenermaßen bereits in Säuglingen vorhanden und kann auch von Kindern mit SSES 
(sprachspezifische Entwicklungsstörung) trotz syntaktischen Unzulänglichkeiten erlangt werden. Die 
hohen linguistischen Anforderungen von Testaufgaben für falsche Überzeugungen und der hohe 
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mentale Gehalt von Testaufgaben für syntaktische Kompetenz verfälschen die Ergebnisse und 
bewirken die "stabilen" Korrelationen zwischen den beiden Kompetenzen, auf denen die Theorie des 
sprachlichen Determinismus fußt. Schließlich werden theoretische Grundpfeiler der Theorie ebenfalls 
enthebelt: der "Perspektivenmarker" (point of view marker), den de Villiers als entscheidendes 
Element der Komplementationssyntax angibt, ist an sich ein fragwürdiges und in linguistischer 
Theorie nicht haltbares Konzept; die Behauptung, dass falsche Überzeugungen ausschließlich in 
syntaktischen Konfigurationen mit eingebetteten Komplementsätzen ausgedrückt werden können, 
wurde als falsch identifiziert und die Folgen, die diese Feststellung mit sich bringt, bedeuten auch das 
theoretische "Aus" für den sprachlichen Determinismus. Es bleiben vor allem die Testergebnisse mit 
tauben Testpersonen, die es noch zu erklären und näher zu erforschen gilt, da diese eine besonders 
robuste Korrelation aufwiesen.  
